The Guns of August (published in the UK as August 1914) is a 1962 book centered on the first month of World War I written by Barbara W. Tuchman. After introductory chapters, Tuchman describes in great detail the opening events of the conflict. The book's focus then becomes a military history of the contestants, chiefly the great powers.
The Guns of August provides a narrative of the earliest stages of World War I, from the decisions to go to war up until the start of the Franco-British offensive that stopped the German advance into France. This led to four years of trench warfare. The book discusses military plans, strategies, world events, and international sentiments before and during the war.
The book was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction for publication year 1963,1963 Winners, The Pulitzer Prizes. and proved very popular. Tuchman later returned to the subject of the social attitudes and issues that existed before World War I in a collection of eight essays published in 1966 as The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890–1914.
Synopsis The book starts with the May 1910 funeral of King Edward VII, using that scene to introduce leaders of the European monarchies and their relationships with each other. This event marked the last time they were together peacefully. These figures went on to become central to World War I. This includes KaiserThis section and the next, which summarizes Tuchman's book, are written in American English and follow the author's spelling and usage conventions (e.g. the Kaiser or Kaiser instead of Emperor, Franchet d'Esperey instead of Franchet d'Espèrey, Kluck for von Kluck), are not narrated in the third person and quote with page references any word copied from the book. These rules, but the last one, have been relaxed in the other sections of this article. Wilhelm II of Germany and Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria.
The remaining twenty one chapters of the book are grouped in three parts: "Plans", "Outbreak" and "Battle".
"Plans" delves into the prewar military strategies of the four major European powers: Germany – Facing threats from the West and the East since the 1890s, the Schlieffen Plan was designed to avoid fighting a prolonged war at two fronts at once by quickly beating France, as done in 1870 (and again in 1940), before the Russian Empire could mobilise its forces. It relied on attacking France through Belgium with a strong right wing, but Schlieffen's successor as the chief of German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, weakened the plan, leading to assumptions of a swift victory that were overly optimistic (chapter 2). France – After decades of defensive strategies following their quick defeat at Sedan, France adopted General Joseph Joffre's offensive Plan XVII in 1913, emphasizing attack and broad operational plans (chapter 3). Britain – The military cooperation with France evolved from informal arrangements to a formal naval agreement and Britain preparing to deploy the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) but these initiatives were supported by a narrow and fragile political will (chapter 4). Russia – Despite internal weaknesses and corruption, Russia's massive army planned an invasion of Eastern Prussia, prompting Germany to prepare reactive strategies to protect this critical territory (chapter 5).
"Outbreak" meticulously chronicles the events that led Europe into war, hour by hour, between August 1 and 4, 1914: On August 1, Germany ordered general mobilization; its offensive might have taken a radically different direction if Wilhelm II, on the basis of a misunderstood telegram from London, had managed to convince Moltke to change plans; but Moltke prevailed and Luxembourg was invaded (chapter 6). France declared general mobilization on the same day in response to Germany's ultimatum to Russia while in London Prime Minister H. H. Asquith's divided Cabinet failed to move (chapter 7). On August 2, 1914, Germany presented Belgium with an ultimatum, which King Albert rejected (chapter 8). On August 3 and 4, political leaders in Germany, France, Belgium, and Britain unified their nations behind the war imperative; Germany declared war on France and invaded Belgium, which triggered Britain's entry into the war, with only a few leaders foreseeing a prolonged conflict (chapter 9).
"Battle" extensively details three of the four European military fronts of August 1914:Tuchman ignores the war fought between Austria and Russia and between Austria and Serbia, except as it touches on the Mediterranean. In her Author's Note, she explains that the "inexhaustible problems of the Balkans" would necessitate a "tiresome length," which fortunately can be omitted without sacrificing the "unity" of the book. Hostile relations between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Kingdom of Serbia thus fail to merit further mention. the Western Front: the Battle of the Frontiers (chapters 11 to 14), the battle of ideas (chapter 17), and the fighting in France up to the beginning of the First Battle of the Marne (chapters 19 to 22) the Eastern Prussia Front (chapters 15 and 16); the sea front: the Adriatic Campaign (chapter 10) and more generally the strategies of the three main naval forces, the UK, Germany and the US (chapter 18).
The afterword reflects on the First Battle of the Marne, highlighting the deadlock and immense human and material costs of the Western Front. Despite the Allies' eventual success in saving Paris, the war's initial battles failed to be decisive and resulted in a war of attrition. The next four years of war were mostly determined by the events that took place in August 1914.
Summary by chapters
Ch. 1 – A Funeral On May 20, 1910, of the nine kings who led the funeral of King Edward VII, Kaiser Wilhelm II held conflicted views on his deceased uncle. In public, he was the gravest and most attentionate mourner. In private, he scorned Edward's personal diplomacy which supported Britain's shift from isolation to alliances with former foes France and Russia, calling his uncle "Satan" for plotting to encircle Germany. Wilhelm's inner tension reflected a wider polarisation around the question of Germany's rise, illustrated by two influential books. In "The Great Illusion" Norman Angell demonstrated that any war between large states was impossible because of its exorbitant cost whereas General von Bernhardi argued in "Germany and the Next War" that his nation had to either attack and annihilate France, or accept its downfall. On that May morning of 1910 "the sun of the old world was setting in a dying blaze of splendor never to be seen again."
Plans
Ch. 2 – "Let the Last Man on the Right Brush the Channel with His Sleeve" To avert a two-front war, Schlieffen saw it as a "military necessity" to attack France via Belgium, whose perpetual neutrality was guaranteed internationally since 1839. If Germany threw seven-eighths of its 1.5 million soldiers against France, it could beat it in six weeks before turning to Russia. Influenced by Clausewitz and the recent decisive victories over Austria and France, Schlieffen's plan aimed to march 34 active and 20 reserve divisions through Belgium. Such a strong right wing would envelop the French armies and rake in the BEF. Schlieffen presumed Belgium would merely protest but the Kaiser, who wanted more assurance, unsuccessfully attempted to bribe King Leopold II by promising him French territories and money. Moltke, who succeeded Schlieffen in 1906, weakened the right wing at each new iteration of the war plan. His version of June 1914 saw Paris capitulate 39 days after mobilisation but assumed delusively that every possible contingency could be planned for.
Ch. 3 – The Shadow of Sedan The humiliating defeat at Sedan set France on the defensive for forty years. Sixteen war plans were produced, each defensive. But her direction changed a few years to 1914 after it gradually regained confidence in itself as a nation and General Foch planted the seed of the mystique of the will in the military doctrine. The War Council, pressed by the War Minister Messimy, replaced in 1911 the defensive General Michel with General Joffre, who developed Plan XVII, the first offensive war plan adopted by the War Council in May 1913 and ready for distribution to generals in February 1914. Its bold goal – go to Berlin via Mainz – was not supported by a detailed operational war plan like Schlieffen's but instead emphasised the army's imperative – Attack! – and laid out war options that generals could implement depending on circumstances.
Ch. 4 – "A Single British Soldier …" Russia's defeat to Japan in 1905 precipitated Germany in probing France in Morocco and Britain in developing military arrangements with France after Campbell-Bannerman authorised Wilson to open informal works with his French counterpart. But this embryonic military cooperation waned after the first Moroccan crisis subsided. It re-emerged in 1910 when Wilson used his new position of Director of Military Operations and his friendship with Foch to reinvigorate joint war plans, just in time for the second Moroccan crisis of 1911, whose aftermath was a shake up of the Royal Navy's top brass, a naval agreement between Britain and France and a non-binding mutual support of their armies. Wilson delivered "Plan W" by the spring of 1914. Britain's military was ready to deploy the BEF and 145,000 men to France but the British political leaders were not: only the few involved in the CID were aware of these military commitments.
Ch. 5 – The Russian steamroller Not withstanding its defeats (Crimea in 1856, Manchuria in 1905) and defects, Russia's imposing 6.5 million men army unsettled Germany and reassured France and Britain, its Triple Entente allies. After the defeat to Japan, Grand Duke Nicholas, as chair of the Council of National Defence, initiated military reforms but these were thwarted in 1908 when the conservatives dissolved it. The same year,Page 71, Tuchman writes, referring to Sukhomlinov: "This was the man who was Minister of War from 1908 to 1914." In reality, he was appointed Minister of War on March 11, 1909. Sukhomlinov became Minister of War. Corrupt and inefficient, he froze the modernisation of the army and changed Chief of Staff six times by 1914. Still, despite these weaknesses, Russia planned to invade Eastern Prussia with two armies totalling 800,000 men. But Germany was determined to retain this vital territory. Max Hoffmann, anticipating that the Russian army would have to split around the Masurian lakes, considered two reactive tactics: a retreat or a frontal assault on either flank.
Outbreak Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination on June 28, 1914, led Austria to seek Serbia's annexation, with German backing on July 5. Austria's ultimatum on July 23, followed by a declaration of war on July 28 and Belgrade's bombardment on July 29, provoked Russia to mobilize on July 30 to defend Slav interests and its prestige. Germany's ultimatum to Russia on July 31 intensified the crisis. "War pressed against every frontier."
Ch. 6 – August 1: Berlin