The years of peace between the first and second French War of Religion would be active ones for France's foreign relations. King Charles IX and his mother Catherine de' Medici were compelled to navigate a series of crises in the Franco-Spanish alliance which had been established in 1559. The 1563 edict of Amboise which had brought the first French War of Religion to a close in 1563 was resented in Spain for the tolerance it provided to the French Protestants. The actions of the Spanish ambassador Chantonnay in France meanwhile generated such cause for scandal that the French demanded his recall, and he was replaced by Francès de Álava in 1564. In the following years, the revolt in Corsica, dispute over papal precedence, and the stealing of Álava's diplomatic ciphers would strain relations between the powers. The Bayonne Interview between the two crowns, arranged for 1565, would fail to achieve any breakthrough for either side.
In the New World, the French colonisation of Florida aroused the opposition of the Spanish, who destroyed the French colony in late-1565. A French privateer would subsequently revenge himself upon Spanish Florida. Off the coast of Africa, a French expedition would attack the Portuguese island of Funchal.
Relations with England had been compromised by the English support for the Protestant rebels during the civil war, and it would not be until April 1564 that peace was made between the two kingdoms. The status of Calais remained a sore point up to 1567. With the Holy Roman Empire there were likewise difficulties due to the French occupation of the Three Bishoprics. Both the French crown and the French Protestants would conduct diplomacy with the Protestant princes of the Empire, feeling out their support. France's alliance with the Ottomans was weakened during this period by the failure of France to provide an ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. While the French crown remained keen to hold onto the alliance, various French nobles attempted to fight against the Ottomans. France also sought to involve itself in the Dano-Swedish war but was unable to facilitate a settlement between the two kingdoms. In Switzerland, the alliance with the Cantons was renewed, but despite the campaign of the French crown, and the French Protestants, certain Protestant cantons would remain aloof from participating.
In late 1566, a rebellion erupted in the Spanish Netherlands which would send shockwaves through France. The French Protestant grandees were keen to demonstrate their support for their coreligionists, meanwhile Catherine little desired to see the kingdom driven into war with Spain. Anxieties were raised as a Spanish army was put together to crush the Dutch Protestants, an army that would travel along the French border to the Netherlands. Various precautionary measures were taken in France to secure the kingdom against a surprise attack, however these measures also inspired fears in the French Protestants that the crown intended to attack them in league with the Spanish. Ultimately this would be one of the factors which led to the second French War of Religion.
Procedure
During this period, the letters of the queen mother of France Catherine de' Medici to the ambassadors of France, like those of her son king Charles IX, constituted state correspondence, as opposed to private letters. Diplomatic packets would contain letters from the king, and letters from the queen mother. This was true both during and after her formal regency which terminated in August 1563. On occasion, letters from other figures would merit inclusion, such as from a secretary of state or another noble. Similarly, ambassadors would write back to both figures at once. The letters of Charles and Catherine referenced one another in their texts, making it clear that Catherine if not helping to write Charles' letters, was at least aware of what the king had written.
Catherine's correspondence reached a peak during the minority of Charles IX and entered something of a decline after his declaration of majority in August 1563. This did not apply to her diplomatic correspondence though, which remained steady, at around five diplomatic missives a month. Similarly, the French ambassadors in the various European capitals continued to write letters directly to her. The historian Gellard uses this to counteract the suggestion that her continued pace of diplomatic writing was an effort by her to fight an erosion of influence caused by the royal majority through imposing herself on foreign affairs, one of the most royal areas of state.
Of the nine countries in which France had continuous diplomatic representatives present in this period, six were neighbours of the kingdom of France. The major exception to this rule of proximity was the Ottoman Empire, with whom the French had enjoyed relations going back to the reign of Francis I. Alongside the nine chief diplomatic postings, the French maintained a further five secondary ones in this period.
As concerned diplomatic residencies that were begun in the 1560s, Gellard calculates their average length as being 43 months. This is almost twice as short as the missions that were begun in the 1570s. The character of the men chosen for the offices varied depending on the locale. Magistrates dominated appointments to Brussels, Chur, Solothurn and Venice. Members of the clergy received appointment to most of the major postings, with the exception of Brussels, sword nobles were to be found in five of the major postings, with a concentration around London, Madrid and Rome. The locations to which the sword nobles were not sent tended to be the ones the crown entrusted to the robe nobility/magistracy.
England and Scotland Le Havre
Betrayed alliance As part of the edict of Amboise, provision was made for the removal of foreigners from the French kingdom. The French government gave the English queen Elizabeth to understand that what this meant was the removal of the German mercenaries from the kingdom, as opposed to any attempt to dislodge the English from Le Havre (which they had occupied during the civil war).
Elizabeth I was greatly vexed by the betrayal of her French Protestant allies, who had not consulted her as they had an obligation to by the treaty of Hampton Court concerning the making of peace with the French crown. Through her representative Middlemore, Elizabeth demanded the return of Calais to the English in exchange for the English withdrawal from Le Havre. Further, the submission of French hostages to England for a period of two years (so that the fortifications of Calais might be rebuilt in security). Finally, the return of all funds the English had afforded the French Protestants during the war. This was not acceptable to the Protestant French prince de Condé and admiral de Coligny, for whom the handing over of Calais would have brought disgrace and charges of treason. The two men therefore refuted the demands made by their former ally. They were able to exploit the relative ignorance of the English ambassador Thomas Smith concerning the agreement they had made with Elizabeth the previous year. The French Protestant translation of Elizabeth's justification for intervention excluded all mention of agreement relating to Calais, being a matter purely of their securing religious liberty in France. This having been secured, there was no cause for the English to maintain Le Havre. Should he so desire, Smith could of course intervene with Charles and Catherine to plead for the return of Calais per the 1559 treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. The seigneur de Briquemault was dispatched to England to explain their position to Elizabeth and reinforce the alliance between the French Protestants and England.
The English opinion of Condé was considerably soured. Middlemore opined in a missive of 14 April that Condé was evolving in the direction of a new king of Navarre. A man more interested in his romantic pursuits than Protestantism. It seemed likely to Middlemore that he would make the crossing to Catholicism. Learning of these opinions of Middlemore, and the harsh language Elizabeth had used concerning him, Condé complained to Cecil, who assured him he remained steadfast even though his enemies were attempting to pollute his image.
Fearful that Le Havre might be betrayed to the French, an expulsion of inhabitants from the city was undertaken shortly after the edict of Amboise was published. Those not native to the city, as well as French soldiers were ordered to depart by 23 March.
Elizabeth did not take these French Protestant manoeuvres idly. She sent Smith the text of the treaty of Hampton court by letter of 20 April, with particular attention to the clauses relating to the return of Calais. She noted this had been signed by Condé, Coligny and other Protestant grandees. She observed that the admiral de Coligny had affirmed this arrangement again in February 1563 so that he might secure money for his reiters (a mounted pistol cavalry). Briquemault, who had arrived in London, received a frosty reception on 30 April. Elizabeth complained of the Protestant ingratitude, and threatened to expose the agreement they had made and the promises they had violated. Condé counterattacked. He argued that he had no cognisance of the Calais component of the treaty. The prince claimed he and his compatriots had given a blank treaty they had signed to his emissaries. His negotiators had then been forced to assent to this clause by Elizabeth's council, but he had never been appraised of this fact. He had no part to play in Coligny's February reaffirmation of the clause as he was in prison at the time. Coligny took a similar tack to that of Condé. In his telling, the first he learned of the clause was while in Normandy in February when it had been revealed to him by the English representative Throckmorton. He claims he did not accept the clause in the February ratification of the treaty. Daussy notes that the defences of both men are impossible to validate for sincerity.
Both men affirmed that if Elizabeth withdrew unconditionally from Le Havre, she would receive Calais in 1567 as per the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. If king Charles was compelled to retake Le Havre by force, her right to reclaim Calais would be voided by Cateau-Cambrésis' terms.
Securing the voluntary return of Le Havre was important for the Protestant leadership. On the one side they had the queen mother Catherine, who would resent them for having to launch an expensive military campaign to recapture a city they had handed off to a foreign power. Elizabeth would similarly be irritated at the consequences imposed on her by their broken promises. Thus, Robert de La Haye was dispatched to London in June for effort. Elizabeth meanwhile sent a certain Dannet to undertake secret talks with Condé and the admiral de Coligny. These efforts would get nowhere.
French royal plans Writing to the seigneur de Gonnor on 17 April, the French secretary of state Jacques Bourdin opined that driving the English into war with France represented the best solution to the Le Havre issue.
All the artillery that had recently been used for the reduction of Orléans was forwarded on to Le Havre during April, by 23 April the earl of Warwick estimated there were 10,000 French and 6,000 Swiss surrounding Le Havre.
On 30 April 1563, Charles IX wrote to the English queen Elizabeth I. He requested that she withdraw her presence from Le Havre, arguing that her justification for seizing it was invalid now that the edict of Amboise had been agreed with the French kingdoms' domestic rebels. Elizabeth, frustrated by the betrayal of the French Protestant rebels, would drag out the war with France another sixteen months.