Australia, a close neighbour of both Indonesia and East Timor, was the only country to recognise Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. Some members of the Australian public supported self-determination for East Timor,Kelton, Maryanne "More Than an Ally?: Contemporary Australia-US Relations" Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008 p 73 and also actively supported the independence movement within Australia. The Australian Government saw the need for both stability and good relations with their neighbour, Indonesia.In office: Paul Keating, Australia's Prime Ministers, National Archives of Australia, accessdate 4 May 2016 However, it was criticised in some quarters, including by Xanana Gusmão (the FRETILIN leader) for putting those issues above human rights.Gusmão, Xanana, "Xanana attacks Australia over East Timor", The Age (Melbourne, Australia). July 13, 1994, 3 In 1998, the Howard government changed its stance and supported East Timor self-determination, prompting a referendum that saw East Timor gain its independence."Unanimous assembly decision makes Timor-Leste 191st United Nations member state", United Nations, 27 September 2002, accessdate 4 May 2016

Background

With a change in government following the 1974 Portuguese revolution, the colonial ruler of East Timor, Portugal, moved to decolonise. As a result, Portugal effectively abandoned their colony of East Timor. Following this, in 1975, the two main East Timorese political parties Fretilin and the UDT, formed a government. At this time, Indonesia began a secret operation to build a relationship with the UDT, named Operation Komodo. The UDT attempted a coup, which Fretilin resisted with the help of the local Portuguese military. With the UDT leaders fleeing into Indonesia, Fretilin made a unilateral declaration of independence on 28 November 1975, of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (República Democrática de Timor-Leste in Portuguese). Shortly after, on 7 December 1975, Indonesian forces invaded East Timor.

Overview

According to author Clinton Fernandes the governments of Malcolm Fraser, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating co-operated with the Indonesian military and President Suharto to obscure details about conditions in East Timor and to preserve Indonesian control of the region.Fernandes, Clinton (2004), Reluctant Saviour: Australia, Indonesia and East Timor Australian governments saw good relations and stability in Indonesia (Australia's largest neighbour) as providing an important security buffer to Australia's north. Nevertheless, Australia provided important sanctuary to East Timorese independence advocates like José Ramos-Horta (who based himself in Australia during his exile). However, throughout the duration of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, the Australian public were generally uncomfortable, if not actively against the occupation, initially highlighted by the deaths of five Australian journalists who came to be known as the "Balibo 5". Also the actions of the Timorese people in supporting Australian forces during the Battle of Timor in World War II were well-remembered, particularly by veterans. These two issues kept the East Timor occupation in a negative light, throughout the duration of the invasion and occupation. Protests took place in Australia against the occupation, prominent East Timorese lived in Australia and kept the issue alight, and some Australian nationals participated in the resistance movement. According to Professor James Cotton, writing in his book on the invasion, Suharto in fact avoided coming to Australia, with the knowledge that there would be public protests.James Cotton, Professor School of Politics, "East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and Its Aftermath", Routledge, p 33

Governmental responses

Whitlam government 1974–75

There are a number of reasons why the Whitlam government supported Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. Whitlam, speaking to the ABC, said to an extent, his Government was carrying on the view that East Timor was not viable as an independent state. Additionally, there were initial fears of a possible Communist government being installed in East Timor by the Timorese, after the withdrawal of the Portuguese. This saw the Whitlam government look favourably upon Indonesian annexation, and Whitlam expressed this desire to Suharto in a visit to him in 1974.

Michael Salla, writing in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, said Whitlam perceived and interpreted the issue in an anti-colonial framework. Whitlam himself said "the division of the island of Timor is no more than an accident of Western colonial history". There were also fears that a long drawn out civil war could result in great loss of life over a long period, as had occurred in Angola, another ex-Portuguese colony.Salla, Michael (1995), "Australian foreign policy and East Timor", Australian Journal of International Affairs, 49:2, 207–222, DOI: 10.1080/10357719508445157 To an extent, Whitlam established the logic and support of the annexation, and this was carried on by later Australian prime ministers and their governments. In addition, the Australian Government saw the desire for peace in the ASEAN region. Nicholas Klar, writing on Whitlam's response to the Indonesian invasion, said that Whitlam also was concerned that revolution by separation movements could spread across Indonesia, causing a domino effect that could see the balkanisation of Indonesia into several small states. According to historian Luke Miller, Wikileaks documents have indicated that before the invasion, there is some possible evidence that Australia was feeding intelligence to Indonesia about Portugal, in order to minimise misunderstanding about the situation between the two countries.

It has been argued that comments by the Whitlam government may have encouraged the Suharto regime to invade East Timor,"Fed: Cables show Australia knew of Indon invasion of Timor". AAP General News (Australia). 13 September 2000. Retrieved 3 January 2008. with former Army officer, and deputy commander of UNTAET, Michael Smith, writing that the invasion at least had "tacit approval from Australia and the United States".Smith 2003, p. 38. Despite this, and the general favourable view of the annexation, the Australian Government voted for a UN resolution condemning the invasion, in 1975.

During the lead up to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor in 1975, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) paid a Dili-based Australian businessman Frank Favaro for information on local political developments. The leaking of his identity in late 1975 led to a confrontation between the then Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and Bill Robertson, the head of ASIS, resulting in the sacking of the intelligence agency director on 21 October 1975, to take effect on 7 November. Bill Robertson disputes the reason for his dismissal in documents lodged with the National Archives in 2009.

Fraser government 1975–1984 The government of Malcolm Fraser was the first to officially recognise Indonesia's de facto annexation of East Timor, doing so in January 1978. This was followed by de jure recognition, during negotiations with Indonesia regarding the seabed boundary between the two countries."Final Report on the Inquiry into East Timor", Senate Report, Commonwealth Government of Australia, 7 December 2000, section 7.2 The Prime Minister ordered the seizure of a two-way radio link between East Timor and Australia being operated illegally by Fretilin supporters near Darwin. Following his return from Jakarta, Mr Fraser gave instructions that the Telecom outpost radio service near Darwin cease picking up and passing on Fretilin messages from East Timor. He also denied Australian entry visas to Fretilin spokesmen claiming to represent the Democratic Republic of East Timor."Final Report on the Inquiry into East Timor", Senate Report, Commonwealth Government of Australia, 7 December 2000 Section 7.10

The opposition party at the time, the Labor Party, in 1979, called on the Fraser government to withdraw the recognition.Thakur, Ramesh, "Responsibility to Protect and Sovereignty", Routledge, p68 Fraser himself saw that he had no choice but to continue the recognition, as it would have caused serious repercussions with Indonesia, and the US at the time would not support Australia, as they saw the East Timorese resistance group, FRETILIN, as communists,Fraser, Malcolm and Margaret Simons, "Malcolm Fraser: The Political Memoirs", Melbourne University Publishing, 2010 and it was seen in Australia's interest to support Indonesia. "Final Report on the Inquiry into East Timor", Senate Report, Commonwealth Government of Australia, 7 December 2000, Section 7.9

Hawke government 1983–1991

The Hawke government continued and confirmed Australia's de jure recognition of the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. Portugal expressed its displeasure by recalling its Ambassador, Inacio Rebello de Andrade, back to Lisbon."Final Report on the Inquiry into East Timor", Senate Report, Commonwealth Government of Australia, 7 December 2000, section 7.40 Indonesian and Australian representatives signed the Timor Gap Treaty in a plane above the Timor Sea. The treaty came into force on 9 February 1991. It established a zone of cooperation in an oil-rich undersea area, with future plans to manage oil resources in the area."Final Report on the Inquiry into East Timor", Senate Report, Commonwealth Government of Australia, 7 December 2000, section 7.43

Keating government 1991–1996 Initially, after Paul Keating took over the role of Prime Minister, he simply continued the recognition of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. However, the Keating government escalated its military and other relations with Indonesia, beyond the level of engagement of previous governments. Both Australia and the US were involved in assisting the Indonesian military, and upgraded relations during this time included the signing of a security treaty. According to John Pilger and several other journalists, Keating was perceived as not having done enough, while Prime Minister, to prevent human rights abuses in East Timor,Pilger, John, "Blood On The Hands of the Mates", New Statesman & Society. March 11, 1994, Vol. 7 Issue 293, p. 8.AAP staff, "Nobel Laureate Attacks Keating", The Age, 3 April, p. 3.Scott, David, "Keating and the politics of appeasement: The old guard should exit the Australia-Indonesia stage", The Age (Melbourne) 10 May 1999, p. 15. though others, such as Whitlam, have defended Keating's policies.Whitlam, Gough, "Whitlam renews E Timor attack", The Australian, (National, Australia). July 28, 1999, 005

Birmingham, Cotton and Thakur, writing in their respective books on the occupation of East Timor, stated that following the 1991 Dili massacre, which occurred on 12 November 1991, the Keating government claimed the massacre was an aberration, and not indicative of the occupation as a whole.John Birmingham, "Appeasing Jakarta: Australia's Complicity in the East: Quarterly Essay 2", Black Inc 01/06/2001James Cotton, Professor School of Politics, "East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and Its Aftermath", Routledge, p. 111Thakur, Ramesh, "Responsibility to Protect and Sovereignty", Routledge, p 71 However, a Government Joint Committee criticised the Government, saying its response to the massacre should have been more condemning."Final Report on the Inquiry into East Timor", Senate Report, Commonwealth Government of Australia, 7 December 2000, section 7.67 While the US chose to limit their relation and military support for Indonesia after the massacre, Keating moved to increase Australia's military support, effectively stepping into the gap the US left.