The Mass Rally of Capital Red Guards Strongly Protesting the Anti-China Atrocities by the Burmese Reactionary Government at the Meridian Gate was a large-scale mass rally held on 3 July 1967, in the square in front of the Meridian Gate of the Forbidden City in Beijing, China, to protest against the Burmese government. The purpose was to protest the attack on the Chinese Embassy in Burma that broke out in June.

Background On 8 June 1950, the Union of Burma formally established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, becoming the first non-socialist country to recognize the People's Republic of China.陈扬勇,周恩来外交生涯的"冰点"时刻,新一代2007年4期 On 2 March 1962, Ne Win, Chief of the General Staff of the Tatmadaw, led a military coup, overthrowing the rule of Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, and then became the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma. The People's Republic of China became the fourth country to recognize the Ne Win government on 7 March, following the United Arab Emirates, India, and the United Kingdom. After that, the People's Republic of China was very indifferent to Burma in the ideological field, but actively sought to win it over in the international relations field.范宏伟,奈温军人政权的建立与中国的对缅政策,《厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2010年第4期

On 30 April 1962, the Ne Win government published its governing program, the Burmese Way to Socialism, which proposed a path to establish Burmese-style socialism. Because the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party believed that this was not true socialism, China reacted coldly and did not make any public comments. However, the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries such as Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland actively supported Burma's socialist path. Burma was dissatisfied with China for this. In April 1964, Liu Shaoqi, the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, visited Burma and talked with Ne Win, which dispelled some of Ne Win's doubts. However, China's attitude did not change afterward.

On the other hand, after Ne Win came to power, he adopted a large-scale economic nationalization policy. China took a positive attitude in supporting this. On 19 March 1964, the Burmese government promulgated a commercial nationalization policy, nationalizing more than 10,000 private shops nationwide, of which more than 6,700 shops were operated by overseas Chinese or Burmese Chinese. On 17 May 1964, the Burmese government announced that 50 and 100 kyat banknotes would be discontinued. In addition, during the nationalization of private schools and newspapers, overseas Chinese schools and newspapers in Burma were also nationalized or closed one after another. The Bank of Communications and the Bank of China were also confiscated by the Burmese government. In response, the government of China expressed its willingness to give the assets of the Bank of Communications and the Bank of China in Burma to the Burmese government without compensation; on the other hand, it actively appeased overseas Chinese and prevented them from transferring funds to China. This was in stark contrast to the Indian government 's protest against Burma and its actions to assist Indian expatriates in transferring assets. Although China gained the favor of the Ne Win government as a result, it also aroused strong dissatisfaction among overseas Chinese in Burma.

The report of the Chinese Embassy in Burma in 1964 and the report of the First Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China in 1965 analyzed that the nature of the Ne Win government was the dictatorship of the bourgeois military group, and its political attitude belonged to the bourgeois centrist. It opposed the subversion of the United States imperialism, but dared not offend the United States imperialism. At the same time, it had illusions about the Soviet Union's modern revisionism and was somewhat close to it. It adopted a peaceful, friendly and neutral attitude towards China, but was also wary. These reports analyzed that if the Ne Win government fell, it was likely that a more right-wing government would come to power, and the United States and the United Kingdom would openly enter Burma, which would be very unfavorable to the situation of China and Southeast Asia. Therefore, maintaining the Ne Win government would be beneficial to the anti-American struggle in Southeast Asia for a certain period of time and would buy time for the Burmese revolution. For this reason, China helped the Ne Win government thwart the coup in 1964 and provided assistance to the Ne Win government to help it stabilize the domestic situation.

Arming the Communist Party of Burma In 1967, during the Cultural Revolution, CCP Chairman Mao Zedong continued to emphasize the need to criticize the "Three Peaceful Acts and One Reduction" and the "Three surrenders and One Extermination" to promote world revolution and oppose imperialism and revisionism. On 7 July 1967, shortly after the conclusion of the anti-Burmese rally at the Meridian Gate, Mao Zedong delivered a speech when meeting with representatives attending the military training conference of the People's Liberation Army, in which he discussed his views on the world situation:卜伟华,文革中的外交极左问题,二十一世纪2006年6月号Currently, many places are anti-China, which may appear to isolate us; in reality, their anti-China sentiment stems from fear of China's influence and the impact of the Cultural Revolution. This anti-China sentiment is intended to suppress the people domestically and divert their discontent with their rule. This anti-China sentiment is a joint scheme orchestrated by the US, the Soviet Union, and revisionism. This does not mean we are isolated; rather, it signifies a significant increase in our global influence. The more they oppose China, the more they promote revolution among the people. The people of these countries realize that the Chinese path is the only path to liberation. China should not only be the political center of the revolution but also, militarily and technologically, become the center of the world revolution. We must provide them with weapons, even weapons with inscriptions (except in certain special regions). We must openly support them and make China the arsenal of the world revolution.Mao believed that armed revolutions should be vigorously supported around the world, even at the cost of disrupting normal international relations between countries. On 18 May 1967, Zhao Yimin, deputy head of the CCP International Department, submitted a report to Zhou Enlai and forwarded it to Mao regarding the composition of the delegation of the CCP to the talks with the Communist Party of Burma. The report proposed a list of recommended members of the delegation, which included Jiang Qing. On 26 May 1967, Mao instructed: "It is better for Jiang Qing not to participate." In late May 1967, the CCP held talks with the Communist Party of Burma in China, and the CCP Central Committee determined to support the Communist Party of Burma (then chaired by Thakin Than Tun) in taking armed struggle.

Deterioration in relations

In 1966, the Cultural Revolution broke out in China. After that, some personnel of the Chinese Embassy and Consulates abroad, aid workers, students studying abroad and overseas Chinese distributed Chairman Mao's works, Chairman Mao's quotations, Chairman Mao badges and Cultural Revolution propaganda materials in the countries where they were located, which caused disputes in the countries where they were located. In June 1967, the personnel of China stationed in Burma disregarded the advice of the Burmese government and forcibly distributed Chairman Mao's quotations and Chairman Mao badges to overseas Chinese and Burma citizens, which aroused the dissatisfaction and intervention of the Burma government. Since the British colonial authorities had previously run an organization in Burma, which issued a badge to young people in Burma who joined the organization and required them to wear it to show their loyalty to the British Queen, Burma was very sensitive to the badge. The Burma government had previously enacted a law prohibiting students from wearing foreign badges.

Since June 1967, many overseas Chinese schools in Burma have asked students to remove the Mao badges they wear, but the students refused. On 22 June, the Yangon Chinese Girls' Middle School forcibly removed the Mao Zedong badges worn by overseas Chinese students, causing a dispute. On June 23, the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Chinese Embassy in Burma (then Chinese Ambassador to Burma Geng Biao had been ordered to return to China) protested to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Burma regarding the incident on 22 June, in which the school authorities of the former Yangon Chinese Girls' Middle School forcibly removed the Mao badges worn by overseas Chinese students and openly insulted Chairman Mao, the great leader of the Chinese people.从"洋娃娃"到外交官───冀朝铸口述回忆录,北京:北京大学出版社,2000年,第266页。 On the same day, the Burma government announced the closure of the Chinese Girls' Middle School and the Overseas Chinese Girls' Middle School. Subsequently, the Burma government closed nine overseas Chinese middle schools and overseas Chinese primary schools indefinitely. There have been many clashes between Chinese and Burma people in Burma, and dozens of overseas Chinese and students have died in the clashes.我政府向缅甸政府提出最紧急最强烈抗议,人民日报1967年6月29日,第1版

On 27 to 28 June, in Yangon, the capital of Burma, Burmese citizens surrounded and stormed the Chinese Embassy in Burma. The Burma government dispatched troops to the scene to dissuade the Burma citizens, but some Burma citizens stormed into the embassy and killed Liu Yi, an economic expert from China who was assisting Burma. After the incident, the Burmese government repeatedly expressed its willingness to continue to maintain friendly relations with China. China government showed a tough attitude in diplomacy. On 28 June 1967, Han Nianlong, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, summoned Samar Duwah Sin Wah Naung, the Burmese Ambassador to China, to strongly protest against the Burmese government's instigation of thugs to attack the Chinese Embassy in Burma, kill Chinese experts, and persecute overseas Chinese. On 29 June, the People's Daily published on its front page the headline "The Burmese government instigated thugs to attack our embassy, kill our experts, and persecute our overseas Chinese. Our government lodges the most urgent and strongest protest with the Burmese government," and published the note issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China to the Burmese Embassy in China.

On 29 June, the Burmese government submitted a memorandum to the Chinese government, requesting that the Chinese government prevent Chinese citizens from holding demonstrations to protest against Burma's "anti-China atrocities." On June 30, 400,000 people from all walks of life in Beijing held a demonstration at the Burmese Embassy in China. On 1 July, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China handed over a memorandum from the Chinese government to the Burma Embassy in China, rejecting the Burma government's request in its memorandum dated 29 Jne for the Chinese government to prevent demonstrations and protests, and again demanding that the Burma government immediately lift the siege of the Chinese Embassy in Burma and the residential areas of overseas Chinese. As of 3 July. the number of Chinese people who went to the Burma Embassy in China to demonstrate and protest had exceeded 1 million.