The Mississippi class of battleships comprised two ships which were authorized in the 1903 naval budget: and ; these were named for the 20th and 43rd states, respectively. These were the last pre-dreadnought battleships to be designed for the United States Navy, but not the last to be built, because one more ship of a prior design was completed later under the 1904 naval budget. While the quality and technology of the weaponry and armor were first-rate, these ships included a variety of main, intermediate, secondary, and tertiary gun sizes in a predreadnought configuration which became obsolete before the ships were completed.
The first several years of the 20th century were a period of confusion and transition in US naval strategy, tactics, and ship design. The Mississippi class, along with the preceding , were designed based on lessons learned in the Spanish–American War, but while they were under construction, the Russo-Japanese War, war games, and experimentation demonstrated new priorities and concepts which would influence future designs. This was also a period where rapid development of techniques and training in the use of large guns made the inclusion of rapid-fire intermediate and secondary weapons unnecessary. Future US designs would reduce the confusing array of guns sizes in predreadnought battleships and rely on one gun size for the main armament, the "all-big-gun" concept, along with many small guns of a uniform caliber to combat small vessels in close proximity.
The Mississippi-class ships were smaller than the several preceding classes of US battleships. They were designed in an attempt to reduce the rapid growth in the size and cost of U.S. battleships. Also, a theory existed among influential naval leaders, including Dewey and Mahan, that many small battleships could be strategically useful, as were small ships of the line in the 18th and 19th centuries. In essence, the Mississippi-class ships were smaller versions of the preceding Connecticut class with virtually the same armament and armor, but the reduction in length, engine size, and fuel capacity caused them to be slow and short-ranged. Other design compromises caused them to perform poorly in terms of steering, stability, and sea keeping.
These ships served in the US Navy from 1908 to 1914, when they were sold to Greece. Most US service was with the Atlantic Fleet, though these ships did not perform well in fleet operations due to their lower speeds and shorter ranges. The ships were frequently detached for special tasks, including goodwill tours, and Mississippi was used for a time as a seaplane support vessel. Both ships took part in US military interventions in Mexico and the Caribbean, including landing Marines and supporting early air operations.
In 1914, both Mississippi-class ships were sold to Greece, being renamed Kilkis and Lemnos; this was the only sale of functional US battleships to a foreign government. From 1914 to the early 1930s, the ships were active in the Greek Navy, serving mostly in coastal defense and attack roles. In these missions and in the calmer waters of the Mediterranean, their limitations were less pronounced. They served in the Russian Civil War and the Greco-Turkish War. By the mid-1930s, they were relegated to reserve and auxiliary roles, and Lemnos (ex-Idaho) had her guns removed to bolster coastal fortifications. Both were sunk by German aircraft in 1941, and raised in the 1950s to be sold for scrap.
Purpose
In the early 20th century, the US Navy was growing rapidly. The Navy commissioned its first battleships in 1895,Friedman 1985 p. 424 and by the middle of the next decade, Jane's Fighting Ships ranked its battle line second only to the British Navy.Rose pp. 12–14 However, this rapid growth was not universally supported either within the government or within the Navy. Compromises between powerful groups were frequently necessary to get funding.
The Mississippi-class ships were designed to meet Congressional and Navy Department objectives of reducing the escalating cost of new battleships, the quantity, size, and cost of which had increased dramatically over the first two decades of US battleship production. A division occurred among US naval planners in the early years of the 20th century over whether to have technically superior ships or many less expensive ones, with President Theodore Roosevelt among those supporting the former and Admiral of the Navy George Dewey along with Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan supporting the latter approach. The 1903 naval budget effected a compromise by calling for five ships: three more ships of the Connecticut class and two ships of a new less expensive class of about , with the design still to be determined.
The ships that became the Mississippi class were intended to serve as the modern equivalent of 19th-century third-rate ship of the line, offering what was thought to be an efficient compromise between sailing ability (speed, handling), fire power, and cost.Reilly p. 187 This concept had formed the backbone of the sailing battle fleets of the previous century, but trends in early 20th century naval strategies were making the third-rate concept obsolete. Prevailing strategies called for a consistent battle line of first-rate units.
Design The Mississippi-class battleships were the last predreadnought US battleship class to be designed; however, , the last ship of the prior Connecticut-class design, was authorized and completed after these ships; therefore, it was the last US predreadnought ship to be built.Friedman 1985 p. 44
While Congress had authorized three vessels in the 13,000-long ton range, the design was not specified in the 1903 naval budget. Three approaches were initially considered: a scaled-down version of the preceding 16,000-long ton Connecticut class, five of which had been approved with the 1902 and 1903 budgets; a scaled-up version of the , an 1898 design, three of which were commissioned from 1902 to 1904; and a completely new design which might incorporate new ideas and technology. Interesting adaptations were considered for new designs, and weight-saving technology could allow increased efficiencies to be achieved from the older Maine class design, which was closest to the weight goal.
As with most US naval designs, coal storage and engine efficiency were more important than in European designs. US ships might have to fight far from their home shores, especially in the Pacific.Friedman 1985 p. 5 Even in the Caribbean, US forces might be farther from their coaling stations than a European power with colonial bases. Draft was a concern, since southern US harbors tended to have shallow entrances, and some proponents felt that all ships should be able to egress all major harbors.Friedman 1985 p. 20 Beams were typically limited by the width of dry docks.
Armament
In 1903, differing concepts of the ultimate combination of guns were available, with many ideas based on various experiences and interpretations from recent naval battles, war games, and other experimentation. Recent US battleship designs had included primary guns, intermediate guns, secondary guns, and tertiary guns, which were typical in the predreadnought configuration. In 1890, the US Navy had pioneered the use of intermediate guns with the , but had not used these consistently in their previous designs because opinions and experiences varied.Gardiner & Lambert p. 163
The quality of guns, armor, ordnance, and design was changing rapidly, so experience could quickly become irrelevant. Combat experience in the Spanish–American War had shown the value of many smaller guns at close range, where the larger guns had been inaccurate. In the Russo Japanese War of 1904–1905, just six years later, decisive effects were obtained at long ranges, well beyond the effective limits of ordnance. However, by this point the designs were established for the Mississippi class and the keels had already been laid down.Cressman MississippiCressman Idaho
Main batteries Recent American designs had continued to include large primary batteries of either or guns, along with several intermediate 8-inch guns for faster fire in closer combat with armored vessels. The lighter intermediate guns were considered valuable for penetrating upper-level armor, where the heavy guns were more effective on the main belt and heavy turrets. The former were likely to diminish the fighting ability of the opponent, while the latter were more likely to sink her.Friedman 1985 pp.44 & 53
Earlier US battleships had used 13-inch guns with black powder propellant; the 1898 design of the Maine class used more powerful but smaller 12-inch guns using smokeless powder, giving a greater velocity and flatter trajectory.Friedman 1985 p. 38 The 12-inch rifles available in 1904 had a range of , about double the range of the black powder main armament used in the Spanish–American War.Alden p. 211 These were considered an excellent compromise between weight and firepower, since limitations in gunnery control made longer-range guns impractical.Friedman 2008 p. 176 The contemporary consideration was not whether to go larger, but whether to go with more.Friedman 1985 pp. 42–60 In 1902, naval officers, with the backing of President Theodore Roosevelt, began to develop superior fire control techniques and equipment. The development of better spotting and range finders led to improvements in range capacity and accuracy.Friedman 2008 p. 176 At the same time, superior training and systems significantly reduced the time required to load and fire the large guns, from three minutes to one minute.Friedman 1985 p. 43
Intermediate 8-inch guns had been discontinued in 1896 with the Illinois class, but based on experience in the Spanish–American War in 1898, 8-inch/45-caliber guns were reinstated in the Virginia class and continued in the Connecticut class.Hovgaard pp. 104–109 Typically, these were carried in two-gun turrets, but the placement of the turrets had been inconsistent in prior designs; in two prior designs, the turrets for the 8-inch guns were superimposed over the turrets for the 12/13-inch guns (see and classes).Reilly pp. 140–141 Some designers felt that 8-inch guns were redundant to the faster firing 7-inch/45-caliber guns carried in casemates.Reilly p. 162–163 Others argued that increases in the rate of fire and accuracy of the 12-inch guns eliminated the need for any smaller guns in the main battery.Friedman 1985 p. 44
Secondary batteries In 1903, secondary batteries were typically considered to be a combination of torpedo defense—defense against smaller boats armed with torpedoes, such as torpedo boats or destroyers—and weapons to attack the lightly armored upper structures of capital ships.
Recent US warships had mounted a combination of a few 7-inch or 6-inch guns and many smaller guns in the to range (6-pounder to 12-pounder in the traditional terms). The larger of these guns were typically protected in casematesReilly p. 164 and the smaller ones open on the deck or in lightly protected casemates.Reilly pp.149, 166–167 & 169
A fast-firing 7-inch/45-caliber gun had been adopted with the previous battleship class to replace earlier 6-inch guns;Friedman 1985 p. 43 these brought a significant improvement in ballistics, expanding the potential beyond torpedo defense, but came with drawbacks. Various opinions on the best combination of guns existed: all 8-inch, all 7-inch, or a mix.
Though considered to be quick-firing, the propellant for 7-inch guns was loaded in bags, making them slower than contemporary 6-inch guns.Friedman 1985 p. 43 The Navy considered these to be excellent for the intended role; however, in World War I North Atlantic convoy duty, the disadvantages in seakeeping outweighed the utility; they were removed from battleships remaining in US service in 1918.U.S. Navy Department. Bureau of Ordnance pp. 203–205