Hrizea of Bogdănei (), also rendered as Hrizică, sometimes Hrizea-Vodă ("Hrizea the Voivode"; ? – April to September 1657), was a Wallachian boyar and rebel leader, who proclaimed himself reigning prince in 1655. After rising to high office under his relative, Prince Matei Basarab, he was reconfirmed by Constantin Șerban. He alternated the offices of Spatharios, in charge of the Wallachian military forces, and Paharnic, before being won over by the rebellious Seimeni mercenaries. He issued a claim to the throne in Târgoviște, but controlled only part of the country, and had his seat at Gherghița. In summer 1655, his army was defeated, at Șoplea, by Wallachian loyalist troops, supported by Transylvanians and Moldavians.
Hrizea took refuge in the Ottoman Empire, where he surrendered, and then was retained with his family as hostage by Transylvanian Prince George II Rákóczi. He escaped his captivity at Feyérvár during the confusion that followed Rákóczi's participation in the Swedish Deluge. Trying to stage his return to Wallachia with a new Seimeni force, he was reportedly kidnapped south of Hermannstadt, and delivered to Wallachia as a prisoner. His supporters were met by Preda Brâncoveanu in Gorj County in September 1657, and were defeated there, possibly following a ruse or a betrayal.
The survivors were mutilated or executed in various ways. Hrizea and his retinue were also killed—either hanged or broken on the wheel. The Seimeni continued to be involved in intrigues against Prince Constantin, and were eventually pacified by the latter. Some made a brief return to prominence under Mihnea III, part of a warlord alliance gathered around Rákóczi.
Biography Rise Hrizea was alive at the time when Wallachia and Moldavia, the two Danubian Principalities, were vassal states of the Ottoman Empire; he was by origin a member of the boyar nobility. Born at an unknown date, he was the only known son of Vistier Dumitrașco of Bogdănei (died 1636). His mother Alexandra was the daughter of another Hrizea, the boyar of Bălteni, who served as Vornic.Ionașcu, p. 267; Stoicescu, pp. 174–175, 196–197 The family took its name from a core estate in Ialomița County, though it also owned land in Oltenia, at Verguleasa.Ionașcu, p. 267 Dumitrașco is described by scholar Nicolae Iorga as a "rural boyar",Iorga, p. 197 which indicates that he was not one of the major figures in Wallachian politics. However, as noted by historian N. Stoicescu, his known aristocratic origins contradict claims that Hrizea was an upstart, claims which were first publicized by an anonymous chronicle, Letopisețul Cantacuzinesc.Stoicescu, pp. 196–197 Moreover, Hrizea was cousins with the scholar Udriște Năsturel and his sister Elena; the latter was married to Matei Basarab, a Seimeni leader who became the Wallachian Prince in 1632.Stoicescu, pp. 196–197, 215
Iorga describes the future rebel as a staunch opponent of the regime, one whose servants testified against Prince Matei in front of Ottoman Sultan Murad IV.Iorga, p. 89 This in fact refers to his maternal grandfather Hrizea, who spent the early 1630s as a refugee in Moldavia, eventually reconciling with his lord.Stoicescu, pp. 195–196 Himself a loyalist, Hrizea of Bogdănei is first attested as a second-class Postelnic at Prince Matei's court in May 1642, and confirmed as one of the Cluceri in 1643; he possibly served as Clucer until March 1650, when he was assigned a Captaincy in the Wallachian military forces.Stoicescu, p. 196 He was Matei's Great Paharnic from February 23, 1651, to June 11, 1653, possibly inheriting this office from his father-in-law, Drăgușin (or Dragomir) of the Deleni boyars.Ionașcu, pp. 101, 263, 267 Drăgușin's daughter, named in records as Stana, was the mother of Hrizea's three sons—Barbu, Stoica and Matei—and daughter, Ilina.Ionașcu, pp. 263–265, 267; Stoicescu, pp. 193, 196–197 On their estate at Verguleasa, the family erected a Wallachian Orthodox church, where he is mistakenly recorded as "Rizea".Ionașcu, pp. 200–201, 267
A new Prince, Constantin Șerban, selected Hrizea as his general commander, or Spatharios, on April 25, 1654. He served in that position to December 29, returning as Great Paharnic from January 8 to May 11, 1655.Stoicescu, p. 196. See also Paul of Aleppo & Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, pp. 135, 137, 144 He was also an "intimate friend" of the new ruler, whose ascent came with the persecution of Matei Basarab's loyalists. In 1654, the preceding Spatharios, Diicul Buicescul, was mutilated ("they carved his nose") to prevent his candidacy for the throne. Buicescul then ran away from the country, seeking refuge in the Principality of Transylvania.Nicolae Minei, "Poșta Magazin Istoric. Un boier oltean", in Magazin Istoric, September 1973, p. 97Paul of Aleppo & Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, pp. 144–145; Stoicescu, pp. 129–130; Xenopol, p. 135 As noted at the time by the chronicler Paul of Aleppo, Wallachia's Spatharios (or Serdar), who may have been either Buicescul or Hrizea, was a central figure at the investiture, receiving the army and people's oath on behalf of the Prince.Paul of Aleppo & Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, pp. 135–137
Rebellion At this stage, Hrizea became involved in the plot against Prince Constantin, which broke out as a rebellion of the Seimeni (or Servitori) mercenaries, which is traced by historians to February 26 or 27 (Old Style: February 16 or 17), 1655.Cazacu, p. 5; Demény, pp. 315, 317; Iorga, p. 197; Rezachevici, p. 92 According to various records, Constantin had intended to terminate contracts for mostly Serb troops, already noted for their rebelliousness under Prince Matei. The Seimeni were warned of this by their colleagues in the regular infantry, and proceeded to seek out boyars whom they viewed as responsible for their plight.Demény, pp. 315–317; Filipescu, pp. 132–133 Other detailed accounts suggest that Constantin wanted infantry officers on his side, promising them an increased pay, upon which the footmen sided with the Seimeni.Cazacu, p. 5; Rezachevici, pp. 91–94 Historian A. D. Xenopol favors a different account: Constantin tried but failed to arrest all of the Seimeni at once, as only 200 of some 1,000 obeyed his order to show up in Bucharest. The boyars, Xenopol writes, were correctly identified as being hostile to the Seimeni, having openly supported the elimination of an expenditure which went to "savage" and "desperate" troops.Xenopol, pp. 133–134, 136 Chronicler David Herman reports that the Seimeni were never subject to a mass arrest, although their commander, Simion, was kidnapped by Constantin's guards.Demény, p. 316–317
The enraged mercenaries embarked on an "unprecedented bloodletting";Rezachevici, p. 94 they "entered the boyar homes, chopping them up with their weapons before their wives and young ones, in many places raping their women, pillaging their homes and estates."Costin, p. 191 Various accounts name between 14 and 32 of Wallachia's boyars as murdered in the first incidents of the revolt, though tens more were probably also killed at this stage.Demény, pp. 317–318 Despite its brutality and its desecration of churches, the revolt was endorsed by the Wallachia's Romanian populace, and was especially popular with the boyars' serfs.Cazacu, pp. 4–6, 7, 14; Demény, pp. 312–314, 317–321, 327–329; Giurescu, p. 73 Allied or opportunistic revolts broke out among the tenants of Arnota Monastery, in Dobriceni and Bărbătești, as well as among the tanners of Bucharest and the burghers of Târgoviște, Buzău, and Ploiești.Cazacu, p. 6; Demény, pp. 319–321
Several historians propose that the revolt should be read as more than a "praetorian" uprising. This view was embraced by Ludovic Demény, who agreed with Iorga's description of "deeper causes" for Seimeni massacres. He decries "subjectivist" assessments by Ilie Minea and Sándor Szilágyi, highlighting mass popular support for the mercenaries.Demény, pp. 307–312, 319–321, 333–335 Likewise, Matei Cazacu describes the uprising as an "anti-feudal movement" or "social war", "the first one in our history to target the Prince [...], as well as religion".Cazacu, pp. 5–6 This view is also backed by another author, Constantin Rezachievici, who views the Seimeni rising as "the most important mass movement of all the medieval period, south of the Carpathians."Rezachevici, p. 95 Researcher George Potra also deems the Seimeni war a "great popular uprising [...] against boyar oppression and exploitation".Potra I, p. 17
The uprising was in full swing by April, managing to kill several figures at Constantin's court, including Ban Ghiorma Alexeanu and Clucer Cârstea Cornățeanu, as well as a former Vistier, George Karydis.Giurescu, p. 73; Stoicescu, pp. 105, 162–163, 182, 193. See also Filipescu, p. 133 By several accounts, Prince Constantin was his troops' hostage, pretending to endorse the massacres, but secretly asking for a Transylvanian intervention against the Seimeni.Cazacu, pp. 6–7; Costin, pp. 191–192; Demény, pp. 320–324; Filipescu, pp. 132–133; Iorga, p. 197; Rezachevici, pp. 93, 95–96 This view is partly contradicted by Xenopol, who notes that Constantin had a running dispute with the Transylvanian Prince, George II Rákóczi. The latter was interested in intervening against the Seimeni because he wanted Buicescul and his son to take over as puppet rulers of Wallachia.Xenopol, pp. 134–136 Buicescul's name is recorded among those of Wallachian boyars who openly begged for a Transylvanian intervention.Demény, p. 324
Prince-claimant Rákóczi officially declared that he would take measure to contain the revolt and prevent it from spreading into Transylvania or Moldavia; he was also alarmed by news that the Seimeni were trying to forge an alliance with the Cossack Hetmanate, which risked opening a war on two fronts.Demény, pp. 322, 324–327 He convened a Diet at his capital in Feyérvár (Bălgrad), asking for its permission to commence war in Wallachia. This began on April 13, with a southward march from Segesvár (Sighișoara) to Corona (Brașov), where Rákóczi gathered some 30,000 soldiers and 12 cannons.Demény, pp. 323–324, 327; Iorga, p. 197. See also Cazacu, p. 7 Faced with this emergency, the Seimeni took an oath from Constantin, who promised again to act as their sovereign.Xenopol, pp. 136, 139 Led at the time by a Muslim, they welcomed Ottoman envoys, assuring them that theirs was not a revolt against the Empire.Xenopol, pp. 133–134, 136–137 As Cazacu notes, the Ottoman overseers, in particular Siyavuş Pasha, wanted to join in the war on the Seimeni, but the main Ottoman army was still fearful of a war in the East.Cazacu, p. 6 Other authors suggest that the reason for such inaction was the Cretan War.Demény, p. 322; Rezachevici, p. 95
As noted by Rezachevici, Constantin had been able to send out some of the Seimeni leaders as delegates to Transylvania, whereupon Rákóczi had captured them; he replaced the missing commanders with boyars from his own retinue.Rezachevici, pp. 95–96 He then persuaded his captors to let him meet with Rákóczi at Gherghița, but while on his way there changed course eastward and headed for the Ottoman province of Silistra, surrendering to Siyavuş Pasha.Demény, p. 328; Filipescu, p. 134; Rezachevici, p. 96; Xenopol, p. 137. See also Costin, p. 192; Iorga, pp. 197–198 The boyars began courting Preda Brâncoveanu, proposing that he replace Constantin on the throne. Brâncoveanu remained a loyalist, with his own son Papa having been killed in the events.Stoicescu, p. 125 Before or after this moment, the mercenaries ransacked Dintr-un Lemn Monastery, which was under Preda's patronage.Ioan Lăcustă, "Mănăstirea Dintr-un Lemn – veacuri de istorie", in Magazin Istoric, August 1998, p. 58