The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC, Ugath Padam Ha Prathisandhana Komishan Sabhava, ) was a commission of inquiry appointed by Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa in May 2010 after the 26-year-long civil war in Sri Lanka to function as a Truth and reconciliation commission. The commission was mandated to investigate the facts and circumstances which led to the failure of the ceasefire agreement made operational on 27 February 2002, the lessons that should be learnt from those events and the institutional, administrative and legislative measures which need to be taken in order to prevent any recurrence of such concerns in the future, and to promote further national unity and reconciliation among all communities. After an 18-month inquiry, the commission submitted its report to the President on 15 November 2011. The report was made public on 16 December 2011, after being tabled in the parliament.
The commission concluded that the Sri Lankan military didn't deliberately target civilians but the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) repeatedly violated international humanitarian law. According to the commission the military gave the "highest priority" to protecting civilians whereas the Tamil Tigers had had "no respect for human life". The commission admitted that civilians had been killed by the Sri Lankan military, albeit accidentally, contradicting the government's line that there were zero civilian casualties. The commission did, however, receive some eyewitness evidence alleging abuse by the military which warranted further investigation and, if necessary, the prosecution of perpetrators. The commission acknowledged that hospitals had been shelled, resulting "considerable civilian casualties", but it did not say who was responsible for the shelling. The commission blamed Sinhalese and Tamil politicians for causing the civil war: the Sinhalese politicians failed to offer a solution acceptable to the Tamil people, and the Tamil politicians fanned militant separatism.
The commission has been heavily criticised by international human rights groups, the UN Panel of Experts and others due its limited mandate, alleged lack of independence and its failure to meet minimum international standards or offer protection to witnesses. These critics believed that the Sri Lankan government was using the commission as a tool to prevent an independent international investigation of alleged abuses. As a consequence of this, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group refused to appear before the commission.
Background Tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities in Sri Lanka turned into a full-scale war between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE in 1983. In 2002, government and the LTTE signed a Norwegian-mediated ceasefire. Both LTTE and the government resumed fighting in 2006, and the government officially backed out of the ceasefire in 2008. After a violent last few months, in May 2009, the government killed LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and declared an end to the civil war. Following the end of the war, international pressure mounted on the government to inquire into the final stages of the civil war, in which it was alleged thousands of civilians, possibly as many as 40,000, were killed. Over the course of the entire war, between 60,000 and 100,000 deaths. There were calls to look into the root causes of the civil war and meaningful reconciliation. The Sri Lankan government rejected calls for an independent international inquiry but instead on 15 May 2010, nearly a year after the end of the civil war, President Rajapaksa appointed the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission to look back at the conflict Sri Lanka suffered for 26 years. Its secretariat was established at the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies in Colombo. Hearings of the commission, which commenced on 11 August 2010, were public and open to media, unless the witness requested otherwise. The LLRC issued some interim recommendations on 13 September 2010. Time limit to produce the final report was extended twice, until 15 November 2011. Hearings were held in Colombo and in former conflict affected areas such as Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar and Vavuniya. Field visits were conducted to the former war zone and detention centres where surrendered Tamil Tiger combatants were held. After analysing over 1,000 oral and 5,000 written submissions it had received, the commission presented its 388-page final report to the President on 15 November 2011. It was made public on 16 December 2011.
Mandate The mandate of the LLRC was as follows:
"To inquire and report on the following matters that may have taken place during the period between 21 February 2002 and 19 May 2009, namely: The facts and circumstances which led to the failure of the ceasefire agreement operationalized on 21 February 2002 and the sequence of events that followed thereafter up to the 19th of May, 2009. Whether any person, group or institution directly or indirectly bear responsibility in this regard; The lessons we would learn from those events and their attendant concern, in order to ensure that there will be no recurrence; The methodology whereby restitution to any person affected by those events or their dependants or their heirs, can be affected; The institutional administrative and legislative measured which need to be taken in order or prevent any recurrence of such concerns in the future, and to promote further national unity and the reconciliation among all communities, and to make any such other recommendations with reference to any of the matters that have been inquired into under the terms of the Warrant."
Members The LLRC's eight members were: C. R. De Silva, PC (chair) - Attorney General (2007–09); Solicitor General (1999–2007); Deputy Solicitor General (1992–97) A. Rohan Perera, PC - former legal advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and current member of the International Law Commission Karunaratne Hangawatte - Professor of Criminal Justice at the Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada, Las Vegas and former consultant to the United NationsPen sketch of commissioners Chandirapal Chanmugam - Secretary to the Treasury (1987–88) H. M. G. S. Palihakkara - former Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Permanent Representative to the United Nations Manohari Ramanathan - former Deputy Legal Draftsman and former member of the Monetary Board of Sri Lanka Maxwell Parakrama Paranagama - former High Court Judge M. T. M. Bafiq - Senior Attorney at law and member of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka
The commission's secretary was S. B. Atugoda, a former Sri Lankan ambassador to Qatar.
Interim recommendations In September 2010 the LLRC published its interim recommendations: A special mechanism should be created to examine the cases of long term detainees on a case-by-case basis; A list of names of those in detention be published; Released detainees should be issued with a certificate of discharge so that they are not taken into custody again; Delays in the legal system should be looked into; The government should issue a clear policy statement that private land will not be used for government backed settlements; Illegal armed groups be disarmed (high priority); Immediate steps be taken so that the public can communicate with officials and receive documents in a language that they understand; Free movement on the A9 highway should be encouraged; and There should be better coordination and communication between government agents and the security forces in normalising civil administration.
The report
Summary The report provides a detailed analysis of the oral and written representations made to the commission. The 1st chapter gives an introduction to the report and the methodology the commission has used. 2nd chapter is devoted to the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). There the commission analyses its background, political and security dimensions and the impact. The commission also tries to evaluate the CFA's effectiveness and the causes which led to its eventual collapse. The next chapter provides an insight into the security forces operations in Eastern and Wanni theatres, with a note about the casualty figures of both security forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Chapter 4 deals with the Humanitarian law issues pertaining to the conflict. This includes hundreds of eyewitness reports and clarifications of the incidents brought to light. There is also an evaluation of the Sri Lanka experience in the context of allegations of violations of International humanitarian law (IHL). Here, the commission concludes that security forces had not deliberately targeted civilians during the final stages of war, but civilian casualties had occurred under unavoidable circumstances. The commission also casts doubts about the authenticity of Channel 4 videos.
Chapter 5 deals with the human rights issues arising from the conflict. It analyses the alleged "white van" abductions, unlawful arrests, arbitrary detention and involuntary disappearances. This chapter goes into details of the instances where such incidents have occurred, and places the blame on certain paramilitary groups who allegedly hold the responsibility. Next 2 chapters are devoted to land issues regarding the returning Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and restitution/compensatory relief paid out to persons who are affected by the conflict. Chapter 8 talks about the post war reconciliation and alleviating the grievances of affected groups, especially the Sri Lankan Tamil people, in broad terms. The ninth and the final chapter summarizes the principle observations and recommendations made by the commission.
Observations
The 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA) which was signed between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE, although brought about a short lived respite to the country, was unstable and eventually unproductive. Conceptual flaws and the untenable dual roles of the Government of Norway, as facilitator of the peace process and the head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission paved the way to its failure. The military strategy of the Sri Lanka Armed Forces during Eelam War IV is satisfactory. It gave the highest priority to the protection of civilian population. Security Forces had not deliberately targeted civilians in the No Fire Zones (NFZs), which were declared in the final stages of the war. Given the complexity of the situation and based on the Principle of Proportionality, commission concluded that the Security Forces were confronted with an unprecedented situation where no other choice was possible other than returning fire into the NFZs in reply to the incoming fire, and all "feasible precautions" that were practicable in the circumstances had been taken. Determining and obtaining of a re-construction of all the conditions under which the "combat action" took place would be "next to impossible". The commission is satisfied, on a careful consideration of all the circumstances that shells had in fact fallen on hospitals causing damage and resulting in civilian casualties. But evidence submitted is equivocal in nature and does not warrant a definitive conclusion that one party or the other was responsible for the shelling. Government of Sri Lanka with the co-operation of the aid agencies, has taken all possible steps in getting food, medical supplies and other essential items across to the entrapped civilians. However, there appears to have been a paucity of medicines and the medical facilities appear to have been inadequate.