The Republic (; )Henri Estienne (ed.), Platonis opera quae extant omnia, Vol. 2, 1578, p. 327. is a Socratic dialogue authored by Plato around 375 BC, concerning justice (), the order and character of the just city-state, and the just man.Brickhouse, Thomas and Smith, Nicholas D. Plato (c. 427–347 BC), The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, University of Tennessee, cf. Dating Plato's Dialogues. It is Plato's best-known work, and one of the world's most influential works of philosophy and political theory, both intellectually and historically.National Public Radio (8 August 2007). Plato's 'Republic' Still Influential, Author Says . Talk of the Nation.Plato: The Republic . Plato: His Philosophy and his life, allphilosophers.com
In the dialogue, Socrates discusses with various Athenians and foreigners the meaning of justice and whether the just man is happier than the unjust man.In ancient times, the book was alternately titled On Justice (not to be confused with the spurious dialogue of the same name). He considers the natures of existing regimes and then proposes a series of hypothetical cities in comparison, culminating in Kallipolis (), a utopian city-state ruled by a class of philosopher-kings. They also discuss ageing, love, theory of forms, the immortality of the soul, and the role of the philosopher and of poetry in society. The dialogue's setting seems to be the time of the Peloponnesian War.Although "there would be jarring anachronisms if any of the candidate specific dates between 432 and 404 were assigned". Nails, Debra (2002), The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics. Hackett Publishing. , p. 324
Place in Plato's corpus The Republic is generally placed in the middle period of Plato's dialogues. However, the distinction of the middle dialogues from the early dialogues is not as clear as the distinction of the late dialogues from all the others. Nonetheless, Ritter, Arnim, and Baron—each adopting separate methodologies—agree that the Republic was well distinguished, along with Parmenides, Phaedrus and Theaetetus.Brandwood, Leonard, The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues (Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 251.
The first book of the Republic, which shares many features with earlier dialogues, is thought to have originally been written as a separate work, with the remaining books being conjoined to it, perhaps with modifications to the original of the first book.
Outline
Book I: Aging, Love, and the Definitions of Justice (327a–354c)
Socrates and Glaucon visit Athens' port, Piraeus, when they are intercepted by Polemarchus who demands that they join him for a dinner and festival. Polemarchus points out that his men are superior in number and therefore Socrates and Glaucon must comply. Socrates asks if he might be persuaded otherwise but Polemarchus replies that he will refuse to listen. Socrates agrees to go. At Polemarchus' house, Socrates encounters Polemarchus' father, Cephalus.
Cephalus (328e–331d) In his first philosophical conversation with the group members, Socrates asks the aged Cephalus, "is life painful at that age, or what report do you make of it?" Cephalus answers by saying that many are unhappy about old age because they miss their youth, but he finds that "old age brings us profound repose and freedom from this and other passions. When the appetites have abated, and their force is diminished, the description of Sophocles is perfectly realized. It is like being delivered from a multitude of furious masters." The repose gives him time to dedicate himself to sacrifices and justice so that he is prepared for the afterlife.
The discussion then turns to the definition of justice. Cephalus says that justice is honesty and returning to people that which they are owed. Socrates refutes this by arguing that it would not be just to honestly return a borrowed knife to a man who has since gone mad and would harm himself with it.
Polemarchus (331d–336b) Polemarchus argues that justice is giving what is appropriate to others — to do good to one's friends and bad to his enemies. Socrates refutes this in four parts, concluding that harming anyone, even one's enemies, in itself creates injustice, and thus cannot appear just.
Thrasymachus (336b–354c) Thrasymachus then argues that justice is that which is advantageous for the stronger. Socrates responds by posing the scenario where the strong make mistakes that are not advantageous to them. Thrasymachus then responds by claiming that one is stronger when he does not make mistakes as to their advantage. Socrates refutes this with a further argument: Crafts aim at the good of their object, and therefore to rule is for the benefit of the ruled and not the ruler. Thrasymachus then observes that the shepherd, for example, herds his sheep not for their benefit but for his own, and argues that injustice is better than justice, for one who commits undetected injustice to satisfy his own desires is better off than the just person.
Socrates further observes that a shepherd's concern for his sheep is different from his concern to make money, which is extraneous to the art or craft of shepherding,(345c) and that no power or art provides what is beneficial to itself.(346e) He claims that the best rulers are reluctant to rule but do so out of necessity: they do not wish to be ruled by someone inferior.(347a-c) Socrates then gives three arguments in favour of the just life over the unjust life, centering on wisdom,(349b) harmony,(351b) and the soul.(352d)
Book II: Ring of Gyges (357a–383c) Glaucon and Adeimantus are unsatisfied with Socrates's defense of justice. They ask Socrates to defend justice as a thing good in itself, and not only for its consequences. To demonstrate the problem, Glaucon tells the story of Gyges, who – with the help of a ring that turns him invisible – achieves great advantages for himself by committing injustices. He uses this argument to challenge Socrates to defend the position that the just life is better than the unjust life.
Socrates suggests that they use the city as an image to seek how justice comes to be in the soul of an individual. After attributing the origin of society to the individual not being self-sufficient and having many needs which he cannot supply himself, Socrates first describes a "healthy state" made up of producers who make enough for a modest subsistence, but Glaucon considers this hardly different from "a city of pigs." Socrates then alters his original plan to accommodate Glaucon's demand for more luxuries. He decides to create an image of justice coming to be in not just any city but a luxurious one with a desire for "endless variety" in what he calls "a fevered state". Acquiring and defending these luxuries requires a guardian class to wage wars.
Socrates then asks how the guardians will not become tyrants to the people they guard. He concludes that it is necessary for there to be careful education of the guardians, which education would involve censorship of poetry and stories. For example, he argues that stories that ascribe evil to the gods or heroes or portray the afterlife as bad are untrue and should not be taught.
Book III: Noble lie (386a–417b)
Socrates further describes the program of censored education in such a city: Poetry should be censored in such a way that encourages courage, obedience, cunning, and self-discipline, while discouraging the fear of death, laughter, absolute truthfulness, avarice, or hubris. Further, the guardians will require physical training to prevent illness, benefit the soul, and in preparation for war. From the guardians, the rulers of the city will be selected, which rulers shall act only in the city's advantage. For the citizens to accept their role in society, the rulers must perpetuate a noble lie (γενναῖον ψεῦδος, gennaion pseudos).
The noble lie is illustrated by Socrates's myth or parable of the metals. In this version of the noble lie, each human is regarded as either containing gold, silver, or bronze, and, correspondingly, are best suited to rule, guard, or merely produce. Socrates claims that if the people believed "this myth...[it] would have a good effect, making them more inclined to care for the state and one another."Book 3, 415c–d
Socrates then ends with the conditions in which the guardians must live. For example, they shall be prohibited from owning private property, privacy, and wealth, so as to keep their focus on the good of the city.
Book IV: Kallipolis, cardinal virtues, and the soul (419a–445e) At this point, Adeimantus interrupts Socrates, noting that in such situations, the guardians are likely to be unhappy. Socrates argues that in the just city, it is the entire city's happiness that is maximised, and not just that of the guardian class. To achieve this, it is necessary for certain conditions to be satisfied, such as the strict education of the guardians and the rules imposed upon them. Moderation, for example, must be emphasised, since both poverty and excessive wealth will corrupt them.(422a1) In this ideal city, it would be pointless to worry over specific laws, like those pertaining to contracts, since proper education ensures lawful behavior, and poor education causes lawlessness.Julia Annas, "Law in the Republic" from Virtue and Law in Plato and Beyond (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2017). DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198755746.003.0002(425a–425c) Socrates further observes that in such a just city, the guardians will share wives and children.
Having established the theory of the just city (Kallipolis), Socrates argues that because the city is completely good and virtuous, it embodies the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, justice and temperance. He then proceeds to search for wisdom, courage, and temperance in the city, on the grounds that justice will be easier to discern in what remains.(427e) He finds wisdom among the guardian rulers, courage among the guardian warriors, temperance among all classes of the city in agreeing about who should rule and who should be ruled. Finally, Socrates defines justice in the city as the state in which each class performs only its own work, not meddling in the work of the other classes.(433b)
Socrates then creates an analogy between the parts of the city and the soul. He argues that psychological conflict points to a divided soul, since a completely unified soul could not behave in opposite ways towards the same object, at the same time, and in the same respect.(436b) He gives examples of possible conflicts between the rational, spirited, and appetitive parts of the soul, corresponding to the rulers, auxiliaries, and producing classes in the city. Having established the tripartite soul, Socrates defines the virtues of the individual. A person is wise if he is ruled by the part of the soul that sees and knows "what is beneficial for each part and for the whole," courageous if his spirited part "preserves in the midst of pleasures and pains" the decisions reached by the rational part, and temperate if the three parts agree that the rational part lead.Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.(442c–d) They are just if each part of the soul attends to its function and not the function of another. It follows from this definition that one cannot be just if one does not have the other cardinal virtues.
Having established the theory of justice as a balance between the parts of the soul, Socrates seeks to address the remaining question whether justice is better than unpunished injustice by exposition of a broader political theory.(444e-445e)
Book V (449a–480a): Philosopher-kings and the theory of forms At this point, Adeimantus again interrupts Socrates, questioning him on the point about the sharing of wives and children. Socrates is overwhelmed at what he perceives to be an "ambush" on his argument.