Ariel Rubinstein

Ariel Rubinstein (Hebrew: אריאל רובינשטיין; born April 13, 1951) is a Professor Emeritus of Economics at Tel Aviv University and a Professor of Economics at New York University. His primary research focuses on economic theory, specifically game theory, bounded rationality, choice theory, economics and language, and experimental economics.

Rubinstein is a recipient of the Israel Prize (2002), a member of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, and a foreign member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the British Academy.

Politically, Rubinstein holds a left-wing Zionist worldview, which he frequently expresses in his publicistic writing.

Biography Rubinstein was born in 1951 in the Tel Arza neighborhood of Jerusalem. His parents, Leah and Yehuda, immigrated to Israel from Białystok in the 1930s. His sister was the musician Bat-Sheva Rubinstein.

He attended the Sokolov and Beit HaYeled schools and later graduated from the Hebrew University Secondary School. He served as an officer in the Artillery Corps. In 1971, he began his studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, completing a B.A. in Mathematics, Economics, and Statistics (1974). He earned an M.A. in Economics (1975) under Menahem Yaari and an M.Sc. in Mathematics (1976) under Bezalel Peleg. In 1979, he was awarded a PhD in Economics, also supervised by Menahem Yaari.

After postdoctoral fellowships at Nuffield College and Bell Labs, he joined the faculty of the Hebrew University in 1981, becoming a full professor in 1985. In 1990, he moved to the School of Economics at Tel Aviv University, where he became Professor Emeritus in 2019. Concurrently, he held partial appointments at Princeton University (1990–2003) and New York University (since 2003).

His major honors include the Israel Prize in Economics (2002), the Nemmers Prize in Economics (2004), the EMET Prize (2006), and serving as the President of the Econometric Society (2004).

He was a co-founder of the "Movement for Another Zionism" and one of the initiators of the "Officers' Letter" (1978) and Peace Now. He was married to Yael Rubinstein, a former Israeli ambassador, and has two children, Michal and Yuval.

Academic Work Rubinstein views models of economic theory as fables and believes they should be evaluated as such.Ariel Rubinstein, Economic Fables, Open Book Publishers, 2012-04-20. ISBN 978-1-906924-77-5. He is skeptical of using economic theory as a definitive basis for predictions or policy recommendations. He argues that while theory can clarify thinking, its principles are not necessarily prescriptions for reality:"Economics studies can, at most, encourage systematic thinking about social and economic problems, but they cannot provide solutions... there are no professionals with solutions to society's current problems, but there are plenty of charlatans waiting for the call."He believes that one should not rush to apply economic theory to the moral decisions of everyday life:"The rapid and assertive leap from abstract discussion to concrete problems is the greatest danger in using concepts derived from the academic ivory tower. When dealing with political issues, it is doubtful whether an appeal to academic theory is superior to the wisdom of the 'man on the street'."Rubinstein has made contributions to a vast number of fields in economic theory, as follows:

Game Theory

Bargaining Theory: Rubinstein's most famous paperAriel Rubinstein, "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model", Econometrica, Vol. 50 (1982), pp. 97–109. doi:10.2307/1912531. presents a strategic model of bargaining, which serves as a development of the work of Nobel Laureate John Forbes Nash Jr.. The relationship between Rubinstein's model and the Nash bargaining model was analyzed in two subsequent papersKen Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein, and Asher Wolinsky, "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling", The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 17 (1986), p. 176. doi:10.2307/2555382.Ariel Rubinstein, Zvi Safra, and William Thomson, "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences", Econometrica, Vol. 60 (1992), pp. 1171–1186. doi:10.2307/2951543.. Repeated Games: Alongside Nobel Laureates Robert Aumann and Lloyd Shapley, Rubinstein analyzed perfect equilibrium in repeated game models with players using "limit of means" or "overtaking" criteria, proving what is known as the Perfect Folk TheoremAriel Rubinstein, "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 21 (1979), pp. 1–9. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90002-4.. The Email Game: His paper demonstrates that a game with incomplete information, where players have "almost common knowledge," can differ significantly from a game with actual Common Knowledge (CK). This paradoxical idea has been utilized in game theory as a method for equilibrium selection in an approach called Global GamesAriel Rubinstein, "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under 'Almost Common Knowledge'", The American Economic Review, Vol. 79 (1989), pp. 385–391..

Bounded Rationality Rubinstein was among the first to build economic models where participants engage in decision procedures that are inconsistent with the "Rational Agent" model. His primary contributions in this field include:

Repeated Games with Finite Automata: His paperAriel Rubinstein, "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 39 (1986), pp. 83–96. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90021-9. was a pioneer in analyzing repeated games where players do not only seek to maximize utility but also strive to minimize the complexity of the strategies they employ. Choice Procedures: An example of his work on choice procedures is his study of decision-making under uncertainty using the concept of similarityAriel Rubinstein, "Similarity and decision-making under risk (is there a utility theory resolution to the Allais paradox?)", Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 46 (1988), pp. 145–153. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(88)90154-8.. Mechanism Design: Together with Jacob Glazer, Rubinstein built unique models where a designer attempts to achieve a desired outcome by exploiting the cognitive limitations of the playersJacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein, "A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 120 (2012).Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein, "Magical Implementation", working paper available at arielrubinstein.org.. Imperfect Memory: In a paper with Michele Piccione, the two conceived the Absent Driver ParadoxMichele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein, "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall", Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 20 (1997), pp. 3–24. doi:10.1006/game.1997.0536.: A driver traveling a road with two exits wishes to exit at the second one, but knows that upon reaching an intersection, he will not remember whether he is at the first or second exit. The analysis demonstrates the paradoxical nature of decision-making with imperfect memory. Equilibrium with Sampling: Alongside Martin Osborne, they introduced a game-theoretic solution based on the assumption that players sample each of their available strategies and choose the one that performed best in the sample. This new equilibrium exhibits properties (such as the use of dominated strategies) that are not possible in conventional game theoryMartin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, "Games with Procedurally Rational Players", The American Economic Review, Vol. 88 (1998), pp. 834–847..

Market Models

Bargaining and Markets: Together with Asher Wolinsky, Rubinstein built market models where buyers and sellers meet randomly and bargain under the shadow of the ability to return and bargain with others. The outcome of this process differs fundamentally from the predictions of competitive equilibriumAriel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky, "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining", Econometrica, Vol. 53 (1985), pp. 1133–1150. doi:10.2307/1911015.. Jungle Economics: In a work with Michele Piccione, the two presented a model where the outcome of economic interaction results from the power dynamics between playersMichele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein, "Equilibrium in the Jungle", The Economic Journal, Vol. 117 (2007), pp. 883–896. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02072.x.. Economics Without Prices and Without Games: In recent years, Rubinstein has focused on building market models outside the frameworks of competitive equilibrium or game theory. These works, mostly done with Michael Richter, were summarized in their book No Prices, No Games! (Four Economic Models)Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein, No Prices No Games!: Four Economic Models, Open Book Publishers, 2024. ISBN 978-1-80511-308-9..

Experimental Economics His experimental work began with a collaboration with Amos Tversky on the Hide and Seek GameAriel Rubinstein, Amos Tversky, and Dana Heller, "Naive Strategies in Competitive Games", in Understanding Strategic Interaction, Springer, 1997, pp. 394–402. ISBN 978-3-642-60495-9. and continued through a didactic website he established in 2002"Games-and-Behavior: Experimental Game Theory", arielrubinstein.org, retrieved February 14, 2026.. Rubinstein was a pioneer in emphasizing the importance of measuring response time to interpret participant behavior in economic experimentsAriel Rubinstein, "Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times", The Economic Journal, Vol. 117 (2007), pp. 1243–1259. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02081.x.Ariel Rubinstein, "A Typology of Players: Between Instinctive and Contemplative", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 131 (2016), pp. 859–890. doi:10.1093/qje/qjw008..

Ariel Rubinstein

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