Martin Levi van Creveld (, ; born 5 March 1946) is an Israeli military historian and theorist.
Life and career Van Creveld was born in the Dutch city of Rotterdam to a Jewish family. His parents, Leon and Margaret, were staunch Zionists who had managed to evade the Gestapo during World War II.
In 1950, his family immigrated to Israel, and Creveld grew up in Ramat Gan. From 1964 to 1969, he studied history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and earned an M.A. From 1969 to 1971, he studied history at the London School of Economics and received a PhD. His thesis was titled Greece and Yugoslavia in Hitler's strategy, 1940–1941.
Van Creveld's doctoral dissertation on Hitler's strategy in the Balkans during the early years of World War II was published as a book in 1973: "Hitler's Strategy, 1940–41. The Balkan Clue." After completing his PhD in 1971, van Creveld returned to Israel and began teaching at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He became a professor in 1988. In 2007, he retired from teaching at Hebrew University, and began teaching at Tel Aviv University's Security Studies Program."Prof. Martin Van Creveld" Tel Aviv University website
Van Creveld has been married twice and has three children. He lives in Mevaseret Zion.
Books Van Creveld is the author of thirty-three books on military history, strategy, and other topics, of which Command in War (1985), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977, 2nd edition 2004), The Transformation of War (1991), The Sword and the Olive (1998) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999) are among the best known. Van Creveld has lectured or taught at numerous civilian and military institutes of higher learning all over the world.
The Transformation of War Of particular significance was his 1991 book The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz (UK: On Future War), which was translated into French, German (including a new German edition in 2004), Russian, and Spanish. In this treatise on military theory, van Creveld develops what he calls his non-trinitarian theory of warfare, which he juxtaposes to the famous work by Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (On War).Major K. M. French United States Marine Corps, "Clausewitz vs. the Scholar: van Creveld's Expanded Theory Of War". Van Creveld argued that Clausewitz's famous "trinity of people, army, and government" Clausewitz, Carl von. On War (1832–34). Book 1, Chapter 1, Paragraph 28 (p.89 in the Howard/Paret translation). was an obsolete socio-political construct centered exclusively on the state, which was rapidly passing from the scene as the key player in war. Clausewitz's entire approach to warfare was thus inapplicable to the study of the new variety of conflicts that face the modern analyst, which typically involve one or more non-state actors. Claiming that he had therefore constructed a new "non-Clausewitzian" model for modern warfare, van Creveld proposed that there were five key issues in any war: By whom war is fought – whether by states or by non-state actors What war is all about – the relationships between the actors, and between them and the non-combatants How war is fought – issues of strategy and tactics What war is fought for – whether to enhance national power or as an end to itself Why war is fought – the motivations of the individual soldier
In making this argument, van Creveld joined a trinity of his own, comprising van Creveld, British political scientist Mary Kaldor, and British military historian John Keegan, often collectively referred to as the leadership of the "New Wars" scholars. Central to the "New Wars" model were several additional criticisms of Clausewitz. They suggested that Clausewitz's best-known aphorism, that war is a continuation of politics by other means, is not only irrelevant today but also inapplicable historically.See for instance John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993), passim.
Concerning the "trinitarian" issues, historian Daniel Moran replied that 'The most egregious misrepresentation of Clausewitz's famous metaphor must be that of Martin van Creveld, who has declared Clausewitz to be an apostle of Trinitarian War, by which he means, incomprehensibly, a war of 'state against state and army against army,' from which the influence of the people is entirely excluded."Daniel Moran, "Clausewitz on Waterloo: Napoleon at Bay", in Carl von Clausewitz and Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815, ed./trans. Christopher Bassford, Daniel Moran, and Gregory W. Pedlow (Clausewitz.com, 2010), p. 242, n. 11. That is, Moran was pointing out that van Creveld had excluded "the people" from Clausewitz's thinking even while alleging that "the people" constituted one-third of the trinitarian concept he was refuting. In his paper 'Tiptoe Through the Trinity, or, The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare,' Christopher Bassford demonstrated that the actual components of Clausewitz's trinity are:
1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force;
2) the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and
3) its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to rational calculation (or, as in a later version of the paper, "mere intellect").
Continuing his critique, Bassford noted that
"One need only read the paragraph in which Clausewitz defined his Trinity to see that the words 'people,' 'army,' and 'government' appear nowhere at all in the list of the Trinity's components.... Creveld's and Keegan's assault on Clausewitz's trinity is not only a classic 'blow into the air,' i.e., an assault on a position Clausewitz doesn't occupy. It is also a pointless attack on a concept that is quite useful in its own right. In any case, their failure to read the actual wording of the theory they so vociferously attack, and to grasp its deep relevance to the phenomena they describe, is hard to credit."
For a broader critique of the "New Wars" writers' treatment of Clausewitz, see Bart Schuurman (University of Utrecht), Clausewitz and the 'New Wars' Scholars, Parameters, Spring 2010, pp.89-100. See also the sixteen essays presented in Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe.
The "New Wars" literature proved useful in identifying some of the general characteristics of wars in the post-WWII and especially the immediate post-Cold War eras. Van Creveld noted that many of the wars fought after 1945 were low-intensity conflicts (LICs) which powerful states ended up losing. The book argued that we are seeing a decline of the nation-state, without a comparable decline in organized violence. Moreover, in his view, armies consistently train and equip to fight a conventional war, rather than the LICs they are most likely to face. Consequently, it is imperative that nation-states change the training of their armed forces and rethink their weapon procurement programs. In a commander's quest for certainty in battlefield information, van Creveld popularized the term "directed telescope" to describe the use of specially selected and trusted officers as special agents or observers for the commander".
The book's contemporary influence is attested to by the fact that, until the middle of 2008, it was included on the list of required reading for United States Army officers, and (with Sun Tzu and Clausewitz) the third non-American entry on the list.Brian Whitaker, "Nowhere to run", 29 November, The Guardian, 2005 After the counter-blast from actual scholars of Clausewitz, however, the "New Wars" critique of his work and its influence largely disintegrated. The idea that states were no longer key players became increasingly irrelevant in the face of renewed competition among the Great Powers after the rise of China and growing international hostility to what was widely seen as Chinese economic warfare against the West.
The Privileged Sex In addition to his books on military history, van Creveld has written several books on other issues. The most prominent of these is perhaps his polemic The Privileged Sex (2013). In the book, van Creveld argues that the systematical oppression of women (as claimed by feminists) is a myth unsupported by any serious data and that across modern cultures women tend to enjoy more social protections and privileges than men do, more than offsetting any disadvantages women faced.
Views on current affairs In addition to writing on military history, van Creveld also comments on contemporary politics.
Israeli military operations In a TV interview in 2002, he expressed doubts as to the ability of the Israeli army to defeat the Palestinians during the Second Intifada:
They [Israeli soldiers] are very brave people... they are idealists... they want to serve their country and they want to prove themselves. The problem is that you cannot prove yourself against someone who is much weaker than yourself. They are in a lose-lose situation. If you are strong and fighting the weak, then if you kill your opponent then you are a scoundrel... if you let him kill you, then you are an idiot. So here is a dilemma which others have suffered before us, and for which as far as I can see there is simply no escape. Now the Israeli army has not by any means been the worst of the lot. It has not done what for instance the Americans did in Vietnam... it did not use napalm, it did not kill millions of people. So everything is relative, but by definition, to return to what I said earlier if you are strong and you are fighting the weak, then anything you do is criminal.Jennifer Byrne, "Interview with Martin van Creveld" 20 March, ABC, 2002Van Creveld viewed the Second Lebanon War as a strategic success for Israel and a Hezbollah defeat. He was also highly critical of the Winograd Commission's report for its failure to note the many successes brought about by Israel's military campaign. He noted that Hezbollah "had the fight knocked out of it," lost hundreds of its members and that the organization was "thrown out of South Lebanon," replaced by "a fairly robust United Nations peacekeeping force." He also noted that as a result of the war, Israel is experiencing a level of calm on its Lebanon border not seen since the mid-1960s. More recently, in an article published in Infinity Journal in June 2011, titled "The Second Lebanon War: A Reassessment", Martin van Creveld argued that contrary to the common view, and despite "clumsy, heavy-handed, and slow" ground operations, the Second Lebanon War was a great victory for Israel. He states that as a result of the war, "since the middle of August 2006, all over southern Lebanon hardly a shot has been fired.""The Second Lebanon War: A Reassessment" , June 2011, Infinity Journal, 2011
In an opinion piece published in The Jewish Daily Forward in 2010, van Creveld argued that the West Bank, far from being vital to Israel's security, is a territory "that Israel can easily afford to give up." Van Creveld contended that the West Bank offers no defense against ballistic missiles from Israel's two chief enemies, Iran and Syria. Furthermore, provided that it would be demilitarized in any future peace settlement with the Palestinians, the West Bank would act as a natural barrier impeding the advance of any army endeavoring to invade Israel by land from the east. Lastly, Israel could defend itself against terrorism from the West Bank by means of a wall coupled with offensive campaigns the likes of Operation Cast Lead and the Second Lebanon War, which successfully restored Israel's deterrence factor when the level of terrorism exceeded what Israel was willing to tolerate.
Iraq and Iran