The National Liberation Council (NLC) led the Ghanaian government from 24 February 1966 to 1 October 1969. The body emerged from a coup d'état against the Nkrumah government carried out jointly by the Ghana Police Service and Ghana Armed Forces with collaboration from the Ghana Civil Service.

The new government implemented structural adjustment policies recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. National enterprises, property, and capital were privatized or abandoned. Nkrumah had condemned the development projects of multinational corporations as signs of neocolonialism. The NLC allowed foreign conglomerates to operate on extremely favorable terms. The Ghanaian cedi was devalued by 30%. These economic changes did not succeed in reducing the country's debt or in increasing the ratio of exports to imports.

The National Liberation Council regime won support from powerful groups in Ghanaian society: local chiefs, intelligentsia, and business leaders, as well as the expanding military and police forces. However, its policies of economic austerity were not beloved of workers at large, who suffered from increasing unemployment and repression of strikes. In 1969 the regime underwent a carefully managed transition to civilian rule. Elections held on 29 August 1969 thus inaugurated a new government led by the NLC's chosen successor: the Progress Party of Kofi Abrefa Busia.

1970 Pulitzer Prize recipient investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, has brought to the table convincing reports about the Central Intelligence Agency involvement in the coup d'état, although his main source, an ex-agent, remains anonymous."CIA helped depose Nkrumah, says ex-agent", Irish Times, 10 May 1978.Seymour Hersh, "CIA Aid In Ghana Plot Told", Atlanta Constitution, 9 May 1978.

Early events

Formation of Council Francis Kwashie, part of the core planning group for the takeover, later commented that he and his comrades lacked "the faintest idea" of how to proceed upon gaining power.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 132. Several participants seemed to believe that the victorious officers would simply handpick acceptable civilian administrators and put them in charge. Marginalizing Nkrumah and other radicals would allow a sort of merger between the Convention People's Party and the opposition United Party, and the work of government could go on.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 133–135. "There were no discussions as to which CPP or UP politicians would actually be brought into the new government, nor was there any mention of which specific wings of the CPP would be purged. However, the officers' antipathy to socialism, and their contacts with ministers in the anti-socialist faction in the CPP made it obvious they had in mind the radical socialists within the Party. The purge of the socialists would facilitate the merger of the conservative wings of the CPP with the conservative United Party." The group decided that an interim government was necessary and went about determining its membership. Kokota and Harlley, the most obvious candidates for nominal leadership, turned the position down, preferring instead to retain command over their respective forces. Thus, on February 21 (the day Nkrumah left the country; three days before the coup) the group selected J. A. Ankrah, a popular general who suffered involuntary retirement in August 1965.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 134–136.

The decision to form a ruling council was made on the morning of the coup, at a meeting which included Harlley, Kokota, and Ankrah (but excluded a number of the original group) as well as Emmanuel Noi Omaboe, head of the Central Bureau of Statistics, Supreme Court Justice Fred Kwasi Apaloo, Director of Public Prosecutions Austin N. E. Amissah, and security officer D. S. Quacoopome.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 141. The name of the military government "National Liberation Council" was reportedly proposed by General Kotoka as an alternative to "National Revolutionary Council"—to indicate that the new leaders sought to liberate the country from Nkrumah and the CPP rather than to transform society.Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 7. "The name 'National Revolutionary Council' was suggested, but General Kotoka wanted to make it clear that the aim was to liberate the nation from Nkrumah, not to change the structure of society, and he persuaded his colleagues to adopt the title 'National Liberation Council'."

The council consisted of four soldiers and four police officers. Major Gen. J. A. Ankrah - Chairman of the NLC and Head of State (24 February 1966 – 3 April 1969) Mr. J.W.K. Harlley (Inspector General of Police) - Vice Chairman of the NLC Lt. Col. Emmanuel K. Kotoka (24 February 1966 – 17 April 1967) Major Akwasi Amankwaa Afrifa Mr. B. A. Yakubu (Deputy Commissioner of Police) Col. Albert Kwesi Ocran Mr. Anthony K. Deku (Commissioner of Police, CID) Mr. J. E. O. Nunoo (Commissioner of Police, Administration)

With this membership, the Council displayed more ethnic diversity than did the core group of coup planners. Two members, Nunoo and Yakubu, had no advance knowledge of the coup at all.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 142–143.

Immediate political changes and continuities

Three committees—the Economic Committee, the Administrative Committee, and the Publicity Committee—manifested on the day of the coup as organs of government. The Economic Committee, in particular, was composed of high-ranking members of the pre-existing civil service and played the lead role in creating the policies of the new government.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 200–201. The coup leaders and the "technocrats" of the civil service shared the view that politics and politicians needed to be set aside in order to set up a more effective government apparatus. The military and police, lacking knowledge of economics and governance, relied on the civil service to concoct and engineer the necessary changes.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 210–211. "In the view of both the NLC and the civil service the solution after the coup was therefore to banish, if temporarily, politicians and 'politics', and to create structures that would permit only competetent and skilled technicians to tackle problems. Thus following the coup civil servants were assured that the NLC would rely 'solely on the advice of qualified professional men' in seeking solutions to the country's problems. In a classic statement, one NLC member argued that Ghana's problems after the coup were in any event 'not political at all, but administrative.'"

The first Proclamation of the new government, issued two days after the coup, suspended Ghana's 1960 Constitution, dismissed Nkrumah, dissolved the National Assembly and the Convention Peoples' Party, and named Ankrah as chairman and Harlley as deputy chairman.Burnett, "Post-Nkrumah Ghana" (1966), p. 1097. Next, the Council declared its intention to restore civilian government "as soon as possible" and its plan for separation of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial branches.Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 3. "Only three days after the coup, the new rulers proclaimed their anxiety to hand over power to a duly-constituted representative civilian government 'as soon as possible', and announced their intention to appoint a constitutional commission to prepare a constitution in which 'the sovereign power of the state would be fairly and judiciously shared between the executive, legislature, and judiciary, and which would make the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual impossible." The Council decreed that the judicial system would continue along the same model, but judges were asked to take new oaths in which they agreed to abide by government decrees.Burnett, "Post-Nkrumah Ghana" (1966), p. 1099. "The Proclamation provided that, despite the suspension of the Constitution, the courts should continue to function with the same powers as before. Judges and all others holding posts in the judicial service were continued upon the pre-coup terms and conditions of service. The judges were required to take a new oath, however, swearing to act not only in accordance with the 'laws and usage,' but also in accordance with the 'decrees' of Ghana." (In practice, military commissions would take authority over judicial functions of political importance.)Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 179–180.

The new government made membership in the Convention People's Party illegal and took hundreds of people into "protective custody". These included former members of parliament and district commissioners, as well as 446 people affiliated directly with Nkrumah—including his financial advisor and his driver.Burnett, "Post-Nkrumah Ghana" (1966), pp. 1103–1104. "Even before repeal, however, the Council had laid the legal foundation for its own detention powers under the euphemism of 'protective custody.' The protective custody net has been sweeping. Many persons have been held as part of a class, e.g., all members of the dissolved Parliament or all district commissioners. Subsequent decrees have authorized protective custody for 446 named individuals. Descriptions of the detained persons rarely suggest the basis for their detention; they range from 'Financial Advisor to the Presidency' to 'Lorry Driver' and 'C.P.P. Activist'. Leaders of the Ghana Muslim Council were dismissed on the grounds of their party loyalties.Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 17. Formation of new political parties was banned.Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), pp. 43–44. Commissioners were established to investigate corruption in the previous regime and to organize the continued suppression of the CPP.Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 146–147. "In an effort to further legitimize their rule, win public approval for their actions, and to discredit the overthrown regime, the NLC set up several judicial commissions headed mostly by former opposition members whom the military felt were sympathetic to their course to investigate and unearth possible corrupt practices of the old regime."

The NLC disbanded and confiscated the assets of eight Nkrumaist organizations, including the United Ghana Farmers' Co-operative Council, the National Council of Ghana Women and the Ghana Youth Pioneers.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 198. Boy Scouts and Girl Guides groups were introduced to replace the latter.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 209.

Once the CPP was no longer seen as a political threat, the new government indicated that it would not retaliate excessively against officials from the old regime. All but twenty of the hundreds of imprisoned Nkrumaists were free by 1968. And although the system of ministries was re-arranged, the membership and hierarchy of the civil service remained mostly intact, and in fact gained power after the coup.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 199–200. "Nevertheless the military government depended directly upon the civil service, and the regime relied directly for its day to day operation on the advice and co-operation of senior civil servants. The immediate vacuum that resulted from the post-coup dissolution of Parliament, the banning of the CPP, and the arrest of government ministers, regional and district commissioners and local councillors was filled largely by the civil service; politically, the civil service replaced the CPP."