Horses in World War II were used by the belligerent nations, for transportation of troops, artillery, materiel, messages, and, to a lesser extent, in mobile cavalry troops. The role of horses for each nation depended on its military doctrines, strategy, and state of economy. It was most pronounced in the German and Soviet Armies. Over the course of the war, Germany (2.75 million) and the Soviet Union (3.5 million) together employed more than six million horses.
Most British regular cavalry regiments were mechanised between 1928 and the outbreak of World War II. The United States retained a single horse cavalry regiment stationed in the Philippines, and the German Army retained a single brigade. The French Army of 1939–1940 blended horse regiments into their mobile divisions, and the Soviet Army of 1941 had thirteen cavalry divisions. The Italian, Iranian, Japanese, Polish and Romanian armies employed substantial cavalry formations.
Horse-drawn transportation was most important for Germany, as it was relatively lacking in automotive industry and oil resources. Infantry and horse-drawn artillery formed the bulk of the German Army throughout the war; only one fifth of the Army belonged to mobile panzer and mechanized divisions. Each German infantry division employed thousands of horses and thousands of men taking care of them. Despite losses of horses to enemy action, exposure and disease, Germany maintained a steady supply of work and saddle horses until 1945. Cavalry in the German Army and the Waffen-SS gradually increased in size, peaking at six cavalry divisions in February 1945.
The Red Army was substantially motorized from 1939 to 1941 but lost most of its war equipment in Operation Barbarossa. The losses were temporarily remedied by forming masses of mounted infantry, which were used as strike forces in the Battle of Moscow. Heavy casualties and a shortage of horses soon compelled the Soviets to reduce the number of cavalry divisions. As tank production and Allied supplies made up for the losses of 1941, the cavalry was merged with tank units, forming more effective strike groups. From 1943 to 1944, cavalry gradually became the mobile infantry component of the tank armies. By the end of the war, Soviet cavalry had been reduced to its prewar strength. The logistical role of horses in the Red Army was not as high as it was in the German Army because of Soviet domestic oil reserves and US truck supplies.
Motorization in the interwar period
The trench warfare of the Western Front of World War I resulted in a strategic stalemate: defensive weapons and tactics prevailed over the offensive options available. Early tanks, supported by artillery and foot infantry, provided a weapon for breaching the front line but were too slow to turn the breach into a strategic offensive; the railroads of France and Germany provided the defending side with the ability to move troops and counterattack in sufficient time. Postwar armies concentrated on developing more effective offensive tactics through the mechanization of ground troops. The mechanization strategy was influenced by the state of economies, anticipated scenarios of war, politics and lobbying within civilian governments and the militaries. The United Kingdom, France and Germany chose three different strategies. A fourth option was chosen by the Soviet Union who, influenced by the mobile warfare experience of the Russian Civil War and the Polish-Soviet War, introduced a mechanized corps and airborne troops.Millett, p. 29 Each strategy closed the gap between the capabilities of cavalry and mechanized infantry.
Another factor prompting motorization was the decline of national horse stocks and the inability to restore them in reasonable time. Of all the major powers, only the United Kingdom, weakened by the loss of Ireland, was, in part, compelled to motorize for this reason; horse stocks in Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union remained sufficient for at least their peacetime armies. In 1928, the United Kingdom became the first nation to begin replacing horse cavalry with motorized troopsGudmundsson, p. 56. and by 1939 had become the first to motorize their national army, although some Yeomanry regiments plus regular cavalry units serving overseas remained mounted.Murray and Millett, p. 46. British experimental armored units had performed impressively since 1926,Murray and Millett, p. 25. but, facing resistance from the traditional branches of service, remained unpopular among senior officers until the Battle of France.Murray and Millett, pp. 26–27.
The French Army partially motorized their cavalry in 1928, creating divisions of dragons portés (mobile dragoons) that combined motorized and horse-mounted elements.Gudmundsson, p. 58. In the following decade the French searched for a perfect mix, testing five different divisional configurations.Jarymowycz 2008, p. 163. Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania followed the French mixed pattern; Austrian and Czechoslovak mobile divisions were similar but with a higher share of horses. The Polish Army acquired tanks and the Lithuanian army acquired trucks but otherwise both remained horse-powered, World War I style armies.Liekis, p. 325 The United States Cavalry commanders approved the French strategy but made no radical changes until the 1940 reform that completely eliminated horse troops.
German analysts rejected the French concept of mixed horse-and-motor troops as unworkable. The Wehrmacht had its own opponents of mechanization, but with Adolf Hitler's support Ludwig Beck, Werner von Fritsch and Heinz Guderian succeeded in forging a compact but effective panzer force that coexisted with masses of traditional foot infantry and horse-drawn artillery throughout World War II.Jarymowycz 2008, p. 165. Willis Crittenberger observed that "the French are limited to the armored division, while the Germans have created an armored branch."Jarymowycz 2008, p. 162. By 1939, the Wehrmacht disbanded their 18 cavalry regiments, leaving a single active cavalry brigade; the cavalrymen with their war horses were integrated into infantry divisions.
Motorization of the 1930s raised a number of concerns, starting with the need to secure a continuous fuel supply. The new formations had a significantly larger footprint on the march: the 1932 French motorized division took up of road space compared to for a horse-mounted formation, raising concerns about control and vulnerability. The Spanish Civil War and other conflicts of the 1930s did not provide definite solutions and the issues remained unresolved until the onset of World War II. Only the German blitzkrieg achieved in the Battle of France finally persuaded the militaries of the world, including the United States, that the tank had replaced the horse on the battlefield.Jarymowycz 2008, p. 175.
Horse logistics
German and Soviet armies relied heavily on work horses to pull artillery and supplies. Horses seemed to be a cheap and reliable transport especially in the spring and fall mud of the Eastern Front but the associated costs of daily feeding, grooming and handling horses were staggering. In theory horse units could feed off the country, but grazing on grass alone rendered horses unfit for work and the troops had no time to spend searching the villages for fodder.Dunn, p. 229. Hard-working horses required up to twelve pounds of grain daily; fodder carried by the troops made up a major portion of their supply trains.
Horses needed attendants: hitching a six-horse field artillery team, for example, required six men working for at least an hour. Horse health deteriorated after only ten days of even moderate load, requiring frequent refits; recuperation took months and the replacement horses, in turn, needed time to get along with their teammates and handlers. Good stables around the front line were scarce; makeshift lodgings caused premature wear and disease. Refit of front-line horse units consumed eight to ten days, slowing down operations.
Movements over (the daily horse travel limitDunn, pp. 85 and 227.) were particularly slow and complex. Longer hauls were relegated to trucks at the first opportunity, while horses persisted at divisional levelGlantz, p. 227. and in auxiliary units.Dunn, p. 219: divisional field bakery, hospital and post office. Horse transports were particularly inadequate in deep offensive operations, just like they were in 1914. American trucks supplied to the Soviets allowed operations up to away from the railhead, a distance impossible for horse-drawn sleighs.Dunn, p. 84. Likewise, replacement of field artillery horses with jeeps allowed towing 120 mm mortars in line with advancing troops, another tactic not possible with horses. Use of trucks was constrained by the lack of fuel and high costs of synthetic gasoline on the German side, and the losses of equipment in 1941–1942 on the Soviet side. The Soviets managed their losses with the formation of 76 horse transport battalions of 500 horses each, and employed reindeer in the Arctic and camels in the South. But overcoming the shortage of horses themselves was insurmountable: a work horse matures in three to four years; farm stocks were already depleted of horses as well as tractors. Western European nations, starting with the United Kingdom, witnessed a shortage of horses since the 1920s and adjusted their armies accordingly.Gudmundsson, p. 55. Germany in the 1920s managed to restore their population of horses, but then it declined again as farm horses were replaced by motor power.
The United States Army, having ample reserves of fuel and trucks, opted for all-truck logistics from the onset of their military reform of 1940. As General Robert W. Grow wrote, "there was not a single horse in the American Army in Europe, there was lots of cavalry action".As cited in Jarymowycz 2001, p. 313. Nevertheless, horses, mules, donkeys and even oxen remained essential in rough, remote areas of the Pacific.
Belligerent armies
France Germany Hungary Italy Japan Poland Romania Soviet Union United Kingdom United States National stock of horses 2.9 million (1930) ... 860,000 (1930) 942,000 (1930) ... ... ... 21 million (1940) 1.2 million (1930)Rich, Wilson p. 653 (table 59). Note that decline in horse population due to motorization and the Great Depression continued through the 1930s. 14 million (1940) Horses employed by the military >520,000 (1939)Jarymowycz 2008, p. 163: "France mobilized over 520,000 horses and mules in 1939". 2.75 million 30 thousand ... 100,000 152,000 90,000 3.5 million ... 52,000 Maximum number of cavalry units deployed ... 6 divisions(February 1945) 2 divisions (1944) ... 25 regiments (1940) 38 regiments (1939)Jarymowycz 2008, p. 169. 6 divisions (1942) 80 light cavalry divisions(December 1941) ... 13 regiments (1939) Largest cavalry formation deployed CorpsJarymowycz 2008, p. 171. Corps DivisionFowler and Chappell, p. 36 Division Brigade Brigade Division Group (Army equivalent) ... Division Main role(s) of horse elements in the military Mobile troops Field logistics Mobile troops Mobile andcolonial troops Mobile troops Mobile troops Mobile troops Mobile troops,logistics Logistics,colonial troops Logistics in the Pacific Theater
China
Cavalry provided a major element in the Chinese armies of 1937–1945. Both the National Army of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party Army used cavalry for patrolling, reconnaissance and direct conflict as mounted infantry with the Japanese forces. Mongolian horses provided the bulk of horse-stock in Chinese armies with larger Ningxia ponies sometimes used. As late as the 1940s the Chinese People's Liberation Army included approximately 100,000 mounted soldiers, grouped in 14 cavalry divisions and considered as an elite.
France