The First Battle of Grozny was the Russian Army's invasion and subsequent conquest of the Chechen capital, Grozny, during the early months of the First Chechen War. The attack would last from December 1994 to March 1995, which resulted in the military occupation of the city by the Russian Army and rallied most of the Chechen nation around the government of Dzhokhar Dudayev.

The initial assault resulted in considerable Russian casualties and demoralization in the Russian forces. It took another two months of heavy fighting, and a change in tactics, before the Russian Army was able to capture Grozny. The battle caused enormous destruction and casualties amongst the civilian population and saw the heaviest bombing campaign in Europe since the end of World War II.Williams, Bryan Glyn (2001). The Russo-Chechen War: A Threat to Stability in the Middle East and Eurasia?. Middle East Policy 8.1.

Tactics

Chechen units were organized into combat groups, typically composed of around twenty personnel, further divided into three- or four-person fire teams. Each fire team consisted of an anti-tank gunner armed with Russian-made RPG-7s or RPG-18s, a machine gunner, and a rifleman. To effectively engage Russian armored vehicles in Grozny, multiple hunter-killer fire teams coordinated their actions on the ground level, as well as in second and third-story positions and basements. Snipers and machine gunners provided suppressive fire on the supporting infantry, while the anti-tank gunners engaged any armored vehicles.Grau, Lester W. Russian-Manufactured Armored Vehicle Vulnerability in Urban Combat: The Chechnya Experience , Red Thrust Star, January 1997, See section "Chechen Anti-armor Techniques"

The majority of Chechen fighters were irregulars and militia members who operated under the command of their respective leaders, often warlords. This arrangement complicated effective battle coordination for Colonel Aslan Maskhadov, Grozny's Chief of Staff. The Chechen forces, which included foreign volunteers, among them a group of Ukrainian nationalists, had limited access to heavy weapons. They possessed only a small number of T-62 and T-72 tanks, with the bulk of heavy weaponry being utilized by regular forces.

During the initial stages of the conflict, the Russian forces were taken by surprise as they encountered fierce resistance from Chechen combat groups. The armored columns, originally intended to swiftly seize the city, found themselves in a devastating battle reminiscent of the historic Battle of Budapest in late 1944. To address the immediate challenges, the Russian military implemented a short-term strategy by deploying self-propelled anti-aircraft guns such as the ZSU-23-4 and 9K22 Tunguska. These anti-aircraft guns were utilized due to the limitations of the tanks' main guns, which were unable to elevate or depress sufficiently to effectively engage the Chechen fire teams. Furthermore, the machine guns mounted on the armored vehicles proved inadequate in suppressing the simultaneous firepower unleashed by multiple fire teams. As a result, the Russian forces had to adapt their tactics to counter the determined and coordinated resistance put forth by the Chechen fighters.

Subsequently, the Russian forces implemented a strategy that involved reinforcing their infantry presence for a meticulous house-to-house advance within the city. Dismounted Russian infantry provided support to the armored units throughout the operation. To gain an advantage, the Russians strategically positioned themselves at ambush points and lured the Chechen fighters into carefully orchestrated traps by moving their armored vehicles towards them. In a similar fashion to Soviet tank crews during the Battle in Berlin in 1945, some of the Russian armored vehicles were equipped with 'field-expedient' cages made of wire mesh. These improvised structures were mounted approximately 30 centimeters away from the hull armor, aiming to counteract the shaped charges employed by the Chechen RPGs, and provide an additional layer of protection.Beevor, Antony. Berlin: The Downfall 1945, Penguin Books, 2002, pp.316–319 Russian forces proportionally lost more tanks during the battle than they did during the Battle of Berlin in 1945.

Battle

Air and artillery bombings

On 22 December 1994, at 5 am, the shelling of Grozny began, but only on 24 December did the Russian troops begin to drop leaflets from airplanes with explanations for the population. During these shelling and bombings, according to some reports (the Memorial Society, human rights activist S. Kovalev), several thousand civilians died and were injured. Aviation began the assault from the airfields of Yeysk, Krymsk, Mozdok and Budyonnovsk. Due to adverse weather conditions, the effectiveness of aviation operations was low. Simultaneously with the start of air strikes, artillery opened fire. On the morning of 31 December, the United Group of Federal Forces entered Grozny. The so-called "New Year's assault on Grozny" began.

New Year's Eve assault Citizens of the city woke up at 5 am Moscow Time on New Year's Eve to a Russian bombardment. Bombs and shells hit oil tanks on the western side of the city, creating heavy black smoke. The Oil Institute, in the center of the city, was also set ablaze after coming under aerial bombardment, creating more smoke. Pamphlets urging the Chechens to surrender were air-dropped. Early in December, the Russian defense minister, General Pavel Grachev boasted he could seize Grozny in two hours with just one airborne regiment. Before the battle, Grachev said: It is not a question of an assault in the classic sense of the word. What does an assault on a city mean? It means the use of all the forces and weapons in the country's arsenal. It primarily means heavy rocket preparation lasting several hours. It means heavy bombing raids on the whole city with the aim of disabling 60% of the defenders and de-moralizing the rest.

Plan and composition of the Russian Federal Forces

The plan for the Russian Federal Forces—invade the city in three columns: "Northern group", "Western group", and "Eastern group".

Because of unexpected heavy and mobile resistance of the Chechens, this was modified to Russian Federal Forces attacking in four columns: "Group North" (Север) – commanded by General Konstantin PulikovskyColonel Pulikovsky was also as serving commander of the 67 Army Corps. Staging area – in the foothills 3–5 km beyond "Severny" (northern) airfield on the northern outskirts of Grozny Objective – "Severny" airfield and Maskhadov's "Presidential Palace" Approach route – Altayskaya street to Staropromishlovskoye highway to Mayakovskogo street (for 131st MR Br); Khmel'nitzkogo to Pervomayskaya to Ordzhonikidze streets (81st Gd MR Regt.), with the two units converging in the Palace/Railway station area of the east Zavodskoy Rayon (Industrial Suburb) 81st Guards Motor-Rifle Petrokov Regiment (1st and 2nd battalions, Guards Subcolonels Perepelkin and Shilovsky commanding), 90th Guards Tank Division (Commander Colonel Yaroslavetz, Chief of Staff Colonel Burlakov) 3rd battalion, 6th Guards Tank Regiment, Commander Guards Major Zakhryapin 7th tank company – Commander Guards Senior Lieutenant Kovdrya 8th tank company – Commander Guards Captain Vechkanov 9th tank company – Commander Guards Captain Batretdinov Personnel and equipment: 157 officers and 1,174 enlisted personnel, 96 BMPs,Each BMP was issued with extra 500 rounds of ammunition stored on the rear decks of the vehicles. 2 BREM-1 recovery vehicles, 4 pontoon vehicles,The pontoons would be used if the two bridges along the route were destroyed. 5 BRM-1Ks, 4 BRDM-2s,BRDM-2s were left at staging camp with seventeen of their crews. 31 T-80BV tanks,Note – three tanks were attached to each motor-rifle company, and two Tunguska vehicles were attached to each battalion from the 131st brigade, although one was retained at the brigade headquarters. 4 Tunguska SP AA vehicles, and 24 guns. With the invasion of Afghanistan, the regiment was at half-strength, and lacked riflemen. One third of their officers and half of enlisted personnel were reserve with little training for the operation. elements of the 131st Motor-Rifle Krasnodar Brigade (1st and 2nd battalions) (Colonel Savin) Personnel and equipment: 1,469 officers and enlisted personnel, 42 BMPs, 20 tanks and 16 guns 276th Motor-Rifle Regiment (Colonel Bunin) Personnel and equipment: 1,297 officers and enlisted, 73 BMPs, 31 tanks, 24 guns "Group West" (Запад) – commanded by General Objectives – M-29 highway approach to the city, "Lenin Park", and Grozny Railway Central Station Approach route – Industrialnaya street into Mayakovskogo street 693rd Motor-Rifle Regiment 503rd Motor-Rifle Regiment 237th Parachute Regiment "Group North-East" (Северо-Восток) – commanded by General Lev Rokhlin Objective – Central Hospital Complex Approach route – Petropavlovskoye highway 255th Guards Motor-Rifle Regiment 74th Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade 33rd Motor-Rifle Regiment

"Group East" (Восток) – commanded by Major General Nikolai Staskov Objectives – Grozny Airport and covering R-305/R-306 highway junctions Approach routes – Gudermesskaya street and Khankal'skaya street 129th Guards Motor-Rifle Leningrad Regiment 133rd Guards Independent Tank Battalion 98th Guards Parachute Regiment

Russian advance

The Russian armored columns invading Grozny on 31 December 1994, were amalgamated from various army units, including untrained conscripted soldiers. The force's columns aimed to provide blunt firepower, hoping to intimidate the Chechens through the sheer scale of the armored operation. However, all armored and mechanized units were under-staffed and under-trained. Although the Russian forces enjoyed air superiority, weather kept the Russians from using their precision-guided munitions effectively. Advancing troops were supported only by Mi-24 attack helicopters, with the Group East losing five vehicles alone due to a friendly-fire incident by Russian air.The New Year's Attack on Grozny The previous day, the Russian Air Force bombed nearby villagers, including those anti-Dudayev and pro-Russian.The Chechen War: Part II Simultaneously, Moscow made the implausible claim that Chechens blew up buildings in Grozny to simulate bomb-damage by Russian warplanes. From the ground, the assaulting troops were supported by hundreds of artillery pieces positioned on the hills near Grozny, including rocket artillery batteries such as the BM-27 Uragan and BM-21 Grad.

The Plan: Four Russian armored columns were ordered to move in a sudden and co-ordinated attack, and, after defeating all defenders, were to meet at the Presidential Palace in the center of the city. The key to the plan was all four columns reaching the center of the city simultaneously. However, the 19th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) was late arriving to the group West, commanded by Major General Ivan Babichev, and the bloated column could barely move, with disputed reports of friendly artillery fire. In the east, units of Major General Vadim Orlov's 104th Airborne Division did not join the 129th MRR from the Leningrad Military District after they moved on Grozny and were subsequently hit by friendly artillery fire, the 129th Regiment was badly demoralised and retreated the next day without accomplishing much. Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin's forces of the 8th Corps from the city of Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad) attacked the Chechens from the north.