The Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati (Pashto/ literally 'State Intelligence Agency', also known as 'State Information Services' or 'Committee of State Security'), better known by the acronym KhAD,https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Articles/Article-Display/Article/2072075/afghanistan-intelligence-war/ was the intelligence and security agency of the former Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
The agency was directed to protect Revolutionary Council of the Republic of Afghanistan and economy interests and to counterinsurgency and counterintelligence within the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. However, the agency pursued a proactive and reactive intelligence policy abroad (especially with neighboring countries) to gather intelligence that may pose a threat to the security of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, as well as conducting special intelligence activities for support military operations of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
KhAD received foreign assistance through the KGB and the Stasi.https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312564461_Why_the_NDS_matters_The_emergence_of_the_Afghan_intelligence_agency_after_911
History Pre-KhAD (pre-1979) Afghanistan had an intelligence agency known as the Istikhbarat (Dari: استخبارات), Intelligence or the Intelligence Report Directorate. However, observers have stated it was incompetent with Afghan leaders since it was ineffective as they preferred to use their personal connections instead. Sardar Abdul Wali, the commander of the 1st Central Army Corps, additionally had his own espionage and secret intelligence network where he prosecuted leftist groups such as the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the supporters of Mohammad Daoud Khan. General Ismail Khan was also noted to have been a part of the Civil Secret Agency (CSA) during the “Decade of Constitution” and reign of Mohammad Zahir Shah.
After the events of the Saur Revolution, the PDPA established AGSA (Da Afghanistan da Gato da Saatane Adara or Afghan Agency for Safeguarding National Interest) as its domestic/foreign intelligence agency with Assadullah Sarwari serving as its first director. Sarwari was known for torturing anyone who disagreed with the PDPA. AGSA operations eventually led to an anti-PDPA insurgency. AGSA additionally had a secret code between members Meera Jan, Fazil Qadir and the head of AGSA’s investigation committee which was intercepted by Rahmatullah Omid, used for killing anyone who the Khalq deemed an enemy. The killings would take place at night. The code was used via telephone and was in the Russian language, with the transcript reading “How’s the weather like? Are we going to shoot, are we going to kill?”.
AGSA was additionally involved in the hangings of Parcham members in 1978 and the executions of the following people:
Colonel Hidayatullah (Head of Operations of the Ministry of Defense) Major Arif Major Khaleelullah (Chief of Staff of the 242nd Parachute Battalion) Major Mohammed Anwar Major Jilani Major Seyair Major Shir Jan (242nd Parachute Battalion officer) Major Sayd Zamanudeen (242nd Parachute Battalion officer) Major Abdul Baqi Captain Mohammed Karim Major Inayat Commander Mohammed Musa (Afghan Air Force and Air Defense commander who received his Chief of Army Staff diploma from the United States) General Mohammed Younus (11th Division Commander) Commander Nowruz (Commander of the 7th Division’s 55th Regiment) General Sayd Abdul Ghani Khan General Mohammed Safar Khan Nuristani General Ahmad Shah Gardezi Lieutenant General Mohammed Musa Nuristani
In September 1979, AGSA was replaced with KAM (Da Kargarano Astekhbarati Moassessa or Workers' Intelligence Institute) under Hafizullah Amin's direction. Several AGSA officials were either placed under surveillance or were arrested. KAM had a total of 7000 employees.
Aziz Ahmed Akbari was called in to take over from Sarwari when he took refuge in the Soviet Embassy.Article title After two months, Assadullah Amin was appointed by his uncle to lead KAM. KAM did not last long after the Soviets officially entered Afghanistan in late December 1979.
KhAD (1980–1986) KhAD was created on 10 January 1980 and was officially announced by President Babrak Karmal, with 1,200 personnel inside the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan who took over intelligence responsibilities from KAM in December 1979, with most of them being pro-Parchamites. The group was known as “the activists” and was active until March 1980, being initially headed by Mohammad Najibullah, alongside Dr. Baha who worked on establishing the structure that would later be referred to as KhAD.
After Soviet troops were deployed in Afghanistan, KhAD was expanded with Moscow's assistance, which includes sophisticated torture equipment. Najibullah took the opportunity of his post to rise within the PDPA before Major-General Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi took over KhAD duties in November 1985. Soviet advisors were known to work alongside KhAD personnel and major decisions are not made without their input. In some instances, KhAD agents accompanied KGB Kaskad (Cascade) operators on anti-mujahideen infiltration ops. KhAD personnel were also authorised to use any strategies necessary to ensure they did not disclose their identities as officers of the agency, as a former KhAD advisor stated that Pakistanis did not want to capture KhAD spetsnaz operatives alive. During an attack on army bases in Keran Valley led by Ahmad Shah Massoud in 1987, a base consisting of 200 soldiers immediately fell whereas 16 KhAD operatives continued to fight to their deaths for six hours. In the aftermath, two leaders committed suicide and one agent was killed which led to 13 operatives finally surrendering.
The agency's manpower increased from 1,200 to nearly 70,000 personnel. KhAD was able to turn some mujahideen groups to work with the PDPA by providing incentives such as small arms or money in return for their loyalty by attending loya jirgas and other pro-PDPA activities.
They've worked with the KGB to fund and assist Murtaza Bhutto for his involvement in the hijacking of Pakistan International Airlines Flight 326 and with Baluchistan and Sind dissidents, according to files obtained by Vasili Mitrokhin from KGB files. KhAD’s infiltration of various mujahideen groups did help to contribute to some of the infighting.
In 1986, KHAD was revamped into WAD.
Recruitment Before KhAD approached potential candidates for the agency’s officer base, they extensively screened the candidate beforehand, as well as secretly probed their entire family. Only PDPA members who were extremely loyal and belonged to pro-government families qualified for admission as officers. Women were also employed as NCOs and officers, although they were underrepresented in senior officer ranks.
Once recruited, KhAD NCOs and officers received intensive training known as Parawachi or Parwareshi and after the training was completed, recruits went through a trial period known as either Azmajchi or Azmayeshi, where they’d have to prove their loyalty by spying on their family members, arresting friends, partners and subjecting them to torture. Over time, the tasks seasoned recruits were asked to perform would only become more intense, being ordered to infiltrate the ranks of the Afghan mujahideen. On their first assignment, the recruits were transferred to KhAD/WAD sections actively engaged in tracking down “subversive elements”. Only those who proved their worth were promoted or transferred to sections with more administrative or technical activities.
Potential applicants may have been prompted to join KhAD as the role of officer provided material benefits, such as a salary ten times higher than that of a government official. KhAD officers were additionally exempt from conscription and had free access to alcohol and even prostitutes. If a KhAD officer was killed in action, their family would also receive financial compensation and benefits from the government. Most KhAD officials came from either Kabul or Parwan, with most of them belonging to the Parcham faction of the PDPA.
Training Kaskad operators were responsible for training KhAD personnel. KhAD officers had to go through a mandatory training course in Kabul where they were taught about military logistics, how to recruit potential officers, organisation and how to identify covert meetings and networks. KhAD officers, starting from first lieutenant to lieutenant colonel, were given mandatory training at the KGB School at Balashikha, Uzbekistan, and other KGB training facilities. Unlike the mandatory training in Kabul, the course in Tashkent included interrogation and criminal investigation techniques. High-ranking KhAD officers, starting from the rank of colonel and upwards, received additional mandatory training in Moscow. Unlike other techniques taught to officers in Kabul, Balashikha and Uzbekistan, the higher-ranking officers would receive training on management and policy issues, as well as financial affairs.
Psychological warfare and state-sponsored terrorism Prostitution spy rings In mid-1985, the Soviet Union and Kabul launched psychological warfare against Pakistan in an attempt to morally destabilize society. As part of this strategy, the KGB and KhAD deployed hundreds of young girls of Central Asian, and Russian origin to corrupt Pakistani society. This influx initially targeted the major urban centers such as Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, Faisalabad, Multan, and Quetta. These groups of prostitutes strategically selected affluent areas in these cities and operated within a well-organized structure. Many of these prostitutes had connections to KGB and KhAD agents, with high-ranking government officials and Pakistan army officers being their primary targets. This led to the emergence of a "galemjum (prostitute) culture" in Pakistani society, which attracted professionals, the local commercial class, and frustrated youth in various urban centers.
State-sponsored terrorism According to a report by the US Defense Department, approximately 90% of the estimated 777 acts of international terrorism committed worldwide in 1987 took place in Pakistan. By 1988, KGB and KhAD agents were able to penetrate deep inside Pakistan and carry out attacks on mujahideen sanctuaries and guerrilla bases. There was strong circumstantial evidence implicating Moscow-Kabul in the August 1988 assassination of Zia ul-Haq, as the Soviets perceived that Zia wanted to adversely affect the Geneva process. WAD/KhAD has also been suspected behind the assassination of Palestinian jihadist Abdullah Yusuf Azzam alongside his son in 1989.Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, New York: Free Press, 2006, p.97
Afghanistan's KhAD was one of four secret service agencies accused of perpetrating terrorist bombings in multiple Pakistani cities including Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, and Rawalpindi during the early 1980s resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties. By the late 1980s, the United States Department of State (DOS) blamed WAD for the perpetration of terrorist bombings in Pakistani cities. Between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, Afghanistan security agencies supported the terrorist organization called al-Zulfiqar, the group that hijacked a Pakistan International Airlines plane from Karachi to Kabul in 1981. Notable attacks include the Karachi Car bombing and an attempted car bombing on the US consulate in Peshawar which ended up killing over 30 people in 1987.
The hathora murders of Karachi