Operation Safed Sagar ( lit. "Operation White Ocean") was the code name assigned to the combined arms operation by the Indian Air Force, supporting elements of the Indian Army during the 1999 Kargil war that was aimed at flushing out regular and irregular troops of the Pakistani Army from vacated Indian Positions in the Kargil sector along the Line of Control.Operation Safed Sagar indianairforce.nic.in It was the first large scale use of airpower in the Jammu and Kashmir region since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.
Background The Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts includes the Kashmir conflict and its subsidiary conflicts such Siachen conflict and Trans-Karakoram Tract, which are the disputed territories of India and Pakistan on the India-Pakistan border. Previously, during the Siachen conflict, Indian forces had managed to dislodge Pakistani troops during a takeover attempt at the Siachen glacier. A ceasefire treaty had been proposed to mitigate further conflict in the area, with negotiations being conducted in Delhi during November 1992. However this agreement was not signed.
Following a series of Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, both nations agreed to sign the Lahore Declaration on 21 February 1999 to prevent a mutually catasrophic arms race and avoid conflict in the region. This was met with dismay by elements of the Pakistani Armed Forces who had in the precending months covertly trained and sent Pakistani troops and paramilitary forces, some allegedly in the guise of mujahideen, into territory on the Indian side of the LOC. The infiltration was codenamed "Operation Badr"; its aim was to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh, and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, thus forcing India to negotiate a more favorable settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute."Kargil: where defence met diplomacy" , India's then Chief of Army Staff VP Malik, expressing his views on Operation Vijay. Hosted on Daily Times"Book review of The Indian Army: A Brief History by Maj Gen Ian Cardozo" , Hosted on IPCSVikas Kapur and Vipin Narang, "The Fate of Kashmir" , Stanford Journal of International Relations
Prelude
Operation Badr The Kargil conflict was triggered in early 1999 by the infiltration of Pakistani troops—disguised as Kashmiri militants—into strategic positions on the Indian side of the line of control which serves as the de facto border between the two countries in the disputed region of Kashmir. During its initial stages, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed the involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces, led by General Ashraf Rashid.Nawaz, Shuja, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, p. 420 (2007)
Initial infiltrations were noticed in Kargil in early May 1999. Because of the extreme winter weather in Kashmir, it was common practice for the Indian and Pakistan Army to temporarily abandon forward posts and reoccupy them in the spring. That particular spring, the Pakistan Army started reoccupying the forward posts well before the scheduled time. In a preliminary step in their bid to capture Kashmir, they reoccupied not only their own posts, but also 132 posts that belonged to India.
By the second week of May, an ambush on an Indian army patrol acting on a tip-off by a local shepherd in the Batalik sector led to the exposure of the infiltration. Initially with little knowledge of the nature or extent of the encroachment, the Indian troops in the area initially claimed that they would evict them within a few days. However, reports of infiltration elsewhere along the LoC soon made it clear that the entire plan of attack was on a much bigger scale.
Operation Vijay The Indian Armed Forces responded with Operation Vijay, a mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops towards the region. However, because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; the scale of most fighting was often at the regimental or battalion level. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 20,000, along with several thousand from the Paramilitary forces of India and the Indian Air Force were deployed in the conflict zone. The intruders were found to be well entrenched and while artillery attacks had produced results in certain areas, more remote ones needed the help of the air force. To avoid further escalation of conflict between the two nuclear-armed states, the Government of India cleared limited use of Air Power on May 25, more than three weeks after first reports, with the instructions that IAF fighter jets will remain within Indian territory to launch attack on intruder's position within Indian territory and IAF was not permitted to cross the Line of Control under any circumstance.
Combat operations
First bombing campaign The Indian Air Force (IAF) had been carrying out routine Electronic intelligence (ELINT), photo and aerial reconnaissance from early May. On May 21, a Canberra PR57 from the 106 Squadron on a reconnaissance mission, flown by Sqn Ldr A Perumal and Sqn Ldr UK Jha, was hit by an Anza MANPADS crew. The plane returned to the IAF base at Srinagar, on one engine and the crew landed safely. The Indian Government, intent on not provoking escalation,thereafter cleared limited use of offensive and full use of defensive Air Power on May 25, restricted entirely to the Indian side of the Line of Control. Srinagar Airport was at this time closed to civilian air-traffic and dedicated to the Indian Air Force.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) flew its first air support missions on 26 May, operating from the Indian airfields of Srinagar, Awantipora and Adampur. Ground attack aircraft MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-27s, Jaguars and helicopter gunships struck insurgent positions.The newly formed squadrons of Su-30MK's which had been only recently delivered from Russia where deployed to Gujarat. Additional units in Srinagar were put on high alert and standby. Initially, the first flights by Fighter units were tasked with conducting air-to-ground live firing drills at a nearby high-altitude firing range, as well as area familiarisation sorties prior to combat. IAF helicopters and transport aircraft also created a larger logistics chain for the Indian Army.
MiG-21's from the 17th Squadron were tasked with Photo reconnaissance while the MiG-23s from the 9th and 221st Squadron conducted airstrikes. Some MiG-21s also were rigged to carry WW2-era 1,000 kilo bombs from the IAF's reserve inventory, which were often used on snow-covered peaks to artificially trigger avalanches. The MiG-21 fleet operated without modern navigation equipment and pilots co-ordinated their missions using commercial handheld GPS receivers, with pilots often calculating lofted bomb trajectories and measured wind directions before dropping their payloads at pre-determined locations. It was the first use of SATNAV systems by any IAF jet and was also used by helicopter pilots. The MiG-21 fleet started operations after May 29 following successful demonstration of their viability in bombing roles. The initial strikes had the Air Defence versions of the MiG-21s and (later) MiG-29s providing fighter cover. However, operating at high altitudes proved extremely challenging for the ageing MiG-21 that formed the backbone of the IAF, limiting its effectiveness as a fighter aircraft. Despite this shortcoming, it remained the most deployed aircraft in the conflict.
Twelve MiG-23's from the No.9 and No.221 squadrons were deployed during this conflict. The MiG-23BNs and MiG-27s made vital contributions towards softening high-value targets in the areas of Muntho Dhalo, Batalik, Drass, Kargil and Mashkoh. IAF MiG-23's flew over 155 missions and flew at the Battle of Tiger Hill utilising their heavy cannons,57 mm rockets and 500 kg bombs to neutralise enemy targets. The MiG-23's would claim the highest bombing rates of any IAF aircraft as they were being the only aircraft type capable of deploying their maximum weapon load at altitude.
Initial IAF losses Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis had been left out of the formal communication loop at the time of detection of infiltrators, with the First bombardment campaign being done with poor intelligence and higher risks. This led to the loss of IAF assets during this period. The Indian Army also was unable in the initial stages of the war to provide proper targeting co-ordinates for IAF attack aircraft.
The IAF was also unable to utilise its fleet of Mil Mi-25 attack helicopters to support Indian army advances because of the extreme altitude prevented it from carrying a useful weapons load. Thereafter, the IAF relied on its larger fleet of Mil Mi-17 transport helicopters,repurposed as gunships and deployed them from Tololing. An additional problem encountered by the IAF was shortage of fuses for its 1,000 pound bombers, which was mitigated by fitting them with a modified pistol cartridge. US-made Paveway bombs were subsequently delivered to IAF units.
26 May Mig-27 shootdown Flt. Lt. Kambampati Nachiketa, a Mikoyan MiG-27 pilot from the No. 9 Squadron IAF (Wolfpack) took part in a strike in the Batalik Sector on 26 May 1999. Armed with 80mm rockets and the aircraft's 30mm cannon, Nachiketa attacked a fortified enemy position. He was part of a four-aircraft strike group, with his MiG-27 as the trailing unit four kilometers behind the main strike force. The other pilots were Group Captain Anupam Banerjee, Wing Commander Bhupendra Khatana and Group Captain Ashwani Mandokhot. The mission objective was to strike the Muthudalo complex. During the operation, the aircraft took a hit from an Anza surface-to-air missile of the Pakistan Army Air Defence Corps, and Nachiketa was forced to eject. After ejecting, Nachiketa evaded immediate capture but after two to three hours, a Pakistani army patrol captured him. Nachiketa continued to fire his service pistol until he ran out of bullets. He was taken to a prison in Rawalpindi where he was beaten up by Pakistani soldiers until a senior officer intervened. Speaking to NDTV in 2016, Nachiketa said:The jawans who had captured me were trying to manhandle me and maybe trying to kill me because, for them, I was just an enemy pilot who had fired on their locations from the air... Fortunately, the officer who came was very mature. He realised the situation that I am now a captive and now I need not be handled that way. So he was able to control them, which was a big effort because they were very aggressive at that stage.
27 May Mig-21 shootdown