The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, commonly referred to as the Russian Armed Forces, are the military of Russia. They are organised into three service branches—the Ground Forces, Navy, and Aerospace Forces—three independent combat arms (the Strategic Rocket Forces, Airborne Forces and Unmanned Systems Forces) and the Special Operations Forces Command.IISS, The Military Balance 2022, 201.
The Russian Armed Forces are the world's fifth-largest military force, with about one million active-duty personnel and close to two million reservists. They maintain the world's largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, possess the world's second-largest fleet of ballistic missile submarines, and are the only armed forces outside the United States and China that operate strategic bombers. As of 2025, Russia has the world's third-highest military expenditure, at approximately US$190 billion, or 7.5 percent of GDP.
The Russian military is a hybrid system that combines conscripts with contracted volunteers; with certain exceptions, Russian law mandates one year of military service for all male citizens aged 18–27. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book: Russia Despite efforts to professionalise its ranks since the early 2000s,Russian Military Personnel Policy and Proficiency: Reforms and Trends, 1991–2021 ; Anika Binnendijk, Dara Massicot, Anthony Atler, John J. Drennan, Khrystyna Holynska, Katya Migacheva, Marek N. Posard, Yuliya Shokh; published 15 August 2023. it remains heavily reliant on conscripts, with contract soldiers being concentrated in cadre and elite units. In the years before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Ground Forces were ordered to create battalion tactical groups out of enlisted soldiers, separating them from conscript units. These were kept at a higher state of readiness and could be deployed outside of Russia under Russian law.
Despite its perceived military strength, deficiencies have been noted in Russia's overall combat performance and its ability to effectively project hard power.Russian Military Performance and Outlook Congressional Research Services. Updated 10 October 2024. Brass tacks: Why Russia's military fails to reform, European Council on Foreign Relations, 15 May 2024 Global Maritime Power? Russia's Navy faces an uncertain future, Universidad de Navarra, 10 June 2022 Moscow's Aerospace Forces: No air of superiority, International Institute for Strategic Studies 7 February 2024 Logistics and Sustainment in the Russian Armed Forces, Rand Corporation, 15 November 2023 The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war has exposed weaknesses such as endemic corruption, rigid command and control structure,Russian Military Performance and Outlook Congressional Research Services. Updated 10 October 2024. inadequate training,Russia's Ground Forces Poorly Trained and Using Antiquated Equipment: U.K., NewsWeek, updated 16 May 2023 and poor morale.Russian Military Performance and Outlook Congressional Research Service. Updated 10 October 2024. The Russian Armed Forces have experienced successive losses of occupied/annexed territory, the large-scale destruction and squandering of their equipment, and a notably high casualty rate. Western analysts have observed that Russia continues struggling with military professionalisation, but remains capable of rapidly reconstituting its capabilities and has "combat experience."
Directly controlled by the Security Council of Russia, the Russian Armed Forces form part of the country's defence services under Russian law, fulfilling this capacity alongside the Border Guard of the Federal Security Service, the National Guard, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Protective Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations.
History
Formation and early history (1991–2008) The Soviet Union officially dissolved on 25 December 1991. For the next year various attempts to keep its unity and to transform the Soviet Armed Forces into the military of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) failed. Over time, some units stationed in the newly independent republics swore loyalty to their new national governments, while a series of treaties between the newly independent states divided up the military's assets. Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov worked to create a unified CIS armed forces, but President Boris Yeltsin established the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation in May 1992.
On 7 May 1992, Yeltsin signed a decree establishing the Russian Armed Forces and assumed the duties of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Colonel General Pavel Grachev became the Minister of Defence, and was promoted as Russia's first general of the army on assuming the post. By the end of 1993, the CIS military structures had become military cooperation structures.The Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation was established as the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command in March 1992 and then reorganised as the Coordinating Staff in August 1993. It quickly became a very weak body as the new states' authorities asserted their control over their own armed forces. (Russia and NIS Mineral Industry Handbook, International Business Publications, 2007.) Army General Vladimir Yakovlev (general) appears to have become Chief of the Staff in June 2001 (DS2002-0819). Grachev and his allies worked to undermine Shaposhnikov, and there was opposition to his efforts from the newly independent states. The May 1992 creation of the Russian Ministry of Defence was the practical end of the Soviet military; Shaposhnikov and his small staff were evicted from the Soviet General Staff and Defence Ministry buildings in central Moscow, being sent to the former Warsaw Pact headquarters on the city's outskirts. The pretence of the CIS armed forces continued until June 1993, when the Russian Defence Ministry refused to provide necessary funding for it, and Shaposhnikov resigned as its commander-in-chief.
Apart from assuming control of the bulk of the former Soviet Internal Troops and the KGB Border Troops, seemingly the only independent defence move the new Russian government made before March 1992 involved announcing the establishment of a National Guard.For some early discussion on this period, see Richard Woff, "A Russian Army", Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1992, 198-200. See also Voenniy vestnik No 12, 1991. Until 1995, it was planned to form at least 11 brigades numbering 3,000 to 5,000 each, with a total of no more than 100,000. National Guard military units were to be deployed in 10 regions, including in Moscow (three brigades), (two brigades), and a number of other important cities and regions. In Moscow alone 15,000 personnel expressed their desire to service in the new Russian Army, mostly former Soviet Armed Forces servicemen. In the end, President Yeltsin tabled a decree "On the temporary position of the Russian Guard", but it was not put into practice. During the 1990s twelve other agencies besides the Ministry of Defence also had military formations, and were known as "power ministries."
In the next few years, Russian forces withdrew from central and eastern Europe, as well as from some newly independent post-Soviet states. Under agreements signed with several states, the last forces were withdrawn from most of these regions by 31 August 1994. Soviet nuclear forces were either dismantled or returned to Russia under agreements with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, while the conventional forces caused more issues. Although the withdrawal was largely peaceful, and entire units were moved piecemeal to the Russian Federation, some units remained in newly independent countries, such as the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine's Crimea, the 14th Army in Moldova's Transnistria, and other units in Georgia and Tajikistan. Some of them became involved in local ethnic or political conflicts. Russia continues to have several bases in foreign countries, especially in the former Soviet republics.
During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, reforms to the military focused on reductions in personnel and restructuring of the armed services. In 1992 there were five branches: the Ground Forces, the Air Force, the Navy, the Strategic Missile Forces, and the Air Defence Forces. By 2001, the Air Defence Forces were combined into the Air Force, and the Strategic Missile Forces were reduced to an independent combat arm. In the late 1990s there was a debate between Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin and Minister of Defence Igor Sergeyev on whether to prioritise funding to conventional or nuclear forces. The nuclear forces were deemed more important, and a result, the Navy, Air Force, and Air Defence Forces were cut in half, and the Ground Forces saw the largest reduction, by two-thirds. The military's overall strength was reduced from 2,720,000 in 1992 to 1,004,000 in 2000. In the same time period, the Ground Forces were cut from 1,400,000 to 348,000; the Air Force and Air Defence Forces from 300,000 and 356,000, respectively, to a combined 184,600; the Navy from 320,000 to 171,500; and the Strategic Missile Forces from 181,000 to 149,000. The Airborne Forces were reduced from 64,300 to 48,500 in the late 1990s. In 1998 the post of Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief was temporarily abolished, and replaced by a Ground Forces directorate.
There were widespread social and economic problems caused by the sudden arrival of troops at bases in Russia that did not have accommodations for them, and by drastic military spending cuts as Russia faced an economic crisis during its transition to a market economy. This led to a severe decline in discipline, with crime and the already-existing hazing of conscripts (dedovshchina) becoming more common, which in turn led to draft dodging. Many officers and sergeants left the military. Equipment maintenance and training also drastically declined. As of 1998, there had been no exercises above the division level since 1992, and annual flight hours for pilots were reduced to 25, far less than in NATO states. The military's decline was evident during the First Chechen War from 1994 to 1996, when it was unable subdue separatists in Russia's Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Internationally, Russia deployed forces to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for peacekeeping starting from 1992, and to Kosovo from 1999.
The Russian Armed Forces inherited the Soviet era mass mobilisation structure, designed to use reservists to fight a major war involving mechanised deep operations. Pavel Grachev, who was the defence minister until 1996, proposed the creation of a fully manned and equipped high-readiness "mobile force" that could be quickly deployed to conflict zones, but this was unsuccessful. What did occur in the second half of the 1990s was the creation of "permanent ready forces," which had better manning and equipment levels, and these were used with success during the Second Chechen War from 1999 to 2004.
The military in the early presidency of Vladimir Putin still largely had the mass mobilisation structure and Soviet era equipment. Under Putin, the Security Council became the dominant institution coordinating national security policy, limiting the influence of the Defence Ministry and General Staff, and creating a more unified command than had existed in the Yeltsin years. The state armaments programme of 2002 recognised that most orders went unfulfilled during the 1990s, and instead prioritised research and development, with procurement of new equipment scheduled to begin after 2008. Corruption is also a significant impediment to the Armed Forces. In January 2008, senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment Tor Bukkvoll said "The change from Yeltsin to Putin had minimal effect on Russian military corruption. Putin, despite his desire to rebuild Russian strength, has not shown himself willing or able to seriously deal with corruption.″
Serdyukov reform (2008–2012)