The Battle of Medina Ridge was a tank battle fought on February 27, 1991, during the Gulf War, between the U.S. 1st Armored Division and the 2nd Brigade of the Iraqi Republican Guard's Medina Luminous Division outside Basra, Iraq.Bourque, p.355 The U.S. 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, another major contributor, led the attack.Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by Bourque, p.27 Iraq's Motorized Division also participated.Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by Bourque P.350 Medina Ridge is the name American troops gave to an approximately long low rise.
The battle was fought for over two hours, making it the largest tank battle of the Gulf War. The battle took place west of phase line Kiwi, east of phase line Smash, and north of phase line Grape. Phase lines are map references occurring every few kilometers used to measure progress of an offensive operation.
History The 1st Armored Division, commanded by Major General Ron Griffith, consisted of some 3,000 vehicles including 348 M1A1 Abrams tanks. The 1st Armored Division's Cavalry Squadron - 1-1 Cavalry - made contact with the Medina Division and informed the division commander of the location of the enemy forces. 1st Armored Division's 2nd Brigade (comprising three battalions TF 4-70th Armor, TF 2-70th Armor and TF 1-35th Armor) saw major action in this battle and was commanded by Colonel Montgomery Cunningham Meigs (a descendant of General Montgomery C. Meigs of Civil War fame). 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel James Riley, replaced 1st Armored Division's 1st Brigade for the duration of the war and was also heavily involved in the battle.Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by Bourque, p.27 Medina Ridge was one of the few battles during Desert Storm in which American forces encountered significant Iraqi resistance. The Iraqi forces were well fortified and hidden, so that they could not be seen by American forces advancing until after they had finished cleared the top of the ridge line. This reverse slope position was intended to give the Iraqis protection from the powerful long-range direct fire of the M1 Abrams tanks and the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs).
During the battle, the American forces destroyed 186 Iraqi tanks (mostly T-72Ms, Asad Babil and obsolete Type 69s) and 127 other armored vehicles.Carhart, Tom (1994). Iron Soldiers: How America's 1st Armored Division Crushed Iraq's Elite Republican Guard. New York: Random House. pp. 119–204. Only four Abrams tanks were directly hit in the battle. Evidence suggests that some of them were hit by Iraqi T-72 fire.Richard M. Bohannon cites an M1A1 tank platoon leader from TF 1-37: "Speculation continues concerning what knocked out our four tanks. The three most probable answers are T-72 main gun, dismounted anti-tank missile, or Apache launched Hellfire missile. The fact that Apaches were operating to our rear and witnesses' reports of high round trajectory support the friendly fire theory. However, ballistics reports suggest that 125 mm HEAT rounds produced the damage on some of the tanks. Visual examination of others reveals one obvious sabot hole. Overall, the physical evidence implies that T-72 fire took out our tanks, but the friendly fire possibility cannot be excluded".
Bohannon, Second Lieutenant Richard (1992) Dragon's Roar: 1-37 armor in the battle of 73 Easting. Armor magazine, May–June, 1992, pp. 11-17. Ballistics reports have further confirmed this as well as physical evidence such as obvious sabot holes. Out of the four Abrams that were struck, one was a catastrophic loss and other three were disabled but repairable.Carhart, Tom (1994). Iron Soldiers: How America's 1st Armored Division Crushed Iraq's Elite Republican Guard. New York: Random House. p.323 Thirty-eight of the Iraqi tanks were destroyed by US air support formed of U.S. Army AH-64 Apaches and U.S. Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt IIs. The 75th Field Artillery Brigade and Battery B, 25th Field Artillery, the division's target acquisition battery, conducted counter-artillery fire missions and destroyed two Medina Field Artillery battalions in the process.Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by Bourque, p.352 The 2nd Battalion, 1st Field Artillery Regiment also eventually participated in these counter-battery missions.Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by Bourque, p.356 On February 25, the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division conducted a 113 km movement to destroy elements of the 26th Infantry Division, resulting in the capture of 299 prisoners of war (POWs). On February 26, the 3rd Brigade was ordered to attack east to gain contact with and destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) in zone. The 3rd Brigade began an aggressive movement which covered 74 km in 12 hours, while fighting multiple engagements throughout the day and night with elements of the 52nd Armored Division, 17th, Adnan, and Tawakalna Divisions. During one engagement with the Tawakalna Division, the brigade destroyed 27 Soviet export model T-72 tanks which had established a hasty defense to cover the Iraqi forces withdrawing from the Kuwaiti Theater of Operation.
As the heaviest armor brigade, consisting of the 6th Battalion, 6th Infantry; the 1st Battalion, 35th Armor; the 2nd Battalion, 70th Armor; the 4th Battalion, 70th Armor; the 2nd Battalion, 1st Field Artillery and the 47th Support Battalion (Forward), the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division acted as the lead brigade during combat operations. On February 27, the 2nd Brigade was fully engaged with the Medina's 2nd Brigade and, in the largest single engagement of the war, destroyed 61 Iraqi T-72 and T-55 tanks, 34 APCs and five SA-13 air defense systems in less than an hour.Carhart, Tom (1994). Iron Soldiers: How America's 1st Armored Division Crushed Iraq's Elite Republican Guard. New York: Random House..
On February 27, the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division was ordered to transition to pursuit operations to establish contact with and destroy the RGFC forces in the area. As the brigade attacked and fought through the Adnan Division, securing a RGFC major logistics base, it captured 465 POWs and made contact with the Medina Armored Division, which was augmented by elements of four other Iraqi divisions. The battle ended in the destruction of 82 tanks, 31 armored personnel carriers, 11 artillery pieces, 48 trucks, 3 anti-aircraft guns and the capture of 72 POWs for the loss of 2 Bradley Cavalry vehicles, 1 Killed In Action (KIA), and 30 soldiers Wounded In Action (WIA). The American soldier killed was Specialist Clarence A. (“Johnny”) Cash, a scout assigned to 4th Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division.
While conducting offensive operations against the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command, the 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division fought on the division's right flank as it led the VII Corps main attack against the RGFC. Completing the destruction of the RGFC Brigade, the 3rd Brigade rejoined the division & transitioned to pursuit operations and continued its attack eastward. Executing an aggressive and continuous movement, the 3rd Brigade fought numerous engagements, such as making contact with a tank battalion defending the western flank of a major RGFC logistics base. The 3rd Brigade raced eastward at a rate of 15 kilometers per hour. In 24 hours of nearly continuous combat, the 3rd Brigade destroyed or captured 547 vehicles, including 102 tanks, 81 armored personnel carriers, 34 artillery pieces, 15 AAA guns, and captured hundreds of tons of supplies and 528 POWs. The 3rd Brigade completed this exemplary action without the loss of a single soldier or vehicle and only three soldiers Wounded In Action (WIA).
1st Armored Division's aviation assets conducted thirty-nine straight hours of continuous combat operations, rotating companies into and out of the battle prior to and after the actions at Medina Ridge. Attack helicopters maintained a steady destructive presence in front of the division, engaging targets of opportunity and shifting their focus as the scenario required. The brigade's final battle commenced when the division raced to clear its zone of advance to the Kuwaiti border prior to the impending cease-fire.
Although the Iraqis used a correct defensive tactic at Medina Ridge by deploying their armor behind the ridge, this was not effectively repeated through the rest of the war. In one incident, an Iraqi commander attempted to repeat what had been done at Medina but mistakenly deployed his division too far from the ridgeline.Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by Bourque, p.355 This gave the US units the upper hand, as the Abrams tanks specialize in long-distance kills; their Chobham armor is extremely resistant to long-range fire. The American height advantage also reduced the effective range of the Iraqi tanks and presented the Iraqi gunners with a targeting situation for which they were under-trained.Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War by Bourque, p.355 Despite their lack of training for such circumstances, Iraqis shot down an A-10 Thunderbolt II,"The Iraqis had skillfully dug in and camouflaged their firing line and placed a formidable protective ring of antiaircraft guns around it. One ZSU-23-4 managed to shoot down an American A-10 aircraft." Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War, Robert H. Scales, p. 298, Potomac Books, Inc, 1998 and two AH-64 Apache helicopters. Most of the units belonging to the 1st Armored Division and the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division were awarded Valorous Unit Award citations.
In early April 1991, Colonel Montgomery Meigs, the commander of the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Armored Division, paid his respects to his former enemy's Medina Division reporting that, "These guys stayed and fought".US troops remember Medina Ridge The same newspaper articles notes that, "The Americans had more than 100 battle tanks on hand, about the same as the total number of tanks in the Iraqi force. But the Americans had some noteworthy advantages over the Iraqis like attack helicopters and A-10 anti-tanks planes. The Iraqis had no support aircraft."
Task Force 1-37 In a short six-month period during 1990 and 1991, the 1st Battalion, 37th Armor, was alerted for deployment to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, deployed all of its personnel and equipment over from an already forward deployed location, fought a major battle against a well equipped enemy over terrain they had never trained on and then redeployed the unit to its home station.
The 1st Battalion 37th Armor (1st Armored Division) from Rose Barracks, Vilseck, Germany, commanded by LTC Edward L. Dyer, was alerted for deployment to the Persian Gulf on November 8, 1990. 1–37 Armor was the first brigade unit from Vilseck to deploy. 1–37 Armor was attached to the 3rd "Bulldog" Brigade from Warner Barracks in Bamberg, Germany, under their former commander, Colonel Daniel Zannini. A small advance party deployed on 14 December and the main body began departing on December 26. By December 30, the main body of the battalion had arrived in Saudi Arabia. Vehicles and equipment which had been shipped from ports in Europe began to arrive on January 4 and by January 12 all the equipment had arrived. When hostilities commenced on January 15, 1991, the battalion was in the process of closing the last elements into TAA Thompson. The next month was spent task organizing, training, rehearsing, and preparing for the ground war.