Norman Daniel Cota Sr., nicknamed "Dutch" (May 30, 1893 – October 4, 1971) was a senior United States Army officer who fought during World War II. Cota was heavily involved in the planning and execution of the Allied invasion of Normandy, in June 1944, codenamed Operation Neptune, and the subsequent Battle of Normandy. He is known for rallying demoralized troops on Omaha Beach on D-Day, by engaging in combat beside them and personally leading their first successful breakout, for which he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).
Early life and military career Cota was born in Chelsea, Massachusetts, son of George William Cota, a former railroad telegrapher (later a merchant), and Jessie H. Mason, a school teacher whose family lines can be traced to Capt. Hugh Mason and Hester Welles (Wells) on "The Francis", part of "The Winthrop Fleet", the secord or third ship that arrived after the arrival of "The Mayflower". He attended Worcester Academy for three years beginning in the fall of 1910. While playing football there, his teammates nicknamed him "Dutch;" the name stuck with him, but its origins remain unclear.
In June 1913, he was accepted to the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York. The U.S. entered World War I on 6 April 1917, so the Class of 1917 graduated on 20 April, seven weeks ahead of schedule. Cota played for the Army Cadets football team, where he was a teammate of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Omar Bradley.
Cota, graduating 79th in a class of 139, was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Infantry Branch, and his first assignment was with the 22nd Infantry Regiment. Due to the outbreak of war, Cota was quickly promoted to first lieutenant, then captain after only a few months. By the time he had accumulated 18 months of active duty, he was a major. He was assigned to become an instructor in tactics at West Point shortly before the end of the war on 11 November 1918, and he remained on the faculty until 1920.
Between the wars In 1919, the Army downsized and Cota reverted to captain from his temporary wartime rank of major. While post financial officer at Langley Field, Virginia in 1922, he was held personally responsible when the post was robbed of $43,000. It took an appeal to Congress for him to be absolved of having to personally repay the stolen funds.
He later served in Hawaii (1924–1928) and graduated from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in June 1931. His student paper "Study of the dispositions of the Turkish 19th Division on the night of April 24–25 and its operations to include the night of April 27–28" was about the Gallipoli Campaign in World War I. He was an instructor at the U.S. Army Infantry School (1932–1933) and graduated from the U.S. Army War College in 1936. He was an instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School (1938–1940). While there he was promoted to lieutenant colonel on July 1, 1940. He then became the executive officer (XO) for the 16th Infantry Regiment at Fort Jay, Governors Island, New York.
World War II North Africa At the outbreak of the American entry into World War II, he was the G-2 Officer (Intelligence) and then G-3 Officer (Plans and Training) of the 1st Infantry Division from March 1941 until June 1942, during which time he was promoted again, this time to the temporary rank of colonel, on December 13, 1941. In June 1942, he was promoted to chief of staff of the division, a position he held until February 1943.
In that same month, right after his involvement in the Allied invasion of North Africa, under the command of Major General Terry Allen, he prepared a report which included suggested revisions to the task organization of assault divisions, and his recommendations were adopted during preparations for Operation Husky, the codename for the Allied invasion of Sicily.Eisenhower Archives, Description, Jacob Devers Papers on Operation Husky , Box 2, Reel 8, Proposed Organization of an Assault Division -- Report by Norman Cota, retrieved March 4, 2014 He was promoted to the one-star general officer rank of brigadier general in the Army of the United States (AUS) on February 2, 1943 and was quickly sent to the United Kingdom, where he served as the American advisor to the Combined Operations Division of the European Theater of Operations (ETO). In that capacity, Cota helped supervise the training for amphibious landing operations.
Operation Overlord As a major advisor in Operation Overlord, he was made the assistant division commander (ADC) of the 29th Infantry Division, which was designated to land at Omaha Beach during the Battle of Normandy. The 29th Division, a National Guard formation nicknamed the "Blue and Gray", was commanded by his fellow West Point classmate, Major General Charles H. Gerhardt. During the planning for D-Day, he opposed daylight landings, believing a pre-dawn assault would stand a better chance of success. A year before the invasion, at the Conference on Landing Assaults, Cota had argued in favor of striving for tactical surprise:
It is granted that strategical surprise will be impossible to attain. Tactical surprise is another thing however...tactical surprise is one of the most powerful factors in determining success. I therefore, favor the night landing. I do not believe the daylight assault can succeed.
Cota was not alone in his opposition. Major General Leonard T. Gerow, commander of V Corps, and Admiral John L. Hall Jr., commander of Amphibious Force "O" (the naval force responsible for delivery of the 1st Infantry Division to the beach), both fought to change the Operation Overlord plan, pleading for a nighttime assault.
However, the high command decided otherwise, concluding that naval and air bombardment would hopefully neutralize, or in the best case, eradicate, enemy opposition. The plan for Omaha essentially called for hurling infantry directly at a prepared enemy position, a position that was enhanced by the concave shape of the beach (effectively promoting enemy crossfire into the "basin" of the concavity), natural and man-made obstacles, bad weather and other factors.
Most D-Day commanders assured their men that the Germans would be annihilated by the Allies' pre-invasion firepower, and that the defenders were, in any case, outnumbered, inexperienced and demoralized. All of these beliefs were to be proved woefully inaccurate. On the afternoon of June 5, Cota gave an accurate assessment to the staff of the 29th Infantry Division:
This is different from any of the other exercises that you've had so far. The little discrepancies that we tried to correct on Slapton Sands are going to be magnified and are going to give way to incidents that you might at first view as chaotic...You're going to find confusion. The landing craft aren't going in on schedule and people are going to be landed in the wrong place. Some won't be landed at all...We must improvise, carry on, not lose our heads.
While Cota had a far less optimistic view of the plan than the high command, even he did not completely predict the extent of the near-catastrophe that awaited V Corps (composed of the 29th Infantry Division and the famous "Big Red One" 1st Infantry Division) on Omaha Beach.
Cota landed with a part of the 116th Infantry Regiment, part of the 29th Division, in the second wave, approximately one hour after H-Hour on the Omaha sector known as Dog White. His LCVP landing craft came under heavy machine-gun fire as well as mortar and light artillery fire; three soldiers were killed immediately upon leading the disembarkation.
Cota was one of the highest-ranking officers on the beach that day. After landing on the beach, he personally rallied shell-shocked, pinned-down survivors to open one of the first vehicle exits off the beach. Cota and his men advanced to the seawall, where they used Bangalore torpedoes and wire cutters to punch through. They then destroyed a machine-gun nest, after which they made a breakthrough from Omaha Beach. Two quotes Cota spoke during the initial fighting later became famous:
In a meeting with Max Schneider, commander of the 5th Ranger Battalion, Cota asked "What outfit is this?" Someone yelled, "5th Rangers!" In an effort to inspire Schneider's men to leave the cover of the seawall and advance through a breach, Cota replied, "Well, God damn it, if you are Rangers, then get up there and lead the way!" "Rangers lead the way" became the motto of the U.S. Army Rangers. He was also credited with calmly rallying his troops with the statement "Gentlemen, we are being killed on the beaches. Let us go inland and be killed."
For his heroic leadership on D-Day and in the days and weeks afterwards, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC), the citation for which reads:
With the coast of Normandy eventually secured, Allied forces advanced toward Paris. On August 14, 1944, Cota was replaced as assistant division commander by Leroy H. Watson and assigned to command the 28th Infantry Division, succeeding Brigadier General James Edward Wharton, who had been killed in action by a sniper, just hours after assuming command. Cota's ADC's were, in turn, Brigadier General Kenneth Buchanan, Brigadier General George A. Davis, and Brigadier General Edmund Sebree; Brigadier General Basil H. Perry, a 1917 West Point classmate, commanded the 28th Division's artillery. After attempting to trap the retreating Germans at Le Neubourg and Elbeuf on the Seine River, Cota and the 28th Division were assigned to represent the U.S. Army in the parade celebrating the liberation of Paris. Later that year, while in the field, Cota was promoted to major general (AUS) on September 4.
Western Europe
As the commanding general of the 28th Infantry Division, Major General Cota's division was involved in the Battle of Hürtgen Forest, conceived by Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, the U.S. 12th Army Group commander, as a direct assault on established German positions in the heavily forested region, positions which significantly favored the defenders. Cota was not pleased with the operations order he was given. It required him to send three regiments on diverging paths to three different objectives. Further, his division would be the only unit attacking on a front. His complaints were given little weight by his immediate superior, the V Corps commander, Major General Leonard Gerow.
The northern and southern thrusts achieved little. The center regiment, the 112th Infantry, captured two villages and a town, but was eventually driven back by German counterattacks. In an article written for the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Thomas Bradbeer identified "three crucial mistakes" that Cota made. First, neither he nor his staff ordered reconnaissance patrols. Second, he selected, sight unseen, an extremely narrow trail as the division's main supply route. Finally, he chose not to employ the extra armor units he was given in support of his infantry, believing the terrain and road system to be unsuitable for their use, whereas much of the forest was in fact accessible. Instead, the tanks were used as supplementary artillery. Furthermore, Lieutenant General Bradley criticized Cota for remaining in his command post, visiting the front only once late in the fighting, by which time he had already lost control of the situation.