Nallini Pathmanathan (born 23 August 1959) is a Malaysian jurist who served as a judge of the Federal Court of Malaysia from November 2018 to February 2026. She was the first female judge of Malaysian Indian origin to be elevated to the apex court in Malaysia. She was then appointed as inaugural chairperson of the Malaysian Media Council in June 2026. Nallini is also an Adjunct Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Malaya.
Early life and education Coming from a family consisting largely of doctors, Nallini pursued a degree in physiology and graduated from the University of London with a Bachelors of Science (BSc) in Physiology in 1982.
Upon completing her studies, she realised that she no longer wished to pursue a career in Physiology. Following her father's suggestion, she enrolled in a law conversion course at the University of Westminster in 1983, earning a Diploma in Law. She was called to the English Bar (Middle Temple) in 1984 and subsequently to the Malaysian Bar on 15 February 1986.
Career Nallini commenced legal practice in 1986 with Skrine, a law firm in Malaysia, and in 1995, became a partner at the firm in 1995. She served as the chairman of the executive committee of Skrine for a few years.
In 2007, Nallini was elevated to the Bench, initially serving in the criminal courts of the High Court of Shah Alam. By 2009, she was elevated to High Court Judge and presided over the commercial courts at the High Court of Kuala Lumpur shortly after their establishment.
Nallini was then elevated to the Court of Appeal in 2014, where she spent four years before being elevated to the nation’s apex court, the Federal Court, in 2018.
Nallini served on committees of the Malaysian Bar Council and was a member of the Disciplinary Committee Panel of the Advocates & Solicitors Disciplinary Board. As of 2007, she is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. She is also the chairperson of the Malaysian Middle Temple Alumni Association and is Vice Chair of the International Bar Association's Judges' Forum. Further, Nallini is a member of the Steering Group for the Standing International Forum of Commercial Courts. Recently, her Ladyship was appointed Chair of Malaysia’s Maritime Law Review Committee, modernising maritime legislation.
In 2023, Nallini was appointed to Malaysia's Judicial Appointments Committee for a two-year term. The Judicial Appointments Committee also identified Nallini as a potential candidate for the role of Chief Judge of Malaya, the third highest judicial office in the country.
On February 20, 2026 she retired from the Federal Court bench after nearly eight years of service.
On June 15, 2026 it was announced by the Malaysian Media Council that Nallini had been appointed its inaugural chairperson. Following her retirement from the Federal Court in 2026, Nallini Pathmanathan was appointed an adjunct professor at the Faculty of Law, Universiti Malaya. In this role, she contributes her experience in the judiciary and legal practice to the faculty’s academic and professional activities.
Notable Judgements Constitutional and Administrative Law
Peguam Negara Malaysia v Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Anor 2 MLJ 652
In deciding on whether an online news portal committed contempt for publishing comments of third party subscribers in response to an online news article ‘[Chief Justice] orders all courts to be fully operational from July 1’, Justice Pathmanathan authored the sole dissent from a seven-member panel by deciding that the online news portal was not liable for contempt.
In her decision, Justice Pathmanathan held that contempt requires proof of actual knowledge and awareness of the offending content and not merely constructive knowledge. The news portal could not, in her Ladyship’s view, be deemed a ‘publisher’ as it did not have any knowledge of the impugned third-party comments until some three days after and after which, the said comments were taken down within 12 minutes. Far less could it be said, her Ladyship opined, that the news portal possessed the requisite ‘intention to publish’ which was the foundational element for quasi-criminal offence of scandalizing the court. In Justice Pathmanathan’s mind, the standard of proof was not met.
Her Ladyship emphasised that the requirement for actual knowledge as a criterion to establish liability of online intermediaries such as a news portal functioned to not just avoid unduly burdens of round-the-clock supervision (as opposed to the flag-and-takedown approach) but also ensure the non-dilution of the freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed right under Article 10.
Maria Chin Abdullah v Ketua Pengarah Imigresen & Anor 1 MLJ 750
In delivering one of two dissents against the majority decision, Justice Pathmanathan held the ouster clause contained in s 59A of the Immigration Act 1959/1963 (Immigration Acts), purporting to bar a court from examining the constitutionality of any executive action taken by a Minister under the Immigration Acts, as void. Justice Pathmanathan concurred entirely with her fellow dissenting judge, Chief Justice Tun Tengku Maimun bt Tuan Mat, and wrote her dissent in the belief that a multiplicity of views on the approaches to be adopted when construing the Federal Constitution enabled a better appreciation of its substance ().
Justice Pathmanathan commenced her analysis with her view that Article 4(1) of the Federal Constitution is the primary article that defines the nature and extent of judicial power (). To that extent, her Ladyship posited that Article 121(1) of the Federal Constitution ought to be read and construed by reference first to Article 4 because Malaysia is governed by constitutional supremacy, unlike the United Kingdom but like India, the United States, Canada and Ireland. This was the same view the Chief Justice took.
Her Ladyship expressed that Article 4(1) had two components: first, it provided for constitutional supremacy; and second, it provided for all laws which are inconsistent with any provision of the Federal Constitution to be declared void, but only to the extent of its consistency. Her Ladyship continued, clarifying that the first component was well established starting with the decision by Suffian LP in Ah Thian v Government of Malaysia 2 MLJ 112. The second component of Article 4(1) gives “‘bite’ and ‘life’ to the declared supremacy of the Federal Constitution” by enforcing the supremacy of the Federal Constitution (). Her Ladyship opined that without the second component, the Federal Constitution would be reduced to a series of theoretical values and philosophies. To that extent, her Ladyship held that from Article 4(1) flowed the twin fundamental pillars of a constitutional democracy: the rule of law and the separation of powers. Article 4(1), as her Ladyship elaborated, functioned as the root for the conferment of judicial power as articulated further in Article 121 () and further meant that Article 121(1) must be construed harmoniously with Article 4(1) (). Her Ladyship’s view on Article 4(1) would over time be recognised as seminal and a point to which she would return to in consequent decisions.
Accordingly, the ouster clause in s 59A of the Immigration Acts was unconstitutional for, if given its intended effect, it would insulate any acts of persons or bodies acting under Immigration Acts from review under Article 4(1) of the Federal Constitution, encroaching on the powers encapsulated in Article 4(1) in its insulation.
Further reference was made by Justice Pathmanathan to the fact that the Reid Commission derogated from any suggestion that judicial powers were intended to be subject to federal law. For context, the majority’s decision, delivered by Abdul Rahman Sebli FCJ, held that the intention of the Reid Commission was that ‘jurisdiction and powers conferred unto a court were matters purely within the legislative powers of the Federation’ (). As such, what the appeal turned on was the scope for enforcement of fundamental rights, the remedy of which should be governed by ‘ordinary law’: s 59A’s ouster clause was perceived to only oust the availability of remedy for enforcement of rights and not oust the exercise of judicial power ( - ).
Nonetheless, with s 59A’s intended blanket immunity against judicial scrutiny cast aside, Justice Pathmanathan adjudicated the Director General’s decision to blacklist a well-known chairperson of a NGO from traveling abroad for being a person who had “‘memburuk nama Kerajaan’” (tarnish or criticize the Government) as wrongful.
CTEB & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors 4 MLJ 236
In a 4-3 split with the majority dismissing the appeal, Justice Pathmanathan delivered one of three dissents to grant citizenship to a minor male, CTEB, born to a Malaysian citizen father and a Filipino citizen mother. At the time of his birth, his parents were not married. Five months later, they legally registered their marriage in Malaysia and made Malaysia their home.
Though writing only a short dissenting judgment in support of the Chief Justice’s dissenting judgment, her Ladyship delivered a cogent judgment on constitutional interpretation, particularly where supplemental provisions of the Federal Constitution were involved, in context of Malaysia’s status as a nation practicing constitutional supremacy. On the facts, her Ladyship cast doubt at whether the citizenship provision under Article 14(1)(b) of the Federal Constitution could ever be construed in a way that condoned illegitimacy discrimination and gender discrimination.
The Court of Appeal and the High Court had dismissed CTEB’s bid for citizenship based on their reading of Article 14(1)(b). In Justice Pathmanathan’s view, the facts brought to the fore the following issues: (i) the correct construction of citizenship by operation of law provisions in the Federal Constitution (Article 14(1)(b) and the supplementary provisions of s 1 of Part II of the Second Schedule and s 17 of Part III of the Second Schedule, collectively ‘Constitutional Citizenship Provisions’); and (ii) whether by adopting a construction that precludes a child from citizenship by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b), whether Article 8 of the Federal Constitution’s prohibition against gender discrimination is contravened.
Her Ladyship began her analysis by referring to precedent that held that the Federal Constitution cannot be interpreted in a narrow and pedantic manner but rather in a broad, liberal and expansive sense: ‘[t]his is because the Federal Constitution… is a living and organic document which is constantly being examined, explained and developed’ (). Having laid down the basic tenets of Malaysia’s parliamentary democracy, to reflect the basic way of life enjoyed and practiced by the people of Malaysia, Justice Pathamanathan viewed any interpretation of the Federal Constitution that detracted from such basic tenets as being unacceptable (). As such, the citizenship provisions in question could not be read down to deny persons from their basic rights. In her Ladyship’s own words (),
"[T]he [Federal Constitution] sets out the framework for government and its objects and the principles of government ought not to be abrogated by the use of meagre and inadequate technical rules or grammar. As I have stated elsewhere the function of a judge is not to adopt a grammarian approach in the construction of statutes, far less the [Federal Constitution]."
Justice Pathmanathan referred to Malaysia’s status as a nation practicing constitutional supremacy within a government of parliamentary democracy, notwithstanding that it is not the function of a court to place an unnatural or forced meaning to the provisions of the Federal Constitution or fill a gap that does not exist.