The Taney Court (the Supreme Court of the United States under Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, 1836–1864) heard thirty criminal law cases, approximately one per year. Notable cases include Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), United States v. Rogers (1846), Ableman v. Booth (1858), Ex parte Vallandigham (1861), and United States v. Jackalow (1862).
Like its predecessor, the Taney Court exercised only limited appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases. Like its predecessor, it heard original habeas petitions, writs of error from the state courts, and certificates of division from the circuit courts. In addition, unlike its predecessor, the Court heard two writs of error from the territorial courts and three prerogative writs of mandamus and prohibition in criminal matters. The Court denied every petition for a prerogative writ that it received, habeas or otherwise.
Background
The basic structure of the federal criminal system remained the same during Chief Justice Taney's tenure as it had been during Chief Justice Marshall's tenure. The Judiciary Act of 1789 divided original jurisdiction for the trial of federal crimes between the United States district courts and the United States circuit courts. The district courts were given jurisdiction over all federal crimes "where no other punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to be inflicted."Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77. The circuit courts were given concurrent jurisdiction over these crimes, and exclusive jurisdiction over all other federal crimes.Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78–79. The circuit courts also exercised appellate jurisdiction over the district courts, but only in civil cases.Judiciary Act of 1789, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84–85.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 also placed the responsibility for prosecuting federal crimes in the United States Attorney for each United States federal judicial district. The Act provided that "there shall be appointed in each district" a "person learned in the law to act as attorney for the United States in such district, who shall be sworn or affirmed to the faithful execution of his office, whose duty it shall be to prosecute in such district all delinquents for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States."Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93.
Sources of jurisdiction In Ex parte Gordon (1861), the Court summarized its jurisdiction in federal criminal cases thus: [I]n criminal cases, the proceedings and judgment of the Circuit Court cannot be revised or controlled here, in any form of proceeding, either by writ of error or prohibition, and, consequently, we have no authority to examine them by a certiorari. And the only case in which this court is authorized even to express an opinion on the proceedings in a Circuit Court in a criminal case is, where the judges of the Circuit Court are opposed in opinion upon a question arising at the trial, and certify it to this court for its decision.Ex parte Gordon, .
Writs of error Although the Supreme Court could not issue writs of error to examine criminal convictions in the lower federal courts,. it could issue such writs with regard to the state courts and territorial courts.
State courts
Pursuant to its power—under § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789—to review the judgments of state courts on federal questions by writs of error, the Marshall Court had twice reversed criminal convictions obtained pursuant to a criminal statute that violated the federal constitution.; .
The Taney Court continued this trend. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), the Court invalidating a state kidnapping conviction as in conflict with the Fugitive Slave Clause, which the Court found to authorize self-help.. In Thurlow v. Massachusetts (1847), known as the License Cases, the Court invalidated state liquor laws.Thurlow v. Massachusetts (License Cases), . But, in Fox v. Ohio (1847), the Court sustained state counterfeiting statutes, even though the power to punish counterfeiting had been explicitly granted to Congress.Fox v. Ohio, . And, in Moore v. Illinois (1852), the Court upheld state laws that punished those who harbored escaped slaves, even though the same conduct was punishable by the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.Moore v. Illinois, .
In United States v. Booth (1855)United States v. Booth, . and Ableman v. Booth (1858),. the Court held that state courts have no authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to free federal criminal defendants. Booth had been indicted under the federal Fugitive Slave Act.
Territorial courts
Article Four, Section Three, Clause Two of the Constitution provides that "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory". art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Pursuant to this authority, Congress had created territorial courts outside of the Article Three courts established by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and its progeny. Although the Marshall Court had heard some civil appeals from the territorial courts, no criminal appealed had been attempted.
In Forsyth v. United States (1850)Forsyth v. United States, . and Simpson v. United States (1850),Simpson v. United States, . the Court held that its authority to hear writs of error from the Florida territorial courts—which was defined by the organic statute of those courts—extended to criminal cases. Forsyth and Simpson found invalid criminal cases transferred of criminal cases which had begun with indictments by grand juries in the territorial courts and then been transferred to the newly created state courts within re-indictment.
Original habeas
The Marshall Court had heard six original habeas petitions in criminal matters, all involving the United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. Its precedents established that the Court could grant the writ in pre-conviction situations,; Ex parte Burford, . but could not grant the writ in post-conviction situations,Ex parte Watkins, ; Ex parte Kearney, . unless the sentence of conviction had run.Ex parte Watkins, .
The Taney Court heard seven additional such petitions. In Ex parte Wells (1855), over the dissents of Judges Curtis and Campbell, the Court affirmed the holding of the Marshall Court that original habeas petitions were a constitutionally permissible exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.Ex parte Wells, .
In Ex parte Dorr (1845), the Court held that it had no power to issue the writ to state prisoners serving sentences pursuant to a state conviction (except for the limited purpose of obtaining their in-court testimony).Ex parte Dorr, . The holding of Dorr was abrogated by a Reconstruction-era statute granting federal courts the power to grant writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners.Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part I: Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't Make It So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 531, 539 & n.19 (2000) (citing Act of February 5, 1867, 14 Stat. 385). The current version of this statute is found at .
In In re Metzger (1847), the Court held that it had no original habeas jurisdiction to review the case of a prisoner held in custody pursuant to the order of a district judge, awaiting foreign extradition.In re Metzger, . In In re Kaine (1852), by a 5-3 decision, the Court extended this holding under the 1848 extradition act which authorized commissions to play part of the role previously exercised by a district judge.In re Kaine, .
In Ex parte Gordon (1861), the Court held that it had no original habeas jurisdiction to review a post-conviction sentence of death.
In Ex parte Vallandigham (1863), the Court held that it had no original habeas jurisdiction to review the judgements of military commissions; because the military courts were not one of the courts authorized to consider habeas petitions by § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, any such jurisdiction would be constitutionally original rather than appellate, and thus unconstitutional..
Certificates of division
The Marshall Court heard thirty-one criminal cases under the certificate of division procedure authorized by § 6 of the Judiciary Act of 1802. However, the Court had held that the sufficiency of the evidence could not be certified—whether on a motion for a new trial or a motion for a directed verdict.United States v. Bailey, ; United States v. Daniel, . In United States v. Briggs (Briggs I) (1847), the Court further limited its jurisdiction to hear criminal certificates of division by holding that the question of whether a demurrer to an indictment should be sustained was too general to be certified.United States v. Briggs (Briggs I), .
Other prerogative writs
Prior to the Taney Court, no reported decision recorded an attempt by a party to obtain review in a criminal case by means of a prerogative writ other than habeas corpus. In Ex parte Gordon (1861), the court held that it had no power to issue a writ of prohibition to examine a death sentence issued by an admiralty court for piracy (the Court did possess the power to issue writs of prohibition in civil admiralty cases).
The Taney Court also heard and rejected to petitions for mandamus in criminal cases. In Ex parte Taylor (1852), denied a petition on the merits, holding that federal bail in D.C. depended on federal law, not Maryland law.Ex parte Taylor, . In Kentucky v. Dennison (1861), the Court denied another mandamus petition, holding that—even though the Extradition Clause of the Constitution obliged states to extradite criminals to other states for trial—this provision was not enforceable in the federal courts.. Dennison was overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad (1987)..
Defining federal crimes
Counterfeiting Section 20 of the Crimes Act of 1825 prohibiting counterfeiting.Crimes Act of 1825, § 20, 4 Stat. 115, 121. In United States v. Marigold (1850), the Court held that this was a Constitutional exercise of Congress's power to punish counterfeiting.United States v. Marigold, .
Indian country Section 25 of the Nonintercourse Act of 1834 provided federal crimes governing areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction would apply in Indian country, with an exception for Indian-on-Indian crimes.June 30, 1834, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733. In United States v. Rogers (1846), the Court held that the exception did not apply to defendants who were white persons who were adopted by Indians..
Naval timber An 1831 statute prohibited the taking of trees reserved for the use of the United States—specifically, "any life oak or red cedar tree or trees, or other timber".Act of March 2, 1831, 4. Stat. 472. In United States v. Briggs (Briggs II) (1850), the Court held that the "other timber" language was not limited to trees used for naval purposes, even though that was the purpose of the statute.United States v. Briggs (Briggs II), 50 U.S. (9 How.) 351 (1850).
Shipwreck theft
Section 9 of the Crimes Act of 1825 prohibited removing goods from a wrecked ship "within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction of the United States".Crimes Act of 1825, § 9, 4 Stat. 115, 116. In United States v. Coombs (1838), the Court held that the act did not extend to a defendant who had purloined several textile goods from a beached boat above the high tide line because there was no federal criminal admiralty jurisdiction beyond that point.United States v. Coombs, .
Slave trading The Slave Trade Act of 1800 prohibited U.S. citizens from participating in the international slave trade.Slave Trade Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 70. In United States v. Morris (1840), the Court held that the offense could be charged even if the vessel—fitted out for slave trading—was apprehended before slaves were taken aboard.United States v. Morris, .
Criminal procedure