Operation Berlin () was a raid conducted by the two German s against Allied shipping in the North Atlantic between 22 January and 22 March 1941. It formed part of the Battle of the Atlantic during the Second World War. The and sailed from Germany, operated across the North Atlantic, sank or captured 22 Allied merchant vessels, and finished their mission by docking in occupied France. The British military sought to locate and attack the German battleships but failed to damage them.
The operation was one of several made by German warships during late 1940 and early 1941. Its main goal was for the battleships to overwhelm the escort of one of the convoys transporting supplies to the United Kingdom and then sink large numbers of merchant ships. The British were expecting this given previous attacks and assigned battleships to escort convoys, which proved successful, with the German force having to abandon attacks against convoys on 8 February as well as 7 and 8 March. The Germans encountered and attacked large numbers of unescorted merchant ships on 22 February and 15–16 March.
By the end of the raid, the German battleships had roamed widely across the Atlantic, ranging from the waters off Greenland to the West African coast. The operation was considered successful by the German military, a view generally shared by historians. It was the last victory achieved by German warships against merchant shipping in the North Atlantic, with the sortie made by the battleship in May 1941 ending in defeat. Both Scharnhorst-class battleships were damaged by air attacks while they were in France and returned to Germany in February 1942.
Background Opposing plans The (German Navy) developed plans before the outbreak of the Second World War to attack Allied merchant shipping in the event of war. Under these plans, warships were to be used against shipping on the high seas and submarines and aircraft would attack shipping near the coasts of Allied countries. Surface raiders were to range widely, make surprise attacks and then move to other areas. They were to be supported by supply ships that would be positioned before the start of operations. Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, the commander of the , was determined to include the fleet's battleships in these attacks. He believed that the decision by the Imperial German Navy () not to use its battleships aggressively during the First World War was a mistake, and wanted to avoid repeating this perceived error. To conserve the 's small number of battleships and other big ships for as long as possible, the navy's plans specified that raiders would target merchant vessels and avoid combat with Allied warships.
The Royal Navy anticipated Germany's intentions, and adopted plans to institute convoys to protect merchant shipping and deploy cruisers to detect attempts by German warships to break out into the Atlantic Ocean. These included initiating cruiser patrols of the waters between Greenland and Scotland through which German raiders would have to pass to enter the Atlantic following the outbreak of war. The Home Fleet, the main British battle force in the North Atlantic, was responsible for locating and intercepting German warships in the area. From 20 December 1940 it was commanded by Admiral John Tovey.
Both s (sometimes called battlecruisers) and were combat ready at the start of the war in September 1939. The roles envisioned for these battleships when they were designed in the early 1930s included raiding convoys. They were heavily armoured and faster than the Royal Navy's battlecruisers. Their main armament was nine guns, which were inferior to the guns that armed most British battleships. The Scharnhorst-class battleships were capable of sailing for at . This was insufficient for lengthy raids, and meant that they needed to refuel from supply ships.
German surface raids
The Scharnhorst-class battleships conducted their first raid in late November 1939. During this operation they sank the armed merchant cruiser of the Northern Patrol between Iceland and the Faroe Islands on 23 November. Both battleships, accompanied by the heavy cruiser and two destroyers, sortied to attack convoys travelling between the Shetland Islands and Norway in Operation Nordmark on 18 February 1940. This force was detected by the British soon after it sailed and the Home Fleet attempted to intercept it. There was no encounter and the German ships returned to port without having met British shipping on 20 February.
In April 1940 the Scharnhorst-class battleships took part in Operation Weserübung, the German invasion of Norway. They formed the most powerful element of the battle group commanded by Vice Admiral Günther Lütjens that served as a covering force to protect the rest of the German invasion fleet from attack by the Royal Navy. On 9 April they encountered the British battlecruiser off the Lofoten Islands. Both German ships were damaged in the Action off Lofoten, leading Lütjens to disengage and return to Germany. The battleships made another sortie on 4 June to raid Allied shipping near Narvik in northern Norway in Operation Juno. On 8 June they sank the empty troop transport as well as the British aircraft carrier and its two escorting destroyers. A destroyer torpedoed Scharnhorst during this action, inflicting damage that took six months to repair. On 20 June Gneisenau took part in a sortie from the occupied Norwegian city of Trondheim. She was torpedoed that day by the submarine . The torpedo explosion blew large holes in her bow that required lengthy repairs in Germany.
Scharnhorsts repairs were largely completed by late November 1940 and Gneisenau reentered service in early December. The ships trained together in the Baltic Sea during December. After Scharnhorst completed the last element of its repairs, both battleships were assessed on 23 December as being ready for another raid.
In August 1940 the German leader Adolf Hitler ordered an intensification of the attacks on Allied shipping in the Atlantic. The began dispatching its major warships that had survived the Norwegian campaign into the Atlantic in October. The heavy cruiser sailed during that month, and conducted a successful raid that lasted until March 1941. Admiral Hipper went on the abortive Operation Nordseetour from Germany into the Atlantic during December that ended with her docking at Brest in occupied France. During this operation, Admiral Hipper attacked Convoy WS 5A on 25 December and damaged two transports before being driven off by escorting British cruisers. Six German merchant raiders also operated against Allied shipping in the South Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans. The attack on Convoy WS 5A demonstrated that raiders posed a serious threat to shipping in the North Atlantic, and from early 1941 the British Admiralty assigned battleships to escort convoys that were bound for the United Kingdom whenever possible. Westbound convoys lacked this protection, and were dispersed in the middle of the Atlantic.
Raid First attempt The Scharnhorst-class battleships were selected for the next raid, Operation Berlin. Its goal was for the ships to break out into the Atlantic and operate together to attack Allied shipping. Their primary objective was to intercept one of the HX convoys that regularly sailed from Halifax in Canada to the United Kingdom. These convoys were a key element of the Allied supply line to the United Kingdom, and the Germans hoped that the battleships could overwhelm the convoy's escort and then sink large numbers of merchant ships. Raeder directed the battleships to end their raid by docking at Brest, which had been selected as the 's main base in October 1940. The orders issued for the operation forbade attacks on convoys escorted by forces of equal strength, such as British battleships. This was because the raid would need to be abandoned if Scharnhorst or Gneisenau was significantly damaged. Lütjens, who had been appointed the 's fleet commander in July 1940 and promoted to admiral in September that year, commanded the battle group.
Seven supply ships were dispatched into the Atlantic ahead of Operation Berlin to support the two raiders. The plans for the operation also called for Admiral Hipper to sortie from Brest and attack the convoy routes between Gibraltar, Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom. As well as inflicting further casualties, it was hoped that the cruiser would divert British forces away from Lütjens' area of operations. The German signals intelligence service was providing raiders with general information about the locations of Allied ships. The service was generally unable to pass on useful intelligence though, as it was unable to decrypt intercepted radio messages. Each raider embarked a detachment that monitored Allied radio signals and used direction finding techniques to locate convoys and warships. The Germans had little intelligence on the dates on which Allied convoys sailed or the routes they took. This made it difficult for surface raiders to position themselves in the path of convoys.
Berlin was launched on 28 December 1940. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sailed from Kiel, with Lütjens commanding the force from the latter ship. The raid had to be abandoned before the battleships entered the Atlantic when Gneisenau was damaged by a storm off Norway on 30 December. Lütjens initially took the ships into Korsfjord in Norway and planned to repair Gneisenau at Trondheim, but was ordered to return to Germany. Both ships reached Gotenhafen on 2 January. Gneisenau was transferred to Kiel to be repaired. The battleships received additional small calibre anti-aircraft guns during this period.
Breakout into the Atlantic
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sailed again from Kiel at 4:00 am on 22 January 1941. They proceeded north and passed through the Great Belt island chain in German-controlled Denmark that morning. This exposed the battleships to Allied agents on the shore, but was necessary as the waterway was covered in ice thick. The battle group reached Skagen on the northern tip of Denmark on the evening of 23 January where it was to meet up with a flotilla of torpedo boats that would escort it through minefields between Denmark and Norway. The torpedo boats were slow to leave port, and Lütjens' force did not resume its voyage until dawn on 25 January.
From intelligence obtained by traffic analysis of German radio signals, the British had concluded that German capital ships were about to put to sea; Ultra intelligence obtained by breaking German codes did not provide any information on Operation Berlin as the British were unable to decrypt the codes. On 20 January the Admiralty warned the Home Fleet that another German raid was likely. Tovey immediately dispatched two heavy cruisers to reinforce the patrols between Allied-occupied Iceland and the Faroe Islands. On 23 January, the British naval attaché in Sweden passed on a report from agents in Denmark that the German battleships had been sighted passing through the Great Belt. This intelligence was provided to Tovey during the evening of 25 January.
The main body of the Home Fleet departed its base at Scapa Flow at midnight on 25 January bound for a position south of Iceland. It comprised the battleships (Tovey's flagship) and , the battlecruiser , eight cruisers and eleven destroyers. Air patrols of the waters between Iceland and the Faroes were stepped up. Some of the Home Fleet's ships were detached to refuel on 27 January. The had expected this deployment, and stationed eight submarines to the south of Iceland to attack the Home Fleet. Only one of these submarines sighted any British warships, and it was unable to reach a position from which they could be attacked.