Count Edward Bernard Raczyński (19 December 1891 – 30 July 1993) was a Polish diplomat, writer, and politician who served as President of Poland-in-exile (between 1979 and 1986).
He was the longest living (101), and the oldest serving Polish President (from the age of 87 to 94).
Biography
Count Edward Bernard Maria Raczyński was born on 19 December 1891 in Zakopane to a Polish aristocratic family, the younger son of Count Edward Aleksander Raczyński of Nałęcz coat of arms, and his wife, Countess Róża Potocka. The Raczyńskis were related to the Austro-Hungarian house of Habsburgs. The full name was "Raczyński z Małyszyna", as they were a branch of the noble family Nałęcz-Małyski from Greater Poland (the area of the town of Wieluń) and about 1540 took their name from the estate of Raczyn near Wieluń. However, the Raczyńskis remained relatively unknown until the 18th century. Raczyńskis were a bookish family who had long been known for using their great wealth to serve patrons of the arts. Following his family's traditions, Raczyński was a well known bibliophile who was well read on a number of subjects.
Raczyński spent most of his childhood in Kraków, in the family palace in Pod Baranami and in the family palace in Rogalin in Greater Poland. He studied law in Leipzig, Kraków, and London (the London School of Economics) and was awarded a doctorate by the Jagiellonian University in Kraków in 1915. In November 1918, Raczynski joined the army of the resurrected Poland, from which he was called to the diplomatic service in May 1919. Until 1925, he worked in Polish embassies and missions in Bern, Copenhagen and London. Back in Warsaw, he became the head of the department of international agreements. In 1932, Raczyński was appointed Polish ambassador to the League of Nations and in 1934, he became the ambassador of the Republic of Poland in the United Kingdom.
Both the British government and the British public at large tended to view Anglo-Polish relations through the prism of Anglo-German relations. In the interwar period, the Treaty of Versailles was widely felt in Britain to be too harsh towards Germany, and the British government tended to sympathise with Germany's demands for the return of the Free City of Danzig (modern Gdańsk), the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia. The British Foreign Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain had pursued the Locarno treaty of 1925 largely to facilitate German revanchism in Eastern Europe peacefully.Stephen Schuker, "The End of Versailles" in The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: A.J.P. Taylor and the Historians edited by Gordon Martel (Routledge: 1999) pp. 48–49. France had signed a defensive alliance with Poland in 1921 and with Czechoslovakia in 1924, which were meant to deter German invasions of both states. Chamberlain believed that if Franco-German relations were improved, then France would abandon its allies in Eastern Europe, which in turn would force Poland and Czechoslovakia into the German sphere of influence, as both states would have no Great Power protector such as France anymore. Raczyński himself noted right from the moment that he arrived in London as ambassador that Poland was not a nation that British officials liked very, and the British historian Adam Zamoyski wrote that Raczyński "mobilised all the reserves of his breeding, sense of humour and immense personal charm" to champion Poland's case. Zamoyski noted: "Although he was vivacious and surprisingly active, even in his nineties, Raczynski was not a forceful personality."
The two British politicians whom Raczyński was most close to were Sir Samuel Hoare and Winston Churchill. However, the reasons for the interest of Hoare and Churchill differed. Hoare was an ardent appeaser who favoured a deal under which Poland would allow the Free City of Danzig to rejoin Germany while returning the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia to the Reich. Churchill, by contrast, favoured a "Grand Alliance" against Nazi Germany. A major aim of the Polish Foreign Minister Colonel Józef Beck was to win Poland an empire in Africa. Raczyński closely followed the talks concerning the German demand for the return of the former German colonial empire in Africa, which he hoped might establish a basis for Poland receiving an African colony. In June 1936, Raczyński reported to Warsaw that the plans by Labour and Liberal MPs for the League of Nations to play a greater role in the ruling of the German colonies held by Britain as mandates was "a red cloth for the imperialist group of Conservatives, the so-called "die hards"" who wanted to annex the former German colonies as British colonies.
The Danzig crisis
During the Sudetenland crisis of 1938, Raczyński reported to his superior, the Foreign Minister Colonel Józef Beck, that Poland's stance in pressing its claim to the disputed Teschen region had made a negative impression both with the British government and the British public. The Polish historian Anita J. Prazmowska wrote that, despite the way that the government of Neville Chamberlain had favoured the German claim to the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia, the Chamberlain cabinet regarded Poland's actions in pressing its claims to the Teschen region of Czechoslovakia as a treacherous and base action. Reflecting Beck's interest in an African empire, Raczyński was in close contact with Charles Theodore Te Water, the South African high commissioner in London as South Africa was deeply involved in the colonial talks with Germany as South Africa held the former colony of German South West Africa (modern Namibia) as a League of Nations mandate. In November 1938, Raczyński closely followed the visit of the South African defence minister Oswald Pirow, who arrived in Europe with the aim of effecting a colonial deal that would lead to an Anglo-German alliance. Pirow had been sent by the South African prime minister J. B. M. Hertzog to offer up a deal under which Germany would take over the African colonies of some of the weaker European such as Portugal and Belgium, in exchange for Germany renouncing its claim to Southwest Africa, which Hertzog hoped to annex to South Africa. Raczyński reported that the meeting between Pirow and Hitler at the Reich Chancellery on 24 November 1938 did not go well as Hitler continued to insist that he wanted back all of the African colonies the Reich had ruled in 1914.
On 9 December 1938, the British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax told Raczyński that he wanted to see the League of Nations end its role as the protector of the current status of the Free City of Danzig (modern Gdańsk) by 16 January 1939. The United Kingdom was one of the veto-holding permanent members of the League Council (the executive arm of the League analogous to the Security Council of the United Nations) and thus had much say in the running of the League. The decision to have Carl Jacob Burckhardt, the League of Nations high commissioner for Danzig, pull out created much alarm in Warsaw, as the end of the League's role in protecting Danzig's status would end international involvement in the Danzig question and reduce the issue to a bilateral German-Polish dispute. Raczyński protested very strongly that Poland wanted the League to continue its role in Danzig and succeeded in having the question postponed. In response to Polish protests, the League Council ruled that Burckhardt would stay on as the League of Nations High Commissioner for Danzig until at least late 1939. Anglo-Polish relations were distinctly unfriendly in the first months of 1939. Raczyński reported to Warsaw on 8 February 1939 that the Chamberlain cabinet seemed to accept all of Eastern Europe as being in the German sphere of influence and stated that Chamberlain had a strong dislike of the Soviet Union. Raczyński wrote "one could risk the statement that by this "forgetting" of the Soviets, Prime Minister Chamberlain was flirting with the German partner". On 1 March 1939, Raczyński in a dispatch to Warsaw wrote the Chamberlain government was increasing its military estimates to Parliament, but stated that Chamberlain was still committed to appeasement with the increased defence spending merely being a bargaining tool with the Reich. Raczyński reported that based on his sources within the British government that Chamberlain was primarily concerned about Adolf Hitler's demand that Britain return the former German African colonies administered by Britain as mandates for the League of Nations. Raczyński expressed concern that Chamberlain might strike a deal with Hitler under which Britain would recognise Eastern Europe as being in the German sphere of influence in exchange for the Reich renouncing its claim to its former colonies in Africa. On the other hand, Raczyński predicated that if Britain and Germany failed to reach a settlement on the issue of former German colonies in Africa, then Britain would be more friendly towards Poland as a counterweight to Germany. Raczyński concluded that the future of Anglo-Polish relations depended upon whatever Britain and Germany could reach a settlement over the issue of the former German colonies in Africa. He reported that the failure of the Pirow mission indicated increasing Anglo-German tension over the colonial question, which led him to predict that Britain would soon be interested in Poland.
In March 1939, the "Tilea Affair" led to increased Anglo-German tensions as the Romanian minister in London, Viorel Tilea, claimed that Romania was on the brink of a German invasion. Germany had no source of oil of its own (though German scientists were working on a project to build refineries for artificial oil) and Germany's need to import oil from abroad left the Reich very vulnerable to a British naval blockade. From the British perspective, if Germany were to occupy Romania, it would have its own source of oil that would make it immune to a British naval blockade, hence Tilea's claims of an imminent German invasion caused much alarm in London. The defence policies of the Chamberlain government and the Baldwin government before it had been based on the "limited liability" doctrine, on which the bulk of British defence spending was to go to the Royal Air Force, to be followed by the Royal Navy and the British Army to be placed last. Under the "limited liability" doctrine, the British Army was to serve as a glorified colonial police force, just strong enough to put down uprisings in the colonies of the British Empire and would be too small to ever make the "continental commitment" (sending a large expeditionary force to the continent of Europe) again. As a result of the "limited liability" doctrine, the British Army was far too limited, small and underfunded to face the Wehrmacht, and as such Britain would need help to save Romania. As such, the British government asked Poland to save Romania. Romania and Poland had signed a defensive alliance in 1921 directed against the Soviet Union, but it remained unclear if Poland would go to war if Germany invaded Romania. France and Romania had signed a defensive alliance in 1926, but it was widely acknowledged that the French Army would remain behind the Maginot Line in the event of war, which would not stop the Reich from overrunning Romania. At a cabinet meeting on 18 March 1939, Lord Halifax pressed for Britain to save Romania, while the Minister of the coordination of defence, Admiral Ernle Chatfield, stated the British Army was too weak to do anything for Romania and that the only nations that could save Romania were Poland and the Soviet Union. The British government sent out appeals to the governments of Poland, the Soviet Union, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey asking to join some sort of an alliance to protect Romania.