Lieutenant General Lloyd Ralston Fredendall (December 28, 1883 – October 4, 1963) was a general officer of the United States Army who served during World War II. He is best known for his leadership failure during the Battle of Kasserine Pass, leading to one of America's worst defeats of World War II, for which he was relieved of his command.
He was in command of the Central Task Force landings during Operation Torch in North Africa, and led II Corps during the early stages of the Tunisian Campaign.
In February 1943, as a major general in command of the II Corps, his forces were defeated by German forces commanded by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim in the Battle of Kasserine Pass. After this debacle, Fredendall was relieved of command of II Corps by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in North Africa, and replaced by Major General George S. Patton.
In spite of being relieved of command, Fredendall was promoted to lieutenant general in June 1943, assumed command of Second Army and was greeted in the United States as a hero.
Early life and military career Lloyd Ralston Fredendall was born on December 28, 1883, at Fort D. A. Russell near Cheyenne, Wyoming. His father, Ira Livingston Fredendall (December 7, 1846 – February 6, 1935), was on active duty in the United States Army when Fredendall was born. Ira became sheriff of Laramie County before receiving a commission in the Quartermaster Corps during the Spanish–American War. The elder Fredendall retired as a major in 1914, returned to active duty during World War I to supervise construction at several bases in the western United States, and retired again as a lieutenant colonel.
As a result of his father's connections in the service and with local and state politicians, Fredendall secured an appointment from Wyoming Senator Francis E. Warren to enter the class of 1905 at the United States Military Academy (USMA). Described by a classmate as "a very soldierly little fellow, but extremely goaty in mathematics," Fredendall performed poorly in math as well as in general deportment, and was dismissed after just one semester.
His mother persuaded Senator Warren to re-appoint Fredendall the next year, but he dropped out again. Although the senator was willing to nominate him for a third attempt, the academy declined to readmit him. Instead, Fredendall attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1903 to 1904 as a member of the class of 1907. He took the officer's qualifying exam in 1906, and scored first out of 70 applicants. On February 13, 1907, he received his commission in the United States Army as a second lieutenant in the Infantry Branch.
After service in the Philippines and other overseas and stateside assignments, Fredendall shipped out to the Western Front with the 28th Infantry Regiment in August 1917, four months after the American entry into World War I. He held a succession of instructor assignments in the army's schools in France, and commanded one of its training centers. He built a record as an excellent teacher, trainer, and administrator, and ended the war as a temporary lieutenant colonel.
Between the wars The Armistice of November 11, 1918, saw Fredendall assigned, like many other officers, to a variety of staff and training duties. He was both student and instructor at the U.S. Army Infantry School; was a 1923 distinguished graduate (placing 31 out of 151) of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School; and in 1925, he graduated from the U.S. Army War College. He also completed tours of duty in Washington at the Statistics Branch, the Inspector General's Department (September 1934 to March 1936) and as executive officer (XO), Office of the Chief of Infantry. These postings led to important contacts that later furthered his military career.
In December 1939, during World War II (although the United States was still neutral at this stage), Fredendall was promoted to the one-star rank of brigadier general, serving with the 5th Infantry Division. In October 1940, he was promoted to the two-star rank of major general, and given command of the 4th Infantry Division until July 1941.
World War II
Fredendall's rise to military command in World War II was facilitated by General George Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff; and Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, the commander of Army Ground Forces, a friend and colleague. McNair had included Fredendall on a list of the top three generals he believed capable of commanding all U.S. Army forces being sent to Britain. Marshall, in turn, had recommended the swaggering Fredendall to Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower for a major command in the Allied invasion of North Africa, codenamed Operation Torch.
General Marshall was especially fond of the youthful-looking, cocky Fredendall, describing him as "one of the best" and remarking in a staff meeting when his name was mentioned, "I like that man; you can see determination all over his face." Fredendall himself was convinced that neither Eisenhower nor his deputy, Major General Mark W. Clark, wanted him in Africa since he was above both in pre-war rank. However, with such glowing testimonials from senior commanders, Eisenhower chose Fredendall to command the 39,000-man Central Task Force (the largest of three) in Operation Torch. Eisenhower cabled Marshall on November 12, 1942, four days after the invasion, "I bless the day you urged Fredendall upon me and cheerfully acknowledge that my earlier doubts of him were completely unfounded." Eisenhower, in notes dictated to Harry C. Butcher on December 12, 1942, said, "…Patton I think comes closest to meeting every requirement made on a commander. Just after him I would, at present, rate Fredendall, although I do not believe the latter has the imagination in foreseeing and preparing for possible jobs of the future that Patton possesses." Eisenhower later came to regret both this assessment and his selection of Fredendall for the command.
Fredendall was described by General Lucian Truscott as:
Tunisia, Oran, and Kasserine Pass
After the Torch landings, Fredendall became the de facto military governor in Oran. Orders from his headquarters in the Grand Hotel of Oran were headed with "II Corps – In the Field," which prompted derision from his troops, who were living in spartan conditions.
Fredendall was assigned to command the U.S. II Corps in its advance into Tunisia against German forces. (He thus became the second-oldest of the 34 generals to serve as a U.S. Army corps commander in World War II, after Innis P. Swift, commander of the I Corps in the Pacific.) II Corps served under the British First Army, whose commander, Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson, considered Fredendall incompetent well before the loss at Kasserine. Fredendall was given to speaking and issuing orders using his own slang, such as calling infantry units "walking boys" and artillery "popguns." Instead of using the standard military map grid-based location designators, he made up confusing codes such as "the place that begins with C." This practice was unheard-of for a general and distinguished graduate of the Command and General Staff School, who had been taught to always use standardized language and procedures to ensure clarity when transmitting orders under the stress of combat. Fredendall's informality often led to confusion among his subordinates, and precious time was lost attempting to discern his meaning.Carr, Vincent M., The Battle of Kasserine Pass: An Examination of Allied Operational Failings, Air Command And Staff College, Maxwell AFB, (April 2003), pp. 18–21.
During the advance into Tunisia, Fredendall used an engineer company of the 19th Engineer Regiment to build a large, dug-in corps headquarters bunker behind the front in a place called Speedy Valley (nine miles southeast of Tébessa). Blasted and drilled out of solid rock, the bunker (actually two U-shaped complexes running into the hillside) took three weeks to construct.Andrews, Peter, A Place to be Lousy In, American Heritage Magazine (December 1991), Volume 42, Issue 8, pp. 100–109. An anti-aircraft battalion was emplaced to protect the headquarters. Fredendall also ordered a bulletproof Cadillac similar to Eisenhower's, and regularly phoned Oran to find out why it was not being delivered faster. Then-Brigadier General Omar Bradley called the headquarters "an embarrassment to every American soldier," and General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in North Africa, after viewing the elaborate structure, reminded his senior commanders that even generals must assume personal risk in combat.Ambrose, Stephen E., D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II, Simon and Schuster (1994), , , p. 361: After observing Fredendall's huge underground HQ bunker located 70 miles behind the lines, Eisenhower had reminded his senior commanders that "Generals are expendable just as is any other item in an army." Fredendall rarely visited the front lines, and had a habit of disregarding advice from commanders who had been farther forward and had actually reconnoitered the terrain.MacDonald, Charles B., The Mighty Endeavor: The American War in Europe, Da Capo Press (1992), , , pp. 125–126. He split up units and scattered them widely,"Man Under A Star", Time Magazine, March 29, 1943. and at critical defense points had positioned U.S. forces (against advice) too far apart for mutual support or effective employment of artillery, the strongest American arm.Andrews, Peter, A Place to be Lousy In, American Heritage Magazine (December 1991), Volume 42, Issue 8, pp. 100–109.MacDonald, pp. 125–126.Carr, pp. 20–21.
During the Battle of Kasserine Pass, Eisenhower sent Major General Ernest N. Harmon to report on the fighting, to assist Fredendall and the other Allied commanders, and to determine whether Fredendall or his 1st Armored Division commander, Major General Orlando Ward, should be replaced.Carr, p. 28. Harmon noted that Fredendall and his superior, Anderson, rarely saw each other, and failed to properly coordinate and integrate forces under their command. Fredendall was barely on speaking terms with Ward, whom he had deliberately left out of operational meetings after Ward had repeatedly protested the separation of his command into weaker 'penny packet' forces distributed across various sectors of the front.Carr, p. 30.
Allied forces were bereft of air support during critical attacks, and were frequently positioned by the senior command in positions where they could not support each other. Subordinates later recalled their utter confusion at being handed conflicting orders, not knowing which general to obey—Anderson or Fredendall. While interviewing field commanders, Harmon heard much criticism over what many Allied officers viewed as a cowardly, confused, and out-of-touch command. Noting that Fredendall seemed out of touch (and at one point, intoxicated), Harmon requested and received permission to go to the front and intervene where necessary to shore up Allied defenses.D'Este, Carlo, Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, Orion Publishing Group Ltd. (2003), ,
On March 5, 1943, after the American rout at Kasserine Pass, Eisenhower visited II Corps headquarters and conferred with Brigadier General Bradley. Eisenhower asked "What do you think of the command here?" Bradley's response was "It's pretty bad. I've talked to all the division commanders. To a man they've lost confidence in Fredendall as the corps commander." British General Sir Harold Alexander, the 18th Army Group commander, informed Eisenhower that he would welcome a replacement for Fredendall.Blumenson, Martin, Masters of the Art of Command, Da Capo Press (1990), , , p. 284. Eisenhower offered the II Corps command to Harmon, who declined on the grounds that it would be unethical to appear to personally benefit from his negative assessment of Fredendall.