José María Guido Cibeira (29 August 1910 – 13 June 1975) was President of Argentina from 29 March 1962 to 12 October 1963, serving as the head of a provisional civilian government after the Argentine military overthrew President Arturo Frondizi. Guido's nineteen months in office were characterized by a severe economic recession, open conflict between competing factions within the armed forces, and anti-democratic measures including continued proscription of Peronists from Argentine politics. Yet Guido, with critical support from the "legalist" faction of the military, prevailed in his mission to return Argentina to constitutional government with a general election held on 7 July 1963.
Biography
Early life José María Guido was born in Buenos Aires on 29 August 1910. His father José María Emilio Guido Repetto was born in La Plata with Italian ancestry, while his mother, Carmen Cibeira Mosquera, was born in Piñor, Galicia in northern Spain.
He grew up in the capital's San Telmo barrio and graduated from the University of La Plata law school in 1940.
Early career Prior to his involvement in politics, Guido worked as a lawyer and was a member of the centrist Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical or UCR), the traditional party of Argentina's middle class. In 1946, he moved to Viedma, the provincial capital of Río Negro in the Patagonia region to join the law firm of Edgardo Costello.
Guido's career in public service started with his involvement in drafting Law 200 in 1951, which created the (IDEVI), a provincial agency tasked with developing the province's hydroelectric resources. Appointed as an advisor to IDEVI, Guido traveled to the U.S. to meet with officials from the Tennessee Valley Authority, a public utility.
Within a decade, Guido had become a national political figure. When the UCR split in 1956, he joined the dissident branch that became the Intransigent Radical Civic Union party (Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente or UCRI) and was appointed to its Executive Committee secretariat. In 1958, he was elected to the Argentine Senate representing Río Negro; his former employer Costello won the governorship of Río Negro in the same election. During his time in the Senate, Guido was known to be a skilled negotiator and partnered with Rio Negro Senate colleague José Enrico Gadano of the opposition Popular Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo or UCRP) party to promote hydroelectric development in the region.
Fatefully for Guido, he was also elected by his peers to serve as Senate President, making him next in line for the Presidency upon the resignation of Vice President Alejandro Gómez in November 1958. Guido served as Acting President in January 1959 when then-President Arturo Frondizi made a state visit to the United States. His two weeks in that capacity was notable for his decision to crack down on a general strike protesting Frondizi's privatization program. Foreshadowing his later co-optation by military authorities, Guido responded to the strike with repressive measures that included placing employees of Buenos Aires' public transport system and state oil company YPF under military control, posting military reinforcements throughout the capital, and arresting labor leaders. Public order was restored but Guido’s relationship with the labor movement deteriorated.
Presidency Guido ascended to the Presidency after the military deposed constitutionally elected Frondizi in the early morning hours of 29 March 1962. For over 12 hours after the coup, the Argentine Presidency remained vacant as civilian leaders and their military allies worked to forestall the installation of a dictatorship under Army Commander-in-Chief . Since the Vice Presidency had remained vacant after Gómez's resignation, Guido was next in line under Article 75 of the Argentine Constitution and the 1868 Law of Succession (ley de acefalía or literally "Law of headlessness").
As a Frondizi loyalist, Guido was hesitant to assume the Presidency and agreed to do so primarily at the urging of UCRI party leaders, particularly Frondizi's Defense Minister Rodolfo Martínez, who conveyed the ex-President's desire for Guido to take office. The UCRP also pledged its support. On the evening of 29 March 1962, Guido was sworn in by the Supreme Court of Argentina and reportedly took his oath on a copy of the Constitution to symbolize the preservation of constitutional procedure and asking that he not be considered a "traitor to his party or to the people." The following day, Guido's swearing-in was reaffirmed in a public ceremony attended by Supreme Court justices and Congressional and military leaders.
Although nominally President, Guido was a "virtual captive" required to "co-govern" with the armed forces, which exercised the "negative power of veto" over civilian authorities. A further complication was the split within the military between the Azules ("Blues"), also known as legalistas due to their support for a "legalist" transfer of power in accordance with the Constitution, and the Colorados ("Reds") who were eager to install a military dictator. The intense rivalry between the two factions culminated in violent confrontations in late 1962 and early 1963 that brought Argentina to the brink of civil war. The Azules emerged victorious in the ensuing battles, enabling Guido to remain in office and paving the way for the return to constitutional government through the July 1963 election that brought Arturo Umberto Illía of the UCRP to power.
Economic record and policy In the final years of the Frondizi administration, the Argentine economy had recovered from the economic crisis of 1959 but continued to face high inflation (by historical standards) due to an excessive rate of credit expansion and balance of payments deficits as a severe drought sharply reduced agricultural exports. By March 1962, foreign exchange reserves had fallen to US$125 million, a 70% decrease from twelve months earlier.
Pressured by military and agrarian interests, Guido appointed Álvaro Alsogaray as Minister of the Economy. Alsogaray was the architect of orthodox stabilization program under Frondizi and enacted similarly restrictive policies. Foreign exchange controls were liberalized and the peso was devalued by 59%. Monetary and credit conditions were tightened and M2 money supply growth was reduced from an average of 35% per year in 1960–1961 to 23% in 1962 and only 10% in 1963. Fiscal austerity was implemented and Central Bank financing of the budget deficit was virtually eliminated.
The result was a severe two-year recession. Real GDP decreased by -1.6% in 1962 and -2.4% in 1963. Despite tight fiscal and monetary policy, inflation accelerated from 13% in 1961 to 28% in 1962 and 26% in 1963, driven by the peso devaluation and reduced subsidies for public services. Urban unemployment reached 9% in July 1963, a level that would not be exceeded for thirty years, and bankruptcies hit new records. However, the stabilization program succeeded in its primary goal of averting a balance of payments crisis with foreign exchange reserves increased to US$320 million by the end of 1963.
Growth and a modest diversification of exports were one of the few bright spots in the economy during Guido's term. Exports reached US$1,385 million in 1963, an increase of over 40% from 1961 and the highest level since 1948, as agricultural production recovered from drought. Beef exports benefitted from penetrating new markets in Italy and Spain and intensive efforts to control an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease that locked Argentina out of the U.S. market. Argentina also experienced an encouraging expansion of non-traditional exports, including sugar, fruit juices, and even manufactured goods such as motor vehicle parts, agricultural machinery, tools, and textiles.
During Guido's term, Argentina remained open to foreign direct investment which had been a cornerstone of Frondizi's economic policy. In mid-1963, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimated that American companies had invested over US$1 billion in Argentina and employed over 135,000 local workers in the motor vehicle, petroleum, electric appliances, pharmaceuticals, food and beverage, and consumer products industries. U.S. and European companies contributed to Argentina's development by operating training programs, although many of the newly-trained employees subsequently sought to emigrate since their skills were in demand abroad.
Foreign trade and balance of payments Alsogaray's stabilization program drove a remarkable turnaround in Argentina's current account balance from a US$572 million deficit in 1961 to a US$385 million surplus in 1963. In addition to higher exports, Argentina saw a sharp 33% reduction in imports from 1961 to 1963 due to depressed consumer demand and the end of the Frondizi-era capital investment boom. The country also continued to benefit from Frondizi's controversial petroleum contracts, which had enabled a reduction in oil imports from US$250 million in 1958 to only US$90 million in 1962.
However, Argentina continued to face significant balance of payments pressures. Political instability and the "serious economic disequilibrium" resulted in an outflow of capital that offset the gains from a narrower merchandise trade deficit.
Dollar shortages and import restrictions also impacted efforts to revive the economy. Petroleum production declined in 1963 because state oil company Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales lacked dollars to import equipment and pay foreign oil companies for service contracts signed by Frondizi.
Argentina received US$56 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1963, and was one of the bank's largest recipients that year. On 29 March 1963, Guido secured a US$322 million credit package that included new loans, foreign exchange agreements, and refinancing existing debts.
One month before the 1963 general election, the U.S. government agreed to lend US$35.5 million to Argentina at less than 1 percent interest for a housing program and to address balance of payments issues. Unfortunately much of the foreign debt, even official assistance, was short-term in maturity. By mid-1963, it was estimated that half of Argentina's US$2.8 billion of external debt was payable by the end of 1966. Private Argentine companies held US$532 million in foreign debt, nearly half of which was payable by the end of 1963, setting up continued pressure on the balance of payments.
Fiscal policy Determined to avoid deficit monetization at all costs, Alsogaray implemented strict measures to balance the budget, including new taxes such as a 20% income tax surcharge and a 5% levy on imports. Yet in spite of his emphasis on orthodoxy, Alsogaray was responsible for a policy where government employees and contractors were paid partly in bonds rather than cash; recipients who sold their bonds were typically forced to take a discount of up to 40%.
Despite austerity measures, depressed tax revenues meant that the budget deficit actually increased from 5.6% of GDP in 1961 to 7.9% in 1962, before falling to 5.8% of GDP in 1963.
The Guido administration borrowed heavily from multilateral institutions, including a US$25 million 15 year loan from the Inter-American Development Bank for farm mechanization.
Social policy Argentina received aid for low-income housing. However, by mid-1963, U.S. officials decided to wind down its aid program due to Argentina's high living standards at the time.
Relationship with the military The Argentine armed forces saw themselves as guarantors of democracy and the Constitution. General Benjamin Rattenbach defended intervention "when the opinion of the military prevails in the orientation of the Government over the opinion of the civilian political forces."