Kliment Yefremovich "Klim" Voroshilov ( ) (4 February 1881Old Style date 23 January 1881 – 2 December 1969), was a prominent Soviet military officer and politician during the Stalin era (1924–1953). He was one of the original five Marshals of the Soviet Union, the second highest military rank of the Soviet Union (junior to the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, which was a post only held by Joseph Stalin), and served as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the official Soviet head of state, from 1953 to 1960.
Born to a Russian worker's family in Ukraine, Voroshilov took part in the Russian Revolution of 1917 as an early member of the Bolsheviks. He served with distinction at the Battle of Tsaritsyn, during which he became a close friend of Stalin. Voroshilov was elected to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1921, and in 1925 Stalin appointed him People's Commissar for Military and Navy Affairs (later People's Commissar for Defence). In 1926, he became a full member of the Politburo. In 1935, Voroshilov was named a Marshal of the Soviet Union.
At the outbreak of World War II, Voroshilov was held responsible for Soviet failures in Finland during the Winter War and was replaced as Defense Commissar by Semyon Timoshenko. Following the German invasion in June 1941, he was recalled and appointed to the State Defense Committee. Voroshilov failed to stop the German encirclement of Leningrad and was again relieved from his command in September 1941.
After the war, Voroshilov oversaw the establishment of a socialist regime in Hungary. Following Stalin's death in 1953, Voroshilov was appointed Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. His fortunes declined during the rise of Nikita Khrushchev and the Supreme Soviet turned against him. He peacefully resigned in 1960, although he came out of retirement in 1966 and re-joined the party. Voroshilov died in 1969 at the age of 88.
Early life Voroshilov was born in the settlement of Verkhnyeye, Bakhmut uyezd, Yekaterinoslav Governorate, Russian Empire (now part of Lysychansk city in Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine). His father, a former soldier, was employed at different times as a railway worker or miner, and went through periods of unemployment. According to the Soviet Major General Petro Grigorenko, Voroshilov himself alluded to the heritage of his birth-country (Ukraine) and to the previous family name of Voroshylo.Pyotr Grigorenko. "В ПОДПОЛЬЕ МОЖНО ВСТРЕТИТЬ ТОЛЬКО КРЫС..." (In the underground one may find only rats...). Institute "Open society" - Cooperation and Association Fund "Liberty Road". 1981 (Cover of the book )
In his published autobiography, Voroshilov described a childhood of extreme hardship, working from the age of six or seven, and receiving frequent beatings from wealthy peasants, which left him with a lifelong aversion to 'kulaks'. He grew up illiterate, until he was able to enroll in a newly opened school in a nearby village, at the age of 12, and received two years' schooling. During his school years, Voroshilov became a close friend and almost a member of the family of .
In 1896, he started work in a factory near his home village, where he led a strike in 1899. In 1903, he enrolled in a German owned factory in Lugansk (which was renamed Voroshilov during the Stalin era). There, he joined the Bolsheviks, and acted as a strike leader during the 1905 revolution. In April 1906, he travelled to Stockholm for the Fourth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), using the provocative pseudonym 'Volodya Antimekov' or Anti-Menshevik. In Stockholm, he shared a room with the delegate from Georgia, Josif Dzhugashvili, later known as Stalin.
In spring 1907, he travelled to London for the Fifth RSDLP Congress. On his return, he was arrested and deported to Arkhangelsk, but in December he escaped and moved to Baku, where Stalin was also active. Arrested again in 1908, he was released from exile in 1912, and for a time worked in an ordnance factory in Tsaritsyn (Stalingrad/Volgograd).
Russian Revolution and Civil War
Voroshilov was in Petrograd (St Petersburg) during the February Revolution, but returned to Lugansk, where he was chairman of the town soviet, and was elected to the Constituent Assembly. His military career began early in 1918, when he was given command of the Fifth Ukrainian Army, which was made up of a few scattered units, who were driven out of Ukraine by the German army. After a long, hazardous retreat, his group reached Tsaritsyn, where Stalin was posted in summer 1918 as representative of the central party leadership, and where Voroshilov was given command of the Tenth Army. Stalin and Voroshilov led the Red Army's 1918 defense of Tsaritsyn. They also sponsored the creation of the first Red Cavalry unit, commanded by Semyon Budyonny, which was composed chiefly of peasants from southern Russia.Brown, Stephen. "Communists and the Red Cavalry: The Political Education of the Konarmiia in the Russian Civil War, 1918–20" The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan. 1995), p. 88.Barmine, Alexander, One Who Survived, New York: G.P. Putnam (1945), footnote, p. 21. In Tsaritsyn, Voroshilov clashed with Leon Trotsky, the People's Commissar for War, who considered him undisciplined and unfit to command an army, and in October 1918 threatened him with court-martial. Voroshilov was transferred to Ukraine, as commander of the Kharkiv military district, and later People's Commissar for War in the Ukraine soviet republic. He sided with the 'Military Opposition', who opposed the formation of a centralised army, preferring to rely on local mobile units, and objected to the recruitment into the Red Army of former officers from the Tsarist army. Later, during the Polish–Soviet War, Voroshilov was political commissar with Budyonny‘s First Cavalry.
Interwar period
Voroshilov served as a member of the Central Committee from his election in 1921 until 1961. In April 1921, he was appointed commander of the North Caucasus military district. In March 1924, he was promoted to the post of commander of the Moscow military district. In 1925, after the death of Mikhail Frunze, Voroshilov was appointed People's Commissar for Military and Navy Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, a post he held until 1934. Despite the high offices he held, Voroshilov appears not to have been part in the inner leadership. In November 1930, the chairman of the Russian government, Sergey Syrtsov, alleged that a "tiny group", which excluded Voroshilov but included nominally much less senior figures such as Pavel Postyshev, was making decisions "behind the back of the Politburo".
His main accomplishment in this period was to move key Soviet war industries east of the Urals, so that the Soviet Union could strategically retreat, while keeping its manufacturing capability intact. Frunze's political position adhered to that of the Troika (Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Stalin), but Stalin preferred to have a close, personal ally in charge (as opposed to Frunze, a "Zinovievite"). Frunze was urged by a group of Stalin's hand-picked doctors to have surgery to treat an old stomach ulcer, despite previous doctors' recommendations to avoid surgery and Frunze's own unwillingness. He died on the operating table of a massive overdose of chloroform, an anaesthetic. Voroshilov became a full member of the newly formed Politburo in 1926, remaining a member until 1960.
Voroshilov was appointed People's Commissar (Minister) for Defence in 1934 and a Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1935.
The Great Purge
During the first of the Moscow trials, in August 1936, Voroshilov was one of four Politburo members who signed the order that appeals for clemency were to be denied and that the defendants were to be executed without delay. He was also of the main speakers at the March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee, which ended with the arrests of Nikolai Bukharin and Alexei Rykov, whom Voroshilov denounced as "renegades". In the early stages, he seemed to have believed that the purge would not affect the armed forces, and was seemingly unprepared for the arrest of Marshal Tukhachevsky and others in April and May. Voroshilov did not personally share the paranoia towards upper-class elements of the officer corps. He openly declared that the saboteurs in the Red Army were few in number and tried to save the lives of officers like Lukin, who would serve with distinction during the Second World War, and Sokolov-Strakhov, and he was sometimes successful. But on 30 May, he telephoned the commander of the Ukraine military district, Iona Yakir, ordering him to take a train to Moscow for a meeting of the Military Revolutionary Council, knowing that he would be arrested on the way. When the Council met on 1 June 1937, Voroshilov vacated the chair to deliver a report in which he said, apologetically: "I could not believe we would reveal so many and such scoundrels in the ranks of the highest command of our glorious, our valiant Workers' and Peasants' Army."
After that, he played a central role in Stalin's Great Purge of the 1930s, denouncing many of his own military colleagues and subordinates when asked to do so by Stalin. He wrote personal letters to exiled former Soviet officers and diplomats such as commissar Mikhail Ostrovsky, asking them to return voluntarily to the Soviet Union and falsely reassuring them that they would not face retribution from authorities.Barmine, Alexander, One Who Survived, New York: G.P. Putnam (1945), footnote, p. 21. Voroshilov personally signed 185 documented execution lists, fourth among the Soviet leadership after Molotov, Stalin and Kaganovich. He had no problem denouncing officers he disliked such as Tukhachevsky.
Despite taking part in the purging of many "mechanisers" (supporters of wide usage of tanks rather than cavalry) from the Red Army, Voroshilov became convinced that reliance on cavalry should be decreased while more modern arms should receive higher priority. Marshal Budyonny tried to recruit him to his cause of protecting the status of cavalry in the Red Army but Voroshilov openly declared his intention to do the opposite. He praised the army's combined arms warfare capabilities as well as the high quality and ability to take initiative of the officers during the 1936 summer manoeuvers. However he also pointed out issues in the Red Army as a whole in his full report. Among the issues he pointed out were insufficient communication, ineffective staffs, insufficient cooperation between arms, and the rudimentary nature of the command structure in tank units and other modern arms.
When the Great Purge ended, some reforms were undertaken by the high command to reconcile Red Army doctrine (for example deep operations doctrine) with the real state of the Red Army. The politically appointed commanders of the post-purge Red Army saw that the army, especially after the purge, was not suitable to carry out deep operations style warfare. Commanders such as Voroshilov and Kulik were among the instigators of these reforms which positively impacted the Red Army. These commanders themselves turned out not to be able to carry out such operations in practice. Likewise, Voroshilov and Kulik turned out to be unable to institute the necessary reforms. One of the reforms that was implemented was a reorganization of Red Army field units, which accidentally moved Red Army organization to a far less advanced state than it had been in 1936. This reorganization was conceived by Kulik but put into practice by Voroshilov.