The Tet Offensive was both a major escalation and one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War. The North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and the Viet Cong (VC) launched a surprise attack on 30 and 31 January 1968 against the forces of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the United States Armed Forces and their allies, targeting military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam.Ang, p. 351. Two interpretations of the offensive's goals have continued to dominate Western historical debate. The first maintained the political consequences of the winter-spring offensive were an intended rather than an unintended consequence. This view was supported by William Westmoreland and Jamie Salt in A Soldier Reports, Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1976, p. 322; Harry G. Summers in On Strategy, Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1982, p. 133; Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979, pp. 333–334; and Schmitz p. 90. This thesis appeared logical in hindsight, but it "fails to account for any realistic North Vietnamese military objectives, the logical prerequisite for an effort to influence American opinion." James J. Wirtz in The Tet Offensive, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 18. The second thesis (which was also supported by the majority of contemporary captured VC documents) was the goal of the offensive was the immediate toppling of the Saigon government or, at the very least, the destruction of the government apparatus, the installation of a coalition government, or the occupation of large tracts of South Vietnamese territory. Historians supporting this view are Stanley Karnow in Vietnam, New York: Viking, 1983, p. 537; U.S. Grant Sharp in Strategy for Defeat, San Rafael CA: Presidio Press, 1978, p. 214; Patrick McGarvey in Visions of Victory, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1969; and Wirtz, p. 60. The name is the truncated version of the Lunar New Year festival name in Vietnamese, Tết Nguyên Đán, a holiday period when most ARVN personnel were on leave. The North Vietnamese Politburo and leader Lê Duẩn intended to trigger political instability and hoped that mass armed assaults on urban centers would trigger defections and uprisings.
The offensive was launched prematurely in the early morning hours of 30 January in large parts of the I and II Corps Tactical Zones of South Vietnam. This allowed allied forces some time to prepare defensive measures. When the main operation began during the early morning of 31 January, the offensive was countrywide; 77,000 PAVN/VC troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns, and the capital Saigon.Dougan and Weiss It was the largest military operation conducted by either side to that point in the war.
Hanoi launched the offensive in the belief it would trigger a popular uprising leading to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Although the initial attacks stunned the allies and they lost control of several cities temporarily, they quickly regrouped, repelled the attacks, and inflicted heavy casualties on PAVN/VC forces. The popular uprising anticipated by Hanoi never materialized. During the Battle of Huế, intense fighting lasted for a month, resulting in the destruction of the city. During its occupation, PAVN/VC forces executed thousands of people in the Massacre at Huế. Around the American combat base at Khe Sanh, fighting continued for two more months.
The offensive was a military defeat for North Vietnam, and neither uprisings nor ARVN unit defections occurred in South Vietnam. However, it had far-reaching consequences on the views of the Vietnam War held by the American public and the international community. The offensive had a strong effect on the U.S. government and shocked the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the North Vietnamese were being defeated and incapable of launching such an ambitious military operation. American public support for the war declined as a result of the Tet casualties and the escalation of draft calls. Subsequently, the Johnson administration sought negotiations to end the war. Shortly before the 1968 United States presidential election, Republican candidate and former vice president Richard Nixon discouraged South Vietnamese president Nguyễn Văn Thiệu from cooperating in the negotiations, to cast doubt on Johnson's ability to bring peace.
The name "Tet Offensive" usually refers to the January–February 1968 offensive, but also can be extended to cover all of the 21 weeks of intense combat after the initial attacks in January (including the "Mini-Tet" offensive in May), or the Phase III offensive in August.
Background South Vietnam political context The years prior to the Tet Offensive were marked by political instability and a series of coups after the 1963 South Vietnamese coup. In 1966, the leadership in South Vietnam, represented by the Head of State Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ were persuaded to commit to democratic reforms in an effort to stabilize the political situation during a conference in Honolulu. Prior to 1967, the South Vietnamese constituent assembly was in the process of drafting a new constitution and setting eventual elections. After the 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election, the South Vietnamese political situation looked increasingly stable. Rivalries between the generals were becoming less chaotic, and Thiệu and Kỳ formed a joint ticket for the election. Despite efforts by North Vietnam to disrupt elections, higher than usual turnouts marked a shift towards a more democratic structure and ushered in a period of political stability after the instability that had characterized the preceding years.
Protests, campaigning, and the atmosphere of elections were interpreted by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam and Lê Duẩn as signs the population would embrace a 'general uprising' against the government of South Vietnam. The Politburo sought to exploit perceived instability and maintain political weakness in South Vietnam.
United States war strategy
During late 1967, the question of whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), believed that if a "crossover point" could be reached, meaning the number of communist troops killed or captured during military operations exceeded those recruited or replaced, the Americans would win the war. There was a discrepancy, however, between the order of battle estimates of the MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning the strength of VC guerrilla forces within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used by the administration to gauge U.S. success in the conflict.
Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall collected during Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City, the CIA members of the group believed the number of VC guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained the number could be no more than 300,000. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about the possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings.Hammond, p. 326. According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General Joseph A. McChristian, the new figures "would create a political bombshell", since they demonstrated the North Vietnamese "had the capability and the will to continue a protracted war of attrition".
In May, MACV attempted to reach a compromise with the CIA by maintaining VC militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low-level fifth columnists used for information collection. With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, represented the CIA in the last stage of the negotiations. In September, Carver devised a compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate explaining the agency's position.Hammond, pp. 326, 327. George Allen, Carver's deputy, placed responsibility for the agency's capitulation with Richard Helms, the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem ... [Helms] didn't want the agency ... contravening the policy interest of the administration."
During the second half of 1967, the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies.Those in the administration and the military who urged a change in strategy included: Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara; Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach; Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy; Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge; General Creighton W. Abrams, deputy commander of MACV; and Lieutenant General Frederick C. Weyand, commander of II Field Force, Vietnam. Lewis Sorley, A Better War. New York: Harvest Books, 1999, p. 6. Throughout the year, according to the Pentagon Papers, Johnson had discounted any "negative analysis" of U.S. strategy by the CIA and the Pentagon offices of International Security Affairs and System Analysis, and had instead "seized upon optimistic reports from General Westmoreland." Neil Sheehan, et al. The Pentagon Papers as Reported by the New York Times. New York: Ballantine, 1971, p. 592. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling there was no end to the war in sight.Karnow, pp. 545–546. A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win—or get out."Karnow, p. 546. This prompted the administration to launch a so-called "success offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow, the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism.