The Clitophon (, also transliterated as Cleitophon; ) is a 4th-century BC dialogue traditionally ascribed to Plato, though the work's authenticity is debated. It is the shortest dialogue in Plato's traditional corpus. It centers on a discussion between Clitophon and Socrates, with Socrates remaining mostly silent. Most scholarship until recently has been concerned with the authenticity rather than the actual meaning and contents of Clitophon.
Clitophon outside of Clitophon
Not much is known about the historical Clitophon. What is known, outside of Plato, is from his presence in Aristophanes' The Frogs and Aristotle's Constitution of the Athenians. Depicted as a student of Euripides by Aristophanes, Clitophon is mentioned in relation to Theramenes, an Athenian politician, in both works. However while these works tell of Theramenes as Clitophon's companion, Bowe mentions Frogs and Athenian Constitution as not accurate reflections of the historical Clitophon, for only Theramenes is referenced in the works and Clitophon's character cannot be decided based solely upon his associations with Theramenes.
As is evident from Plato's Republic and Clitophon, Clitophon was a politician of Athens, active from 411–405 BC, who was an advocate of ancestral law and a companion of Thrasymachus. In the Republic, Clitophon speaks to defend Thrasymachus' position that justice is what is right to the ruling body. Clitophon sticks to this position even when Thrasymachus backs down (340a-340b). This is the only point in which Clitophon speaks in Republic, but it shows his stubbornness and faith in his own opinions. This reluctance to yield is seen in Clitophon as well.
Summary of Clitophon
Opening Socrates addresses Clitophon and confronts him on the rumor of Clitophon censuring spending time with Socrates while praising time with Thrasymachus (406a1-a4). Clitophon claims that he heard incorrectly and that while he did not praise some things of Socrates, he did praise others (406a5-a7). Socrates agrees to listen to Clitophon's side so that he might learn how to better himself by allowing himself be subject to Clitophon's criticism (407a1-a5).
Clitophon's imitation of Socrates' protreptic speeches Clitophon starts off by reminding Socrates that he is amazed by what Socrates says and admires his exhortative speeches (407a6-a8). Clitophon continues by giving examples of speeches, which Socrates has given (407a8-b2).
Speech concerning wealth Socrates states that fathers focus on increasing their wealth while not finding teachers of justice to instruct their sons on how to use their wealth justly (407b2-b6). He is concerned with the traditional education, which emphasizes music, gymnastics and writing, for disharmony stems from the spirit rather than lacking of measure in music (407c1-d2). The fathers respond saying that injustice is a choice rather than a lack of education. Socrates counters this asking why would someone voluntarily do something hateful to the gods. He asserts that if one is willfully unjust, then he would be willing to allow defeat in battle; therefore it is more apt to say that one is involuntarily unjust (407d5-d7). He ends this speech declaring that more care should be given towards this education of justice (407d8-e3).
Clitophon interjects at the end of the first speech to reiterate his admiration of Socrates before continuing onto the second speech (407e3-e4).
Speech concerning knowledge of use Socrates points out that those who exercise the body are caring only for the part that is ruled, while neglecting the soul, which is what rules (407e5-e8). He goes on to say that if someone does not know how to use a tool, such as a lyre, eyes, ears and body, then that person would not know how to use that of his neighbors (407e8-408a4). Rather than using it incorrectly, it should be left alone (407e8-e9). The same concept pertains to the soul. If one does not know how to use their soul, then they should die or submit themselves to a life of slavery and those who are experts should rule (408a5-b3).
Clitophon concludes the speeches and agrees with the content of Socrates' exhortative works, for they wake people as if they were sleeping, and Clitophon has never spoken against them and never will (408c1-c4).
Questioning of Socrates' companions Clitophon wishes to learn what is followed by these speeches by comparing justice, as if an art, to improve the soul as medicine improves health (408c4). He asks if the companions of Socrates are now able to pursue virtue further or if they are merely only able to exhort others (408d3-e2). He compares the care of the body and soul to the care of agriculture. One should not care only for the products of agriculture, but also pay heed to that which improves the body more permanently; therefore one should pay heed to the soul and virtue and seek a device able to secure such virtue (408e5-e10). Clitophon asks the companions what art improves the soul; they respond "justice" (409a2-a6) Clitophon is not satisfied, for with justice as an art, like medicine and carpentry, it must have two effects (409a7-b1). Medicine results in more physicians and health; carpentry results in more carpenters and buildings (409b2-b6). With one result being the perpetuation of the art, justice results in just men (409b6-b8). He then asks for the second result of justice (409b8-b4).
The companions give the answers "the beneficial," "the needful," "the useful," "the profitable" (409c1-c3). Clitophon finds these answers inadequate, for they are not unique to justice but are the results of all other arts as well (409c6-c7). Another answer given is "friendships" (409d4-d6) Upon elaboration, the definition of friendship is narrowed to the agreement of knowledge (409e3-e10). Again, this attribute can be given to other arts as well (410a3-a4). Finally Socrates answers that justice is to harm enemies and benefit friends, then later it seems that just men never injure anyone and do only good (410a8-b2).
Clitophon's defiance and final question Clitophon is frustrated by these responses, or lack thereof, and claims that Socrates is unable to tell him how to attain virtue and justice (410b3-b6). This inability is either from Socrates' ignorance of how to go further than exhorting, or his unwillingness to share such knowledge with Clitophon (410b6-c6). He gives this reason for his association with Thrasymachus and others, searching for definitions and actions toward justice (410c6-c7).
Clitophon asks Socrates one last time about the nature of the body and how to care for it (410c7-d5). If Socrates is able to tell him, then Clitophon will be able to praise Socrates whole-heartedly (410e3-e5). If not, Clitophon asserts that, while Socrates is excellent at creating a desire for virtue, he is an obstacle to those whom he has already inculcated that desire (410e5-e8).
Themes
Protreptic According to Slings, the use of the protreptic in Clitophon is a parody of protreptic literature, which is designed to cause a change in behavior of the listener. Whether or not Clitophon was paraphrasing, Socrates' speeches lack congruence in content with three unrelated exhortations, taking the pattern of the Platonic trichotomy of values. Clitophon employs this pattern with exhortative motifs seen in other dialogues. The beginning of the dialogue is the accusing protreptic seen in Plato's Apology at 29d9-e3. Slings' example of the accusing protreptic is, "you care about the pseudo-Values x, y, not about true Values p, q." Clitophon's first example of Socrates' speech reflects the motifs of wealth from Plato's Euthydemus; gaining wealth has no use without knowing how to use it (280b8-d7), it is better to leave wisdom than money to your children (282a7-8, 301e1-3), not only one's children but oneself should be educated in wisdom (307c3-4). The last motif of slavery is within the second example of Socrates' speeches in which variants are seen also in Plato's Euthydemus (280e3-281e2) and Alcibiades I (117c6-e5), Xenophon's Memorabilia (4.2.25-29), Aristotle's Protrepticus (62-66). What one cannot handle should be left to others or be left alone. The use of the protreptic and protreptic motifs in Clitophon is to prove that explicit protreptic is not advantageous and instead implicit protreptic ought to be preferred.
Justice As Slings mentions, justice is a secondary theme in Clitophon; justice is primarily used to show the ignorance of Clitophon. Clitophon depicts the concentric definitions of justice's results with the latter definition expanding upon the former until the definition is closer to the object in search and aporia, confusion or puzzlement, is reached. However, in Clitophon, aporia is reached prematurely before Socrates gives his definition. The first set of definitions of the result of justice are definitions borrowed from Republic I with some differences; Clitophon lacks "the gainful" and places "the beneficial" at the beginning of the list rather than the end. The second definition of "friendship in the cities" is a common concept in 4th century philosophical literature, but Slings counters that friendship cannot be given as a definition of the result of justice, for it is the parallel to justice. In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, justice and friendship have the same subject and object; therefore they increase correspondingly (1159ab25-26, 1160a7-8). With respect to the third definition, Plato is the first to reject that to be just is to harm enemies and benefit friends. His rejection is due to Socrates' other definition that justice is benefiting everyone; however, this definition is left undeveloped. In the end, these definitions failed to fit into the criteria of an art with two results.
Clitophon's ignorance Clitophon throughout the dialogue displays his own ignorance, whether intentionally or not. Most important to understanding the dialogue is his ignorance of Socrates' speeches, methodology and his own ignorance.
As Moore points out, Clitophon does not understand Socrates' speeches. He paraphrases them, takes them out of context, and implies there was a much larger audience for the speeches than there actually would have been. There is a misrepresentation and misunderstanding of Socrates' definition of justice and the differing means through which Socrates and Clitophon view virtue and justice as being achieved, by speech and deed, respectively. It is possible that Socrates uses protreptic speeches because he sees being just as being the same as having a desire to be just; therefore justice is achieved through speech. Clitophon holds that deeds and actions need to bring about change and make one just. This clear misunderstanding of justice is an example of how Clitophon misunderstands Socrates' speeches, for Clitophon has already been given the answer for how to achieve justice.
Through not understanding his speeches, Clitophon does not understand Socrates' methods. Clitophon tries to make the protreptic speeches of Socrates effectual while in their nature they are solely meant to encourage and cause people to have a desire for justice. Clitophon misunderstands the Socratic method of elenchus, the cross-examination statements of interlocutors. Clitophon attempts to employ elenchus when he had questioned Socrates' companions, but the portrayal of his method when relating the conversation to Socrates is too one-sided with concern only for his answers and paraphrasing that of the others. This leads Bryan to label Clitophon as a pseudo-dialogue through his use of pseudo-elenchus. Having spoken with Socrates on the topic of justice it is clear that either Clitophon was not a receiver of Socrates' elenchus or he did not realize that he had been given the answer to how to achieve justice. Due to Clitophon's desire to be told what to think, this does not make him a proper interlocutor for elenchus.