The Battle of the Mareth Line or the Battle of Mareth was an attack in the Second World War by the British Eighth Army (General Bernard Montgomery) in Tunisia, against the Mareth Line held by the Italo–German 1st Army (General Giovanni Messe). It was the first big operation by the Eighth Army since the Second Battle of El Alamein months earlier. On 19 March 1943, Operation Pugilist, the first British attack, established a bridgehead but a break-out attempt was defeated by Axis counter-attacks. Pugilist established an alternative route of attack and Operation Supercharge II, an outflanking manoeuvre via the Tebaga Gap was planned. Montgomery reinforced the flanking attack, which from 26 to 31 March, forced the 1st Army to retreat to Wadi Akarit, another back in Tunisia.
Background Axis retreat from El Alamein The retreat of Panzer Army Africa (known as the / from October 1942) took place from 5 November 1942 to 15 February 1943. On 8 November, Operation Torch began in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, as the in Egypt managed to evade British outflanking moves but traffic jams, fuel shortages, poor weather and air attacks reduced the speed of their retreat to per day. in Rome and OKW in Berlin took an optimistic view of the situation and chose the Mersa-el-Brega–El Agheila position as the terminus of the retreat, even though the position had a front of and its strongpoints were up to apart, too far for mutual support and only When the arrived, the had only and only of the of supplies it needed daily.
Rommel wanted to retreat to Wadi Akarit in the Gabès area, further west, where the non-motorised troops could defend a narrow gap between the Mediterranean and the Chott Djerid. The tanks and motorised infantry would join the 5th Panzer Army (Colonel-General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim) further north, drive back the British First Army from Tunisia into Algeria, then swiftly return to force back the Eighth Army. At a meeting with Hitler on 28 November, Rommel discussed the proposal but received only a promise of more supplies. On the night of the British attacked and on the following evening, the resumed its retreat, and despite its chronic fuel shortage, evaded another outflanking move. The took up a defensive position at Buerat on 29 December but it was poorly fortified, wide open to an outflanking manoeuvre and vulnerable to an attack on Gabès by the First Army in southern Tunisia. The supply situation was a little better, with tons of the required daily, but of the fuel had been used distributing supplies or in retreat.
The Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) attacked Axis supply lines and hundreds of lorries were stranded along the roads for lack of fuel, while the Eighth Army amassed fuel and ammunition for its next attack. On 13 January 1943, the infantry of the 21st Panzer Division were sent north to the 5th Panzer Army to protect Gabès. On 15 January, the Eighth Army attacked with against and tanks. That evening Rommel ordered another retreat; lack of fuel and apprehension about the threat to Gabès, led the retreating infantry to pass beyond the Tarhuna–Homs line. The British occupied Tripoli on 23 January; the Axis retreat from El Alamein had covered . On 13 February, the last Axis soldiers left Libya and on 15 February, the rearguard reached the Mareth Line, inside Tunisia. intended them to hold the line indefinitely but Rommel considered it too vulnerable to another flanking move, unlike the Wadi Akarit position further back.
Terrain The broken terrain of southern Tunisia, with difficult rocky ridge lines and desert, limited manoeuvre; opposite the bight where the north–south coast opens to the east, a semi-arid, scrub covered coastal plain is met inland by the Matmata Hills which lie south to north. Across the plain in a line roughly south-west to north-east was the Mareth Line, fortifications built by the French in the 1930s. In the north, the hills and the line of forts ended at the Tebaga Gap, a mountain pass between the Matmata Hills and the Djebel Tebaga, another line of high ground to the west of the gap, running east–west. North and west of this feature is the Chott el Djerid and west of the Matmata Hills, dry country and then the impassable sand of the Grand Erg Oriental. Gabès lies on the coast, where the plain meets the route from the Tebaga Gap. North of Gabès, the road to Sfax passes between the sea and the chotts, was the only route north for the Eighth Army and it was blocked by the Mareth Line.
The Mareth Line followed the line of Wadi Zigzaou, a natural tank obstacle with steep banks rising up to high; the north-west side had been fortified by the French and subsequently reinforced. The wadi crosses the coastal plain from Zarat to Toujane and into the Matmata Hills beyond. In 1938, the French judged impassable for motorised transport, and so had not extended the Mareth Line any further inland, but in 1943, motor vehicles had much better performance. The British had an advantage because General Georges Catroux, the designer and garrison commander of the Mareth Line in the 1930s, was available in Algiers, to provide information and advice for the attack. In the original plan, Montgomery wrote "...the object of Operation Pugilist is to destroy the enemy now opposing Eighth Army in the Mareth Line and to advance and capture Sfax".
Prelude
Battle of Medenine
The Battle of Medenine (/Operation Capri), was an Axis spoiling attack at Medenine in Tunisia on 6 March 1943. The operation was intended to delay an attack by the British Eighth Army on the Mareth Line. Forewarned by Ultra decrypts of German wireless communications, the British rushed reinforcements from Tripoli and Benghazi before the Axis attack, which was a costly failure. General Erwin Rommel, the commander of Army Group Africa (), could not afford to lose men he needed to defend the Mareth Line, and abandoned the effort at dusk. The Eighth Army remained alert overnight in case of another Axis attempt and sent forward patrols to reconnoitre and demolish knocked-out Axis tanks. During the day the and had made a maximum effort with little effect against the Allied anti-aircraft defence and the Desert Air Force. On 7 March, the Axis forces began to withdraw north towards the Mareth Line. The Eighth Army pursued, slowed by rain. The Battle of Medenine was Rommel's last action in the North African Campaign. He returned to Europe for good soon afterwards.
Battle Operation Pugilist
On 20 March 1943, XXX Corps (Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese) commenced Operation Pugilist. The 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division (Major-General John Nichols) managed to penetrate the line held by the 136th Armoured Division "Giovani Fascisti" near Zarat. Rain and the nature of the terrain prevented the deployment of tanks, aircraft or anti-tank guns, which left the infantry isolated. A counter-attack by 15th Panzer Division and the "Giovani Fascisti" on 22 March recaptured much of the bridgehead, 35 British tanks and 200 prisoners. British forces held their positions until darkness. On 24 March all the British attacking forces were recalled. XXX Corps prepared a new attack towards Tallouf, in which the 4th Indian Infantry Division (Major-General Francis Tuker) would make a night attack on around the inland end of the line, coinciding with a wide left hook manoeuvre by Montgomery.
Left hook In early January 1943, a LRDG patrol had found a pass into the Jebel Dahar, which was given the name Wilder's Gap. A later patrol penetrated to the Tebaga Gap and proved that the route was practicable. The patrol demonstrated the weakness of Axis defences by going further north to Gafsa and on 2 February, made contact with the First Army advancing from the west. Montgomery reinforced the 2nd New Zealand Division (Lieutenant-General Bernard Freyberg) and renamed it the New Zealand Corps, for an attack through the Matmata Hills via Wilder's Gap, into the Jebel Dahar, with the assembly of the force concealed from Axis reconnaissance. Staff from X Corps (Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks) were seconded to provide adequate HQ personnel for the new New Zealand Corps, too big for one divisional staff, which caused some friction between the two generals.
The New Zealand Corps advance was planned in three stages, from a night march to Wadi bel Krecheb 19 March, a second night march of to just short of the Tebaga Gap and then the capture of the entrance to the gap at first light on 21 March or as soon as possible afterwards. The corps would then advance to El Hamma, which overlooks the coast road north of Gabès. The flank of the advance was to be protected by Free French forces (led by General Philippe Leclerc) and the 1st King's Dragoon Guards. An attack by X Corps from Al-Hamma to Gabès would cut off the 1st Army defenders of the Mareth positions and give the New Zealand Corps the opportunity to advance up the coast to Sfax and the landing grounds on the west side of the town.
The planning emphasized surprise and the ability to Axis positions. The corps had relatively few infantry and relied on its artillery to break Axis troop morale, with air support provided by fighters and bombers. A simultaneous frontal attack by XXX Corps on the Mareth Line would divide enemy attention and hamper an Axis counter-attack; the II US Corps of the First Army would advance through El Guettar to threaten Axis communications and pin down reinforcements from Sfax.
Free French forces (Force L) After completing the conquest of the Fezzan and linking up with the British Eighth Army at Tripoli in late January 1943, the Free French column commanded by Philippe Leclerc (approximately 3,000–3,500 men) was re-named Force L and placed under Eighth Army command. The bulk of the force consisted of African troops from the Régiment de tirailleurs sénégalais du Tchad (RTST) and other colonial units, reinforced by European Free French personnel, elements of the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion, and the Greek Sacred Squadron (Colonel Christodoulos Tsigantes). Subordinate commanders included Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Dio, Commandant Vézinet and later Commandant Jean Rémy (commander of the attached ).
Force L was lightly equipped by contemporary standards. Its artillery comprised a mixed battery of French 75 mm field and mountain guns together with a small number of British 25-pounders; anti-tank defence relied mainly on a limited number of 25 mm guns and captured or British weapons. Armoured support was initially restricted to a few armoured cars. In mid-March it was reinforced by Rémy’s Colonne volante, which brought additional armoured cars and a small number of Crusader tanks. Transport consisted largely of trucks and a few jeeps (notably those of the Greek squadron). British engineers and some anti-aircraft elements were also attached.
Montgomery assigned Force L the task of covering the inland (western) flank of the Eighth Army opposite the Mareth Line, particularly the sector around Ksar Rhilane. On 10 March 1943 a German force (elements of the 90th Light Division and supporting armoured reconnaissance units) attacked the French positions to eliminate the threat to the Axis western flank. Despite its sparse anti-tank resources, Force L, supported by the Desert Air Force, held its ground and repulsed the attacks, destroying or disabling a number of German vehicles. Montgomery congratulated Leclerc on the action.
Force L was then placed under the operational control of the New Zealand Corps (Lieutenant-General Bernard Freyberg) for the left-hook manoeuvre through the Matmata Hills and the Tebaga Gap (Operations Pugilist and Supercharge II). It secured important high ground on the western flank of the corps and participated in the advance that forced the Axis withdrawal from the Mareth positions. Force L continued operations in southern Tunisia, including actions in the Gabès area.