Protesters and dissidents in the People's Republic of China (PRC) espouse a wide variety of grievances, most commonly in the areas of unpaid wages, compensation for land development, local environmental activism, or NIMBY activism. Tens of thousands of protests occur each year in what the authorities term "mass incidents." Nationwide protests are less common. Notable protests have included the 1959 Tibetan uprising, the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, the April 1999 demonstration by Falun Gong practitioners at Zhongnanhai, the 2008 Tibetan unrest, the July 2009 Ürümqi riots, the 2011 pro-democracy protests, and the 2022 COVID-19 protests.

Overview Tens of thousands of protests occur each year in the PRC. Generally, they are driven by local disputes as opposed to national issues. The most common sources of protests are unpaid wage issues, disputes over compensation for land development, local environmental activism, or NIMBY activism. Protests often result in at least partial success in achieving their objectives.

The number of annual protests has grown steadily since the early 1990s, from approximately 8,700 "mass group incidents" in 1993 to over 87,000 in 2005. In 2006, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimated the number of annual mass incidents to exceed 90,000, and Chinese sociology professor Sun Liping estimated 180,000 incidents in 2010. Mass incidents are defined broadly as "planned or impromptu gathering that forms because of internal contradictions", and can include public speeches or demonstrations, physical clashes, public airings of grievances, and other group behaviors that are seen as disrupting social stability.

Despite the increase in protests, some scholars have argued that they may not pose an existential threat to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule because they lack "connective tissue"; the preponderance of protests in China are aimed at local-level officials, and only a select few dissident movements seek systemic change. In a study conducted by Chinese academic Li Yao, released in 2017, the majority of protests which were non-controversial did not receive much if any negative police action, which is to say police may have been present but in no more capacity than Western police would be attending to a protest/mass gathering event. The idea that Chinese do not protest or would be brutally repressed for any kind of political action does not seem to be supported by existing data.

Tactics Protests targeting specific, local grievances, and where citizens propose actionable remedies, are more likely to succeed than alternative forms of protests.

As the rights consciousness of the Chinese populace has grown since the 1980s and 1990s, a growing number of citizens have adopted semi-institutionalized forms of protest known as rightful resistance, whereby they make use of the court system, petitioning channels, or of central government decrees and policies to bring grievances against local authorities.

The failure of semi-institutionalized means of protest can eventually lead citizens to adopt more overt and public forms of resistance, such as sit-ins, picketing, coordinated hunger strikes,Eva Pils, 'Asking the Tiger for His Skin: Rights Activism in China' , Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 30, Issue 4 (2006). or marches.

An analysis of World Values Survey data from 2007, 2012–2013, and 2018 found that the signing of a petition was the most common form of protest activity reported by Chinese respondents. Among the years analyzed, the amount of respondents who had signed a petition or might sign a petition was its highest in 2018 at 52%.

In isolated instances disaffected citizens have turned to rioting, bombings of government buildings and related targets, or suicide as a form of protest. In December 2011, residents of the village of Wukan expelled CCP authorities following land requisition protests.

In the case of nationalist protests, citizens have engaged in boycotts against foreign goods or companies, officially sanctioned marches, and occasionally targeted foreign embassies for violence.

Technology has become an increasingly important part of the arsenal of Chinese protesters and dissidents. Some protests occur almost entirely in the realm of online activism and engagement, taking the form of citizens signing online petitions, issuing statements online rejecting the CCP, of signing support for dissident manifestos like Charter 08. Cyber-vigilantes make use of the internet to publicize and publicly shame government officials and others who are perceived as corrupt, have committed human rights abuses, or have otherwise offended collective values. Text messages have also been used to organize and coordinate protests.

Rural protests According to a 2011 survey conducted by Landesa, in cooperation with Renmin University of China and Michigan State University, which covered 1,791 households in 17 provinces, "about 43 percent" of villagers across China report being the victims of land grabs by the Government, which then sold it to private developers at an average cost of 40x higher per acre than the government paid to the villagers. The same survey claims that, "according to Chinese researchers", an estimated 65 percent of the 180,000 annual "mass incidents" in China stem from grievances over forced land requisitions. Together with their previous surveys, Landesa observes a steady increase in the number of forced land requisitions since 2005. They also estimate that, every year, local government expropriates the land of approximately 4 million rural Chinese citizens.

In 2025, protests erupted in ethnic Miao communities in rural Guizhou over the government's directive to mandate cremation over traditional burial practices.

Labor protests Labor protests in China's industrial sector are common, as migrant workers resist low wages or poor working conditions. There are trade unions in China, but they consist of CCP cadres.Verdoppelung der Streiks in China , Solidar Suisse, 2 February 2015, retrieved 26 October 2017Stefanie Elbern, Streiken in China: Gewusst wie, Stimmen aus China , Stiftung Asienhaus, 7 April 2017, retrieved 26 October 2017 Trade unions are supposedly an extension of the CCP in companies, factories and general management.Peter Franke, Es gärt in Chinas Fabriken , Welt-Sichten, 23 January 2014, retrieved 26 October 2017Simon Lang, Chinas Führung muss gesellschaftliche Destabilisierung fürchten, Anhaltende Spannungen durch Streiks in China , Merics (Mercator Institute for China Studies), 2013, retrieved 26 October 2017Nora Sausmikat, Europa – Asien, Gemeinsam für eine gerechte Welt , Stiftung Asienhaus, EU – China Newsletter, 17 March 2016, retrieved 26 October 2017

Disputes over unpaid wages are among the most common causes of protest in China.

In the late 1990s, mass layoffs from state-owned enterprises (sometimes without the promised compensation or pensions to those laid off) as a result of the state's Xiagang (下岗: step down from the post) policy has sparked numerous worker protests. Among the policies introduced in response to the protests included dibao, a minimum living standard guarantee for those with no income and living in difficult conditions which was introduced in 1999.

In the early 2000s, migrant farmers farmers increasingly organized protests to local authorities and, viewing their concerns as not being addressed, traveled to Beijing to provide complaint letters to the central government. As part of the policy response to these protests, the government cracked down on employers who failed to pay migrant workers or paid them late.

In March 2010, employees of the Chinese Honda plant went on a strike, demanding a pay raise and a self-chosen union. One employee mentioned that Honda had been willing to compromise, but the government in Guangdong had spoken out against wage increases, fearing that similar demands could be made in other companies.Streikwelle in China, Honda-Mitarbeiter kämpfen weiter , n-tv.de, dpa, 13 June 2010, retrieved 26 October 2017 According to media reports, the number of workers' strikes rose to a record level in 2015. The China Labor Bulletin mentioned 2,509 strikes and protests by workers and employees in China. The main reason for these strikes is said to have been because of many factory closures and layoffs.Zahl der Streiks in China wächst rasant , Spiegel Online, 15 December 2015, retrieved 26 October 2017

In 2011, many migrant workers did not return to their workplace in Guangzhou, in southern China, after the New Year holidays. The reason for this is said to have been that more job opportunities had been created in the hitherto poorer provinces. Thus, many no longer had to go to other areas to work and earn a living. It is said to have been 30 to 40 percent fewer migrant workers, normally 10 to 15 percent, although China's authorities had raised the minimum wages.Kelvin Chan, Chinas Tage als Zentrum der Billigproduktion sind gezählt , Hamburger Abendblatt, 26 April 2011, retrieved 26 October 2017 As a result, foreign companies moved their production facilities to Southeast Asia into "cheaper" provinces or even abroad. China experts at the investment bank Credit Suisse called this change a "historic turning point" both for China's economy and possibly for the world.

Between 2023 and 2025, China experienced a significant increase in labor protests, primarily driven by economic slowdown, factory closures, and widespread issues of unpaid wages in the manufacturing and construction sectors. In the first half of 2023 alone, over 700 strikes were recorded, nearly equaling the total number for all of 2022, and by the end of that year, protests had more than tripled. The trend continued into 2024 and 2025, exacerbated by U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods that led to further industrial shutdowns and mass layoffs. Workers across provinces such as Guangdong, Zhejiang, Hunan, Sichuan, and Inner Mongolia demonstrated over grievances including wage arrears, unfair dismissals, and inadequate social security coverage. By late 2024, economic-related labor unrest accounted for the majority of protest activity nationwide, with workers representing 41% of all dissent incidents.

The year 2023 marked the highest level of strike activity in China since 2016, with a significant rise in factory strikes, particularly concentrated in coastal regions such as the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta. According to the China Labour Bulletin, 434 factory strikes were recorded in 2023, compared to 37 in 2022 and 66 in 2021. Approximately 80 percent of these incidents occurred in the southeast coastal region.

According to the China Dissent Monitor, 777 labor protests were recorded in China between September and December 2023, a significant increase from 245 during the same period in 2022. Supplementary data from the Hong Kong-based China Labour Bulletin documented a further 183 labor protests between January 1 and February 3, 2024, including 40 incidents in Guangdong province alone.

In February 2024, an estimated 3,000 North Koreans in China protested labor conditions and for the right to return to North Korea. These workers were contract laborers who were employed by a company affiliated with the North Korean military, and had been in China for an extended period of time due to the COVID-19 lockdowns and because the North Korean government wanted them to stay longer to generate more revenue.

Political liberalization and democracy movements

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