The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center elicited a large response of local emergency and rescue personnel to assist in the evacuation of the two towers, resulting in a large loss of the same personnel when the towers collapsed. After the attacks, the media termed the World Trade Center site "Ground Zero", while rescue personnel referred to it as "The Pile".
In the ensuing recovery and cleanup efforts, personnel related to the metalwork and construction professions would descend on the site to offer their services and remained until the site was cleared in May 2002. In the years since, investigations and studies have examined effects upon those who participated, noting a variety of afflictions attributed to the debris and stress.
Building evacuation
After American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower (1 WTC) of the World Trade Center, a standard announcement was given to tenants in the South Tower (2 WTC) to stay put and that the building was secure. However, many defied those instructions and proceeded to evacuate the South Tower (most notably, Rick Rescorla, Security Director at Morgan Stanley, evacuated 2,687 of the 2,700 Morgan Stanley employees in the building). People evacuating from WTC 2 were ordered up from the lobby level to a door on the mezzanine level that led to a covered footbridge over West Street to a building complex then called the World Financial Center. People evacuating from WTC 1 were directed from the lobby level through the WTC shopping mall beneath the outdoor plaza. The firefighters directing evacuees did not want anyone going through the front doors because of falling debris and falling people.
Standard evacuation procedures for fires in the World Trade Center called for evacuating only the floors immediately above and below the fire, as simultaneous evacuation of up to 50,000 workers would be too chaotic.
Emergency response
Firefighters
Firefighters from the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) rushed to the World Trade Center minutes after the first plane struck the North Tower. Chief Joseph W. Pfeifer and his crew with Battalion 1 were among the first on the scene (Battalion 1 was the first Unit to notify the Manhattan Central Office.). Engine 10 and Ladder 10 were also some of the first on scene because their firehouse was directly across the street from the Towers. At 8:50 a.m., an Incident Command Post was established in the lobby of the North Tower. By 9:00 a.m., shortly before United Airlines Flight 175 hit the South Tower, the FDNY chief had arrived and taken over command of the response operations. Concerned about falling debris, he moved the incident command center to a spot located across West Street, but numerous fire chiefs remained in the lobby which continued to serve as an operations post where alarms, elevators, communications systems, and other equipment were operated. The initial response by the FDNY was on rescue and evacuation of building occupants, which involved sending firefighters up to assist people that were trapped in elevators and elsewhere. Firefighters were also required to ensure all floors were completely evacuated.
Numerous staging areas were set up near the World Trade Center, where responding fire units could report and get deployment instructions. However, many firefighters arrived at the World Trade Center without stopping at the staging areas, partly because at 8:48 a.m. Battalion 1 transmitted a Third Alarm and ordered third alarm units to the Staging Area and second alarm units to the Towers. As a result, many chiefs could not keep track of the whereabouts of their units. Numerous firefighters reported directly to the building lobbies and were ordered by those commanding the operating post to proceed into the building.
Problems with radio communication caused commanders to lose contact with many of the firefighters who went into the buildings. The repeater system in the World Trade Center, which was required for portable radio signals to transmit reliably, was malfunctioning after the impact of the planes. As a result, firefighters were unable to report to commanders on their progress, and were unable to hear evacuation orders. In addition, many off-duty firefighters arrived to help without their radios. FDNY commanders lacked communication with the New York City Police Department (NYPD), who had helicopters at the scene, or with Emergency Medical Services (EMS) dispatchers. The firefighters on the scene also did not have access to television reports or other outside information, which could help in assessing the situation. When the South Tower collapsed at 9:59 a.m., firefighters in the North Tower were not aware of exactly what happened. The battalion chief in the North Tower lobby immediately issued an order over the radio for firefighters in the tower to evacuate, but many did not hear the order on the faulty radios. Because of this, 342 firefighters died in the collapse of the towers.
The command post located across West Street was taken out when the South Tower collapsed, making command and control even more difficult and disorganized. When the North Tower collapsed, falling debris killed Peter Ganci, the FDNY chief. Following the collapse of the World Trade Center, a command post was set up at a firehouse in Greenwich Village.
The FDNY deployed more than 200 units (about half of all units) to the site, with more than 400 firefighters on the scene when the buildings collapsed. This included a total of 121 engine companies, 62 ladder companies, and other special units. The FDNY also received assistance from fire departments in Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester County, and other neighboring jurisdictions, but with limited ability to manage and coordinate efforts. Besides assisting with recovery operations at Ground Zero, volunteer firefighters from Long Island and Westchester manned numerous firehouses throughout the city to assist with other fire and emergency calls. Steve Buscemi helped as a volunteer the day after the attacks.
Doctors, EMS, and other medical staff FDNY emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and paramedics, along with 9-1-1 system ambulances operated by voluntary hospitals and volunteer ambulance corps, began arriving at 8:53 a.m., and quickly set up a staging area outside the North Tower, at West Street, which was quickly moved over to the corner of Vesey and West Streets. As more providers responded to the scene, five triage areas were set up around the World Trade Center site. EMS chiefs experienced difficulties communicating via their radios because of the overwhelming volume of radio traffic. At 9:45, an additional dispatch channel was set aside for use by chiefs and supervisors only, but many did not know about this and continued to operate on the other channel. The communication difficulties meant that commanders lacked good situational awareness.
Dispatchers at the 9-1-1 call center, who coordinate EMS response and assign units, were overwhelmed with incoming calls, as well as communications over the radio system. Dispatchers were unable to process and make sense of all the incoming information, including information from people trapped in the towers, about conditions on the upper floors. Overwhelmed dispatchers were unable to effectively give instructions and manage the situation.
EMS personnel were in disarray after the collapse of the South Tower at 9:59 a.m. Following the collapse of the North Tower at 10:28 a.m., EMS commanders regrouped on the North End of Battery Park City, at the Embassy Suites Hotel. Around 11:00 a.m., EMS triage centers were relocated and consolidated at the Chelsea Piers and the Staten Island Ferry Terminal. Throughout the early afternoon, the soundstages at the pier were separated into two areas, one for the more seriously injured and one for the walking wounded. On the acute side, multiple makeshift tables, each with a physician, nurse, and other health care workers, and non-emergency service volunteers, were set up for the arrival of mass casualties.
Supplies, including equipment for airway and vascular control, were obtained from neighboring hospitals. Throughout the afternoon, local merchants arrived to donate food. Despite this, few patients arrived for treatment, the earliest at about 5 p.m. around the time that Building 7 collapsed, and were not seriously injured, being limited to smoke inhalation. An announcement was made around 6–7 p.m. that a second shift of providers would cover the evening shift, and that an area was being set up for the day personnel to sleep. Soon after, when it was realized that few would have survived the collapse and be brought to the piers, many decided to leave and the area was closed down.
Police
The New York City Police Department (NYPD) quickly responded with the Emergency Service Units (ESU) and other responders after the crash of American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower. The NYPD set up its incident command center at Church Street and Vesey Street, on the opposite side of the World Trade Center from where the FDNY was commanding its operations. NYPD helicopters were soon at the scene, reporting on the status of the burning buildings. When the buildings collapsed, 23 NYPD officers were killed, along with 37 Port Authority Police Department officers. The NYPD helped facilitate the evacuation of civilians out of Lower Manhattan, including approximately 5,000 civilians evacuated by the Harbor Unit to Staten Island and to New Jersey. In ensuing days, the police department worked alternating 12-hour shifts to help in the rescue and recovery efforts.
Coast Guard, maritime industry, individual boat owners
Immediately after the first attack, the captains and crews of a large number of local boats steamed into the attack zone to assist in evacuation. These ships had responded to a request from the U.S. Coast Guard to help evacuate those stranded on Manhattan Island. Others, such as the John J. Harvey, provided supplies and water, which became urgently needed after the Towers' collapse severed downtown water mains. The Coast Guard Auxiliary helped lead a massive maritime evacuation with estimates of the number of people evacuated by water from Lower Manhattan that day in the eight-hour period following the attacks ranging from 500,000 to 1,000,000. Norman Mineta, Secretary of Transportation during the attacks, called the efforts "the largest maritime evacuation conducted in the United States". The evacuation was the largest maritime evacuation or "boatlift" in history by most estimates, passing the nine-day evacuation of Dunkirk during World War II. As many as 2,000 people injured in the attacks were evacuated by these means.
Amateur radio
Amateur radio played a role in the rescue and clean-up efforts. Amateur radio operators established communications, maintained emergency networks, and formed bucket brigades with hundreds of other volunteer personnel. Approximately 500 amateur radio operators volunteered their services during the disaster and recovery.
The New Jersey Legislature honored the role of amateur radio operators in a proclamation on December 12, 2002.
Note: Government exhibits are from the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui.
Search and rescue efforts On the day following the attacks, eleven people were rescued from the rubble, including six firefighters and three police officers. One woman was rescued from the rubble, near where a West Side Highway pedestrian bridge had been. Two PAPD officers, John McLoughlin and Will Jimeno, were also rescued. Discovered by former U.S. Marines Jason Thomas and Dave Karnes, McLoughlin and Jimeno were pulled out alive after spending nearly 24 hours beneath of rubble. Their rescue was later portrayed in the 2006 film World Trade Center. In total, twenty survivors were pulled out of the rubble. The final survivor, Port Authority secretary Genelle Guzman-McMillan, was rescued 27 hours after the collapse of the North Tower.