Judicial independence is protected by Singapore's Constitution, statutes such as the State Courts Act and Supreme Court of Judicature Act, and the common law. Independence of the judiciary is the principle that the judiciary should be separated from legislative and executive power, and shielded from inappropriate pressure from these branches of government, and from private or partisan interests. It is crucial as it serves as a foundation for the rule of law and democracy.

To safeguard judicial independence, Singapore law lays down special procedures to be followed before the conduct of Supreme Court judges may be discussed in Parliament and for their removal from office for misconduct, and provides that their remuneration may not be reduced during their tenure. By statute, judicial officers of the State Courts, and the Registrar, Deputy Registrar and assistant registrars of the Supreme Court have immunity from civil suits, and are prohibited from hearing and deciding cases in which they are personally interested. The common law provides similar protections and disabilities for Supreme Court judges. Both the State Courts and Supreme Court have power to punish for contempt of court, though only the Supreme Court may convict persons of the offence of scandalizing the court.

The Chief Justice and other Supreme Court judges are appointed by the President acting on the advice of Cabinet. The President must consult the Chief Justice when appointing other judges, and may exercise personal discretion to refuse to make an appointment if he does not concur with the Cabinet's advice. Supreme Court justices enjoy security of tenure up to the age of 65 years, after which they cease to hold office. However, the Constitution permits such judges to be re-appointed on a term basis, as well as for judicial commissioners to be appointed for limited periods, including the hearing of single cases. Judicial officers of the State Courts are also appointed on a term basis by the Legal Service Commission (LSC), and can be transferred from the courts to other government departments to serve as legal officers, and vice versa. It has been claimed that this creates a risk of executive interference, although a 1986 inquiry into such allegations found no evidence of this.

The courts exercise judicial review of executive actions and legislation for compliance with the Constitution, empowering statutes and administrative law principles. Though it has been noted that there is a low incidence of judicial disagreement with the executive, this may not be evidence of undue deference to the executive but may merely be that the executive has attained a high degree of fairness in its decision-making. The fact that a large number of defamation cases involving opponents of the Government have been decided in favour of the Government and members of the ruling People's Action Party has led to criticism that the judiciary is not impartial. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the defendants in such cases have not been successful in proving the truth of the allegedly defamatory facts.

Theory of judicial independence

Importance Judicial independence serves as a safeguard for the rights and privileges provided by the Constitution and prevents executive and legislative encroachment upon those rights.. It serves as a foundation for the rule of law and democracy. The rule of law means that all authority and power must come from an ultimate source of law. Under an independent judicial system, the courts and its officers are free from inappropriate intervention in the judiciary's affairs. With this independence, the judiciary can safeguard people's rights and freedoms which ensure equal protection for all..

The effectiveness of the law and the respect that people have for the law and the government which enacts it is dependent upon the judiciary's independence to mete out fair decisions. Furthermore, it is a pillar of economic growth as multinational businesses and investors have confidence to invest in the economy of a nation who has a strong and stable judiciary that is independent of interference.. The judiciary's role in deciding the validity of presidential and parliamentary elections also necessitates independence of the judiciary.Constitution, Art. 93A, and the , ss. 71–80; and the , ss. 92–101.

Disadvantages The disadvantages of having a judiciary that is seemingly too independent include possible abuse of power by judges. Self-interest, ideological dedication and even corruption may influence the decisions of judges without any checks and balances in place to prevent this abuse of power if the judiciary is completely independent.Warren, pp. 2–3. The relationship between the judiciary and the executive is a complex series of dependencies and interdependencies which counter-check each other and must be carefully balanced. One cannot be too independent of the other. Furthermore, judicial support of the executive is not as negative as it seems as the executive is the branch of government with the greatest claim to democratic legitimacy. If the judiciary and executive are constantly feuding, no government can function well.Warren, pp. 3–5.

Also, an extremely independent judiciary would lack judicial accountability, which is the duty of a public decision-maker to explain and justify a decision and to make amendments where a decision causes injustice or harm. Judges are not required to give an entire account of their rationale behind decisions, and are shielded against public scrutiny and protected from legal repercussions. However judicial accountability can reinforce judicial independence as it could show that judges have proper reasons and rationales for arriving at a particular decision. While judges are not democratically accountable to the people, the key is for judges to achieve equilibrium between the two to ensure that justice is upheld.Warren, pp. 4–5.

Legal safeguards Part VII of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. is the main legislation which protects the independence of Supreme Court judges. Article 93 vests judicial power in the judiciary without placing any restriction on how it may be exercised in matters within the court's jurisdiction,. which shows recognition and acceptance of the judiciary as an independent institution in Singapore.Chan, p. 235. Part VII also provides other legislative safeguards which act as a protective wall against external pressures.Chan, p. 231. These safeguards cannot be amended unless the changes are supported on the Second and Third Readings of constitutional amendment bills by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all elected Members of Parliament.Constitution, Art. 5. However, the dominance of one political party – the People's Action Party – in Parliament can lessen the difficulty of amending the Constitution.

Other legislation which provides safeguards for judicial independence, particularly of junior Supreme Court judicial officers and judicial officers of the State Courts, includes the Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act,. Legal Aid and Advice Act,. Legal Profession Act,. State Courts Act,. and Supreme Court of Judicature Act.. In addition, under the Code of Conduct for the Attorney-General's Chambers legal officers are required to, among other things, "safeguard and enhance the proper administration of justice"...

Appointment of judges

Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President acting on the advice of his Cabinet.Constitution, Art. 95(1). The President exercises personal discretion to refuse to make an appointment if he does not concur with the Cabinet's advice.Constitution, Art. 22(1)(a). The Chief Justice must be consulted,Constitution, Art. 95(2). though it is unclear how much weight his opinion carries. It has been noted that the current constitutional arrangements enable "[a] well-meaning Executive, sincerely believing in the justness and legitimacy of its governmental programme,... to appoint Judges who, in essence, believe in the same fundamental policies. The problem is that this is anathema to the logic of the separation of powers, directed as it is on the potential for the abuse or misuse of power." It is possible for an executive "bent on preserving its power at any cost" to control the judicial appointment process entirely, which would be undesirable as this may result in a bench packed with compliant judges.. On the other hand, alternative judicial appointment methods have their own problems such as the possibility that judges cannot be appointed because decision-makers are unable to agree on the matter.Hor, pp. 501–502. As former Chief Justice of Australia Harry Gibbs pointed out:

The current judicial appointment system may also lead to a Bench enjoying legitimacy as it is aligned with popular opinion. A positive result may be a cohesive state with an interdependent judiciary and executive where the judiciary is unlikely to become too activist and the executive pays due regard to laws.

Removal of judges In Singapore, judges can only be removed for misbehaviour or incapacity. Removal of a judge of the Supreme Court may only be effected upon the recommendation of a tribunal of his or her peers.Constitution, Art. 98(3). Such a system is arguably better than a system of removal by politicians in securing judicial independence as there will be less exploitation by politicians seeking to influence judges.Chan, p. 233.

Security of tenure

Supreme Court judges According to Alexander Hamilton, security of tenure of judicial offices is important for judicial independence, as appointments that require periodic renewal by the executive or legislature render the judiciary liable to rule in favour of these branches of government. Hamilton also suggested that temporary tenure would discourage capable individuals from quitting their existing jobs to become judges: Hamilton, pp. 529–530. While Supreme Court judges in Singapore do not have tenure for life, they have security of tenure up to the age of 65 years, after which they cease to hold office.Constitution, Art. 98(1).

A person who has ceased to hold the office of a judge may be appointed as Chief Justice or may sit as a judge of the High Court or a Judge of Appeal for a designated period as directed by the President if he concurs in his personal discretion with the Prime Minister's advice on the matter.Constitution, Art. 94(3). In addition, to facilitate the disposal of business in the Supreme Court, judicial commissioners may be appointed for limited periods,Constitution, Art. 94(4). including the hearing of a single case only.Constitution, Art. 94(5). This is generally done to clear a backlog of cases, or to test a judicial commissioner's suitability for appointment as a judge.Chan, p. 246. Although judicial commissioners do not enjoy security of tenure, they have the same powers and enjoy the same immunities as Supreme Court judges. It has been suggested that the risk that such judges may not act independently is mitigated by public scrutiny of judicial decisions and the fact that it is to the judge's advantage, for future appointment, if he or she were to act independently in accordance with the law. Also, issues of independence will not usually arise as most of the disputes adjudicated by judicial commissioners will not involve the other arms of government.Chan, p. 247.

State Court judges