Jamgön Ju Mipham Gyatso, or Mipham Jamyang Namgyal Gyamtso (1846–1912) (also known as "Mipham the Great") was a very influential philosopher and polymath of the Nyingma school of Tibetan Buddhism. He wrote over 32 volumes on topics such as painting, poetics, sculpture, alchemy, medicine, logic, philosophy and tantra.Chogyam Trungpa; The Tantric Path of Indestructible Wakefulness (volume 3) Mipham's works are still central to the scholastic curriculum in Nyingma monasteries today. Mipham is also considered to be one of the leading figures in the Rimé (non-sectarian) movement in Tibet.
Derivation of name "Ju" ("holding") was Mipham's family name as his paternal clan is said to have originated as clear light deities who came to the human world holding a rope. "Jamgön" (Skt. Mañjunātha) indicate that he was considered to be an emanation of the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī. His maternal uncle, Minister-Lama Drupchok Pema Tarjay, named him Mipham Gyamtso ("Invincible Ocean" or "Unconquerable Ocean"). In Tibetan literature, the word "mi-pham" is the standard translation of the Sanskrit "ajita", meaning "unconquered", which is a common epithet of the celestial bodhisattva Maitreya.
Biography
Early life Mipham the Great was born to an aristocratic family in 1846 in the Derge Principality of Kham or Eastern Tibet. He was recognized as an exceptional child from a young age, memorizing texts as early as age six. By the age of ten he had already composed many texts. At twelve, he entered the monastery as an ordinary monk of the Ogmin Urgyen Mindrolling lineage at a branch monastery of the great Nyingma seat Shechen.
When he was fifteen or sixteen, after studying the very difficult Mindrolling system of chanting for only a few days and praying to Manjushri, he is said to have completely mastered it. In an 18-month retreat he accomplished the form of Manjushri known as 'Lion of Philosophers' (Tibetan: smra ba'i seng ge), using a liturgy composed by the fifteenth Karmapa, Khakhyab Dorje. He made many medicinal pills blessed with Manjushri's mantra, and many miraculous signs were said to have been manifest. After this, it was said that he could accomplish any sutra or tantra without any effort, and no text was unknown to him. He went to many lamas to obtain the necessary lungs (oral transmissions), but he needed no study or teachings for any texts.
Teachers Mipham was "a luminary of the nineteenth century Nyingma renaissance and Rime movement ecumenical movement, which started in the Kham region of eastern Tibet". As such he received teachings from masters of all lineages Nyingma and Sarma alike. His root gurus were Dza Patrul Rinpoche, from whom he received instruction on Shantideva's Bodhicharyavatara and Dzogchen and the renowned master Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo, from whom he received transmission of the orally transmitted or Kama and revealed or Terma lineages, and many other teachings. His other teachers included Jamgon Kongtrul Lodro Thaye; Dzogchen Khenpo Padma Vajra; Lab Kyabgon Wangchen Gyerab Dorje; Jubon Jigme Dorje; Bumsar Geshe Ngawang Jungne and Ngor Ponlop Jamyang Loter Wangpo.
Philosophy A key theme in Mipham's philosophical work is the unity of seemingly disparate ideas such as duality and nonduality, conceptual and nonconceptual (nirvikalpa) wisdom, rational analysis and uncontrived meditation, presence and absence, immanence and transcendence, emptiness and Buddha nature. Mimicking the Sarma schools, Mipham attempted to reconcile the view of tantra, especially Dzogchen, with sutric Madhyamaka.Koppl, Heidi. Establishing Appearances as Divine. Snow Lion Publications 2008. This was in departure with the Nyingma school which generally positioned the view of tantra as superior to the view of Madhyamaka.
For Mipam, the unity of philosophical views is ultimately resolved in the principle of coalescence (Sanskrit: yuganaddha, Tib: zung 'jug), which is the nonduality of conventional and ultimate realities, of samsara and nirvana. Unlike Tsongkhapa who held that emptiness, as an absolute negation, was the definitive reality and view, Mipham sees coalescence of gnosis and emptiness, form and emptiness, etc. as "the ultimate hermeneutical cornerstone of his interpretations".
In his many texts Mipham explores the tension and dialectic that arises between philosophical reasoning of the ordinary mind (rnam shes) which is represented by the Madhyamaka philosophy and luminous nonconceptual wisdom (ye shes), which is the focus of the teachings of Dzogchen. He attempts a synthesis of them to show that they are not incompatible perspectives and that the teachings of Dzogchen are in line with reason.
Criticism of Gelugpa Madhyamaka Mipham undertook a rigorous criticism of various features of Gelugpa Madhyamaka, such as their insertion of qualifiers which limit the Madhyamaka negandum to "ultimate" existence, as well as uniquely Gelugpa assertions, such as "the vase is not empty of vase but of hypostatic [or inherent] existence."Phuntsho, Karma. Mipham's Dialectics And The Debates On Emptiness: To Be, Not To Be Or Neither, page 79. Routledge Curzon, 2005.
Gelugpa insertion of qualifiers Gelugpa Madhyamaka is concerned to specify that the type of existence negated by Madhyamaka analysis is ultimate and not conventional existence. As such, Gelugpas insist on the insertion of qualifiers, lest one negate too much. However, according to Mipham, the addition of the qualifier "ultimate" to the negandum (that which is to be negated) had been the main point of disagreement between the Prāsaṅgika Candrakīrti and the Svātantrika Bhāvaviveka, with Candrakīrti arguing that Madhyamaka must negate all types of production, not merely ultimate or inherent production. For any production that Madhyamaka fails to negate would not in fact be empty of its own being. On the other hand, Bhāvaviveka maintained that phenomena were empty of ultimate nature, but not empty of conventional own-being (even at the level of ultimate analysis). Mipham argues that the Prāsaṅgika charge that Svātantrikas hold to a substantialist position in their limitation of the negandum (with the insertion of the qualifier "ultimate") must equally apply to the Gelugpas themselves.Phuntsho, Karma. Mipham's Dialectics And The Debates On Emptiness: To Be, Not To Be Or Neither, pages 76-77. Routledge Curzon, 2005.
Like Mipham and Indian masters such as Candrakīrti, Gelugpas assert that emptiness is an absolute or non-implicative negation (prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag), meaning a negation which does not affirm the existence of anything. However, Mipham observes that negating a subject's inherent existence without negating the subject itself would in fact be an implicative negation (paryudāsa, ma yin dgag), contrary to what the Gelugpas claim. Mipham argues that by inserting the qualifier "inherently existent" to the statement, "there is no production," the Gelugpas negate inherently existent production but still affirm a kind of production, namely non-inherently existent production.Phuntsho, Karma. Mipham's Dialectics And The Debates On Emptiness: To Be, Not To Be Or Neither, page 79. Routledge Curzon, 2005.
Mipham also criticized the Gelugpas for the use of qualifiers in negating the tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi). For Mipham, the negation of the tetralemma must be taken at face value to mean the elimination of the four extremes: existence, nonexistence, both existence and nonexistence, and neither existence nor nonexistence. However, for Gelugpas, the negation of the tetralemma cannot be taken literally. They argue it is a contradiction to negate existence while also negating nonexistence. This is because the latter, being a double negation, affirms existence, contradicting the former. As such, the Gelugpas claim, one must insert qualifiers to the extremes negated. In response, Mipham argues that the negation of the tetralemma is non-implicative, i.e. it simply removes each of the four extremes without affirming anything.Phuntsho, Karma. Mipham's Dialectics And The Debates On Emptiness: To Be, Not To Be Or Neither, pages 91-95. Routledge Curzon, 2005.
Instead of negating existence, nonexistence, etc; Gelugpas negate inherent existence, conventional nonexistence, and so on. This they do as they are concerned to preserve rules of logic, such as the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle. However, for Mipham, rules of logic such as double negation as well as the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle are merely intended to aid beginners in debate. They belong to the realm of conventional truth, but do not apply at the level of ultimate emptiness, which is free of all elaborations and conceptual positions.Phuntsho, Karma. Mipham's Dialectics And The Debates On Emptiness: To Be, Not To Be Or Neither, pages 91-95. Routledge Curzon, 2005.
"A vase is not empty of vase" Mipham was also highly critical of the Gelugpa construction, "a vase is not empty of vase but of hypostatic [or inherent] existence." Mipham points out that it is actually a species of other-emptiness (shentong), contrary to the Gelugpas' claim to uphold the doctrine of self-emptiness (rangtong). This is because the inherent existence being negated is something other than the vase itself. This is like a yak's horn being empty of a rabbit's horn, i.e. it is the emptiness of one thing lacking another (itaretaraśunyatā, gcig la gcig med pa’i stong pa). Mipham calls this the worldly form of emptiness, as opposed to the ultimate, which is the scope of yogis.Phuntsho, Karma. Mipham's Dialectics And The Debates On Emptiness: To Be, Not To Be Or Neither, pages 79-80. Routledge Curzon, 2005.
According to the Gelugpa Tsongkhapa, if the vase were empty of vase, it would be utterly nonexistent. Thus for Tsongkhapa, ultimate analysis must establish a basis of negation (such as a vase) which is by nature not the negandum (inherent existence). However, Mipham argues that it is a substantialist tendency to think that negating the vase itself would lead to its total annihilation. It is to fail to see that, although the vase is empty of vase, it is nonetheless undeniable as a dependently originated appearance. What ultimate analysis targets is precisely these conventionally evident phenomena. Moreover, negating something conventionally nonexistent (such as a rabbit's horn or a barren woman's child) is not within the scope of ultimate analysis, as there is no need to negate something at the level of ultimate analysis that does not even exist conventionally.Phuntsho, Karma. Mipham's Dialectics And The Debates On Emptiness: To Be, Not To Be Or Neither, page 80. Routledge Curzon, 2005.
According to Mipham, the negation of a nonexistent thing cannot be the reality (dharmatā, chos nyid) of conventionally existent things. It is not the emptiness of one's own being. Such an emptiness would be similar to a vase's emptiness of cloth, or the emptiness of a rabbit's horn in a yak's horn, which is not the ultimate reality of the vase or yak's horn respectively. What's more, the construction, "the vase is not empty of vase but of inherent existence," contradicts numerous scriptures in which one finds statements such as "matter is empty of matter," and "eye is empty of eye." And since ordinary people do not experience an inherent existence separate from the conventionally existent vase itself, it is the very vase itself which must be established as empty.Phuntsho, Karma. Mipham's Dialectics And The Debates On Emptiness: To Be, Not To Be Or Neither, page 81. Routledge Curzon, 2005.